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Abstract 
 
 
What is absent in much of the literature on executive compensation reform is a deeper 
appreciation of the shift that has occurred since the latest financial crisis away from 
performance-based corporate governance arrangements to an approach that seeks to put the 
brakes on a runaway train, the shareholder value model and its relentless pursuit of shareholder 
wealth at all costs. By situating this debate into a broader discussion of corporate purpose, 
corporate governance and the law’s role in how business corporations are run in their social, 
economic and political environment this project seeks to shed some light onto what really is at 
stake in this debate, whether the existing shareholder primacy paradigm for conceptualizing and 
fashioning a solution for constraining managerial power in the firm is a viable solution moving 
forward from the crisis. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
Introduction 
“In the day of the free market, where our country was the top industrial power, there was 
accountability to the stockholder…because it was their money at stake…today, management has 
no stake in the company…altogether, these men up here [referring to directors and managers], own 
less than 3% of the company…you own the company…that’s right, you the stockholder, you are 
being royally screwed over by these bureaucrats, with their estate palaces, their hunting and fishing 
trips, their corporate jets and golden parachutes…the new law in corporate America seems to be 
survival of the un-fittest…well in my book, you either do it right or get eliminated…I am not a 
destroyer of companies, I am a liberator of them…the point is ladies and gentlemen, that greed, 
for lack of better words, is good.” (Gordon Gekko, 1987, Wall Street The Movie) 
 
SECTION A 
Almost five years have passed since the global financial crisis began and many economies 
are still feeling its devastating effects. In addition to slower than anticipated economic recovery in 
the United States, it is unclear what lessons if any were learned in the corporate governance realm 
and whether changes implemented in the wake of the crisis had any substantive impact on lowering 
risk-taking and encouraging firm sustainability. When the US economy does eventually recover, 
we will again be faced with the question of how the next scandal or crisis can be averted. It is 
crucial not to let recent history casually slip by and to further avail ourselves of the opportunity 
for learning and reform.  
Being at centre stage of the regulatory narrative that unfolded after the crisis, the story of 
executive compensation in the liberal market context has remained relatively unchanged. While 
CEO pay in the US remains staggeringly high, other market economies have seen a stabilization 
of pay levels and a recent trend towards reforming developments which previously militated 
towards US style, market-driven compensation packages. Germany is just one example where 
executive compensation has been tied to the sustainability of the corporation and amongst other 
things has incorporated the interests of other groups that are essential to the firm's success and to 
the smooth functioning of the broader political economy. Consequently Germany has emerged as 
an economic leader on the European scene in light of Europe's deep financial troubles.   
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While the crisis presented a multitude of opportunities to further advance the case against 
shareholder primacy, the executive compensation debate never quite escaped the confines of 
agency theory, as the dominant analytical framework. Even with the staggering blows dealt by 
progressive corporate law scholarship to shareholder primacy's cause, the compensation debate 
continues to be framed from this perspective, reproducing a narrow set of discourses that have 
yielded relatively limited results.  
What is absent in much of the literature on executive compensation reform is a deeper 
appreciation of the shift that has occurred since the latest financial crisis away from performance-
based corporate governance arrangements to an approach that seeks to put the brakes on a runaway 
train, the shareholder value model and its relentless pursuit of shareholder wealth at all costs. By 
situating this debate into a broader discussion of corporate purpose, corporate governance and the 
law’s role in how business corporations are run in their social, economic and political environment 
this project seeks to shed some light onto what really is at stake in this debate, whether the existing 
shareholder primacy paradigm for conceptualizing and fashioning a solution for constraining 
managerial power in the firm is a viable solution moving forward from the crisis. 
This work seeks to step outside the narrow law and economics paradigm from which 
executive compensation has been problematized since at least the 1990's. By disentangling the 
separate lines of argument inherent in the executive compensation debate and viewing these in a 
forum where their interrelation can be adequately assessed, we can highlight the various interests 
at play and the broader significance of how executive compensation has been problematized to 
critically assess whether the existing dominant paradigm can be sustained in light of the 
prospective changes to corporate governance that post crisis compensation reform has identified, 
mainly the need to operate large public corporations sustainably and in the public interest.   
The broader dimensions of this debate can be assessed by first situating the parallel and 
sometimes competing narratives on executive compensation into a wider corporate legal 
framework. By then tracing the evolution of this framework and the compensation issue within it, 
we begin to see today's debate as a particular point in the trajectory of corporate law and how the 
firm is governed. The picture which emerges is one where the debate over compensation in the 
1990's was at the centre of a key shift in governance thinking characterized by a drastic re-thinking 
of the business corporation's legal nature, the role that law should play and how the rights and 
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duties of actors are defined.  
This shift is representative of competing views between the role that mandatory norms of 
behaviour should play versus the prospects of performance and efficiency based norms of 
governance. With the purported limitations of trust and loyalty based norms for solving the 
problem of managerial performance, the vulnerability of shareholders under the framework of 
corporate law and the putative inadequacies of corporate law's division of power, the shift to a 
performance-based model of governance is seen as a repudiation of corporate law's key attributes. 
Excessive executive pay is a symptom of these broader limitations and solutions within this 
paradigm for addressing it, namely by reducing its size and constraining profit-maximization, are 
seen as contributing to the ongoing set of problems facing shareholders. 
Going further back however, it is crucial to understand the strengths and prospects of this 
model, and the previously articulated challenges of protecting society from the far-reaching effects 
of managerial power it was tasked with solving, as expressed in the post-Great Depression debate 
over who corporations should be run for. In this context we can gain an understanding of the role 
served by the existing division of power and legally and structurally entrenched Board discretion. 
We can then understand the larger corporate governance problem represented by executive pay in 
this context and only after assessing more broadly the strengths and weaknesses of this model can 
we approach the issue of what is going in the post-crisis context and how executive compensation 
has played a central role. Only then can we begin to see the consequences of shifting away from 
the former model and of overemphasizing the latter, how the gradual evolution of this approach 
led us to where we are now and how the goals that each approach seeks to achieve conflict, with 
significant consequences for corporate governance.  
Yet the lens for assessing the current state of corporate governance is not complete. 
Building on this historical corporate legal analysis comparative political economy necessarily 
allows us to further broaden the scope of inquiry, this time revealing the contentious relationships 
and political contestations between the interests of actors inherent in the differing approaches to 
constraining managerial power and to conceptualizing the legal nature of the firm. 
What begins to emerge is not only a bigger picture of the executive compensation debate 
as a political contest between economic actors over who's interests the firm should run in and how 
the risks and benefits of economic activity distributed, but also a contest between broader political 
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forces of finance and labour over instituting the self-regulating market versus measures aimed at 
social protection. This enlarged perspective of the compensation debate allows us to engage with 
neo-classical economic assumptions which underpin the existing debate and make it challenging 
to step outside of it and critique compensation from any other perspective, other than to adjust and 
improve the various performance-based mechanisms from within the framework to avoid another 
crisis.  
In many respects the status quo approach to compensation reform which entails working 
within this paradigm represents the fundamental point of contention over how our system of 
political economy should be organized and which improvements to it will ultimately prevail. It is 
crucial to step outside this box and assess whether the latest crisis and the role that our current 
approach to corporate governance has played in it, namely through executive pay, has highlighted 
the inherent shortcomings of the model's current place in its trajectory.  
Thus the other role of comparative political economy in shedding light on the current state 
of affairs is to help broaden our understanding of the impetus behind and consequences of the 
previous shift to a more liberal form of market capitalism, the limitation of the approach before, 
and the prospects and limitations of the existing approach. This culminates in the question, “how 
far can liberal market capitalism be ultimately pushed before it breaks and are we at that point with 
the current state of corporate governance?” 
The final step then to complete this assessment is to look beyond common, technically 
based distinctions of rules versus principles based regulation to gain a deeper understanding of 
what post-crisis regulatory responses represent and how differences in the approaches of two major 
economies, the United States and Germany can be accounted for. Examining their responses to the 
crisis in light of how these changes stand to impact the management orientations of some of the 
world's largest corporations, reveals in certain respects that the shareholder primacy based 
paradigm is incapable of carrying out what post-crisis reform is calling for, to run public 
corporations sustainably for the benefit of shareholders as well as in the public interest. A more 
balanced approach is needed within the liberal market context between emphasizing the profit 
motive and constraining the actions of managers through legal norms of behaviour that are more 
inclusive of a wider set of interests.  
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SECTION B 
 The recent string of corporate scandals and crises that have plagued our economic 
systems have reminded us of the far reaching effects of corporate power on economic and social 
welfare and have highlighted the integral nature of the business corporation as an institution of 
contemporary capitalism.  Like before, questions have been raised over what drives corporate 
decision-making and what influences a corporation’s values and priorities.  During the past two 
decades we have witnessed a progressive but influential shift in the role of the business 
corporation in Anglo-American society in the context a changing political economy marked by a 
shift from industrial to financial capitalism. 1 This in turn has cast a spotlight on the dynamic that 
exists between the various corporate constituents that influence and are impacted by the 
outcomes of corporate activity and in particular has highlighted that these interests are often 
juxtaposed in the contemporary context of financial capitalism.  The trade-offs between these 
interests inherent in how business corporations have been managed recently draws attention to 
how the risks and benefits of corporate activity are managed and distributed amongst the 
corporation’s various stakeholders and how this impacts our economic and social welfare.  This 
coupled with the devastating effects of the most recent financial crisis prompts us urgently to re-
evaluate the set of arrangements that have underpinned our economic systems.  
 At a fundamental level corporations are not only sites where economic actors coalesce to 
engage in exchange and voluntary contracting for the purposes of meeting their individual needs 
and achieving a collective set of economic goals but also organizations in civil society that wield 
tremendous amounts of power and influence over our individual and societal welfare. 2  In most 
industrialized democratic societies the state through its various organs has an interest in both the 
benefits that business corporations create such as innovation, employment, and the provision of 
valuable products and services and the potential harms caused by corporations to the commons 
and to the interests of those who contribute to and rely upon their success and continuity. 3  The 
role of the state in this regard has varied from interpreting, mediating and enforcing the various 
contractual arrangements between corporate actors to facilitating and reinforcing processes for 
                                                 
1  Sanford M. Jacoby, “Labor and finance in the United States” in Cynthia A. Williams and P. Zumbansen, The 
Embedded Firm (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
2  David Sciulli, Corporate Power in Civil Society: An Application of Societal Constitutionalism (New York: NYU Press, 
2001). 
3  Ibid. 
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corporate actors to follow and structure themselves by and finally to legislating the behavior of 
actors as a means of protecting the interests of a particular group. 4 
 Corporate governance as both a study and a practice focuses on mediating the source of 
power in the corporation for the private benefit of those who contribute to and derive benefit 
from this type of organization and also for the protection of those who are impacted by the 
corporation’s activities but are not direct participants in its governance. 5 Corporate governance 
deals both with the practices engaged in by those who exercise power in the corporation and 
partake in its management and with the network of legal and economic factors that constrain or 
facilitate how these actors behave. From a broader perspective, corporate governance is a narrow 
yet decisively important aspect of how a political economy is organized and for that matter 
integrated into an increasingly interconnected global market society. 6 In sum, the types of 
corporate governance arrangements present at the national level represent a particular set of 
solutions and compromises to the conflicts and tensions that arise between actors engaging 
within and around the business corporation in its contemporary context. 7 
 The latest financial crisis demonstrates just how serious the implications of such 
economic arrangements can be not only at the national level but also trans-nationally as 
evidenced by the widespread effects of the financial meltdown in the U.S. banking sector and the 
unprecedented level of regulatory responses at the national and supranational levels aimed at 
correcting the perceived imbalances and deficiencies in how these arrangements are structured. 8  
This further highlights the integral role that such institutions play in our economic and social 
welfare and the necessity of properly balancing the need to facilitate the contribution and 
participation of a particular set of corporate actors with the need to constrain a particular range of 
behaviours of these actors in the course of their involvement in corporate activity.  In the context 
of financial capitalism in much of Anglo-American world the balance not surprisingly has 
favoured the relentless pursuit of shareholder wealth at the expense of a wide range of other 
                                                 
4  Jacoby, supra note 1; Simon Deakin,”Corporate Governance and Financial Crisis in the Long-Run” in Cynthia A. 
Williams and P. Zumbansen, The Embedded Firm (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 15-41; Kent Greenfield,  
5  Sciulli, supra note2; See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis (Washington 
DC: Beard Books, 1976. 
6  See Klaus Hopt, Hideki Handa, Mark J. Roe, Wymeersch and Stefan Prigge eds., Comparative Corporate 
Governance: The State of the Art in Emerging Research (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) at v.-ix. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Eilis Feran, Niamh Moloney, Jennifer G. Hill, John C. Coffee Jr., The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial 
Crisis (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge UK, 2012).  
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interests. 9  
 Executive compensation reform has been central to the post-crisis re-evaluation of 
corporate governance norms and practices. 10 The crisis has revealed the importance of the 
executive compensation issue to deeper questions of how the firm should be run.  Not only does 
executive compensation represent a set of governance arrangements that have particular 
consequences for how the risks and benefits of corporate activity are distributed but also how 
managerial power in the firm is constrained and to what end. 11 Executive compensations has 
played an important part of the equation of how a nation should approach and resolve the sets of 
issues that arise between the actors that are involved with, derive benefit from and contribute to 
the success of the business corporation in the context of its broader economic role. Executive 
compensation has the potential to act as a determinant of managerial behaviour and also serves 
as a mechanism for aligning the interests of corporate constituents into particular coalitions. 12  
On this basis, it has been used as a corporate governance mechanism for constraining the 
managerial power in the public corporation where ownership and control out of necessity are 
separate. 13 In sum, getting the compensation issue right is crucial to averting another crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9  Stout, infra note 16. 
10  See Hill, supra note 8. 
11  See Jacoby, supra note 1. 
12  Ibid. 
13  See Berle, infra note 188. 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
The Current Debate of Compensation Reform and This Work’s Contribution 
 
SECTION A: What This Work Is Trying to Achieve 
 The post-crisis debate over executive compensation, as some have argued, represents a 
possible turning point for the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance and an 
indicator of this model's limitations. 14 The aim of this work is to evaluate this premise. The key 
problems identified with the current state of compensation incentives aside from executive pay 
being excessive, are that compensation incentives aimed at increasing share price performance 
by stimulating greater risk taking and efficiency have led to chronic short-termism and excessive 
risk-taking in public corporations and more notably the financial sector, culminating in the 
collapse of systemically important financial institutions and leading perhaps to the greatest 
economic crisis since the Great Depression. 15 
 Corporate law scholarship has dealt a significant blow to the shareholder value norm 
since the financial crisis. 16 While several of these criticisms echo the weaknesses in governance 
that emerged after Enron, there are key differences in the post-crisis critique which strike to the 
heart of the current model's efficacy by challenging the prospects of self-regulation, performance 
based norms of conduct and the market as a governance tool. 17 Yet the post-crisis re-evaluation 
of executive compensation in the US is still being framed predominantly from within the agency 
theory paradigm. 18 The critique of the current approach has not extended this far, yet the 
development of executive compensation as governance tool is founded upon and inseparable 
                                                 
14  See Feran et al., supra note 8: See also Jennifer G. Hill, “Regulating executive remuneration after the global financial 
crisis: common law perspectives” in Randall S. Thomas and Jennifer G. Hill eds., Research Handbook on Executive Pay (Edward 
Elgar Publishing: UK, 2012) 219-240. 
15  Jaap Winter, “Corporate Governance Going Astray: Executive Remuneration Built to Fail” in Randall S. Thomas and 
Jennifer G. Hill eds., Research Handbook on Executive Pay (Edward Elgar Publishing: UK, 2012) 199-218; Sanjai Bhagat and 
Roberta Romano, “Reforming Financial Executives’ Compensation for the Long-Term” in in Randall S. Thomas and Jennifer G. 
Hill eds., Research Handbook on Executive Pay (Edward Elgar Publishing: UK, 2012) 136-158. 
16  Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, the Corporation and the 
Public (Berrett-Koehler Publishers: San Francisco, 2012).  
17  See David Millon, “Enlightened shareholder value, social responsibility and the re-definition of corporate purpose 
without law” in P.M. Vasudev and Susan Watson, Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 
2012) 68-100. 
18  See Romano, supra note 15; see also Yannick Hausmann and Elisabeth Bechtold-Orth, “Changing Remuneration 
Systems in Europe and the United States: A Legal Analysis of Recent Developments in the Wake of the Financial Crisis” (2010) 
11(2) European Business Organization L R 195.  
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from the shareholder primacy model and the shareholder value norm. If legislators, regulators 
and corporations themselves seek to develop and implement lasting reforms, it is imperative they 
examine compensation reform from outside this paradigm and not take for granted the 
foundations it rests upon might be poised to shift.  
 
SECTION B: Problems with the Current Debate 
 The ongoing debate over compensation reform in the US is framed from an agency 
theory perspective which accepts shareholder primacy's efficacy and unproblematic continued 
existence. 19 This entails the same intensity of reliance on capital markets and performance-based 
governance norms as before. Proponents of this model continue to argue that global responses to 
the compensation problem are rooted firmly within this paradigm, intimating that convergence of 
corporate governance to a liberal market based model persists. 20 However, there are several 
indicators, which will be examined herein, that the crisis has called into question various aspects 
of this approach. Corporate law scholarship has recently examined several aspects of the current 
model's weaknesses, namely the limitations of performance-based governance norms, the 
ineffectiveness of shareholder governance, and the inability of capital markets to signal that 
management's strategy is unsustainable or that the firm's existence is at risk. 21 The impact on 
other stakeholders of overemphasizing the profit motive has also been a central theme. The 
recent revival of an alternative theory to neoclassical economics called the Double-Movement 
has opened inquiries in this area which shed some light on recent events such as Enron, the 
Financial Crisis and the growing disparity of incomes in many liberal market economies. 22 
 The problems identified and norms disseminated by supranational bodies such as the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF), Council of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) and various 
shareholder and labour organizations reveal several key differences when compared with the 
                                                 
19  See also, Lucian A. Bebchuck and Holger Spamann, “Regulating Bankers’ Pay” (2010) 98(2) Georg L J 247. 
20  Hausmann and Bechtold-Orth, supra note 18. 
21  See Leonard I. Rotman, “Re-evaluating the basis for corporate governance in the post, post-Enron era” in P.M. 
Vasudev and Susan Watson, Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2012) 101-119; See 
also Millon, supra note 17; Jacoby, supra note 1, Deakin supra note 4. 
22  Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Farrar and Rinehart: 
1944); Jacoby, supra note 1. 
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post-Enron global response. 23 In the post-crisis regulatory environment the approach has shifted 
from improving managerial performance by encouraging greater profit-seeking and risk-taking 
towards ensuring that compensation incentives do not pose a risk management problem and 
encourage short-term gains at the expense of the corporation’s long-term viability. 24 This post-
crisis dimension of executive compensation reform and its focus on the societal effects of 
corporate power has unfolded at the transnational level. Having global ramifications, the crisis 
has spurred a need across several jurisdictions to put the brakes on a runaway train, the 
shareholder value norm and its relentless pursuit of shareholder wealth at all costs.  
Finally, the magnitude of required change that post-crisis compensation reform has 
identified, namely the need to run large corporations sustainably and in the public interest, raises 
questions of how this can be achieved within the existing paradigm. Several regulatory themes 
emerge from post-crisis regulation of executive pay, indicating a shift away from the current 
approach towards a more stakeholder-inclusive form of governance. 25 
 
SECTION C: The Promises of Agency Theory and Optimal Contracting 
 Before the 1990s during the period of 'managerialism' executive compensation was 
viewed as a potential governance problem in the firm. 26 The challenge was to ensure that the 
CEO was paid adequately for their talents but not excessively. 27 While this dimension of the 
debate still persists today, from the 1990’s onwards it has been viewed more dominantly as a 
mechanism for controlling managerial power. 28 While corporate law imposes mandatory duties 
onto directors to manage the corporation, executive pay has developed alongside statutory norms 
as a self-regulatory mechanism for constraining and harnessing managerial power and talent. 29 
 
                                                 
23  Guido Ferrarini and Maria Cristina Ungureanu, “Economics, Politics and International Principles for Sound 
Compensation Practices: An Analysis of Executive Pay at European Banks” (2011) 64 Vand L R 431. 
24  See Hill, supra note 14.  
25  Ibid. 
26  Charles M. Yablon, “Bonus Questions: Executive Compensation in the Era of Pay for Performance: (1999) 75 Notre 
Dame LR 271.  
27  Ibid. 
28  See Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, “CEO Incentives: It’s Not How Much You Pay But How” (2010) 68 
Harv Bus R 138.  
29  Ibid. 
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Compensation as a governance solution seeks to address managerial power in the firm. It 
defines managerial power narrowly in terms of agency costs, a lack of performance and risk-
taking. 30 Preoccupied with increasing the pursuit of profit and risk-taking this approach justifies 
significantly higher levels of pay as long as share price is increased. 31  It defines the principle-
agent problem as the propensity of managers to withhold maximum effort, play it safe, accept 
higher pay for lower performance and divert the firm's resources to non-productive, self-serving 
ends. It attempts to solve this by replicating for the executive shareholder's incentive for greater 
efficiency, risk and profit-seeking, as measured by market value. 32 Thus, profit maximization 
becomes the sole measure of good governance. This is based on the assumption that current 
share price is an accurate reflection of total firm value and that raising share price is the desirable 
outcome of properly functioning compensation incentives. 33 
 
SECTION D:  How This Governance Orthodoxy Has Now Been Challenged  
 The post-crisis response to compensation reform recognizes that the performance-based 
approach to addressing managerial power in the public corporation introduces a new set of 
problems into corporate governance. Executive compensation, as a solution to the agency 
problem has itself become a risk-management problem according to several post-crisis 
assessments. 34  There exists widespread recognition not only that the structure of pay can be 
flawed and fail to enhance shareholder value, but also that incentive compensation can lead 
executives to damage the corporation for the sake of short-term profits while harming a range of 
societal interests. 35 Corporate governance scholars have been preoccupied with the shareholder 
value model's outwards effects for quite some time. The CSR movement and its proponents have 
adeptly documented the externalities generated by profit maximization and corporate activity 
generally, namely the growing wealth, benefit and risk disparity between front-line workers and 
top management of public corporations as well as top income earners in associated finance-based 
                                                 
30  Jensen and Murphy, supra note 28;  
31  Jensen and Murphy, Ibid. 
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Hill, supra note 14.  
35  See Hill, Ibid; Romano, supra note 15; Bebchuk and Spamann, supra note 19. 
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occupations. 36 However, the crisis represents an additional problem. The outwards negative 
effects of profit maximization have gone so far as to overwhelm the checks and balances of the 
entire governance regime, leading many to comment that the governance by performance 
approach is unsustainable.   
 
SECTION E: How This Is Not Being Recognized 
Amongst post-crisis assessments of compensation systems and their reform, divergent 
views exist on what post-crisis responses represent. The minority view holds that executive 
compensation has undergone a paradigm shift away from the optimal contracting model and 
performance based norms of conduct. 37 This is viewed as a partial reversal of the shift in 
approach that occurred in the 1990's after law and economics thinking had been firmly 
established in corporate law and with the advent of the Jensen and Murphy's influential piece 
advocating that “it’s not how much you pay but how.”  38 
 However, the majority approach attempts to explain all post-crisis responses as being 
consistent with optimal contracting and fails to assess whether a paradigm shift is occurring. It 
acknowledges that post-crisis pay reform centres on reducing excessive risk-taking and 
promoting a long-term sustainable approach to running the firm, yet fails to consider the 
magnitude of this shift and what it actually entails in the liberal-market context. These are crucial 
starting points for determining how to proceed with effective and sustainable reform and for 
assessing whether the current shareholder primacy paradigm is equipped for dealing with the 
changes that post-crisis compensation reform has identified. Thus, to proceed with this project, it 
is essential to ask the following three questions: 
 
                                                 
36  See Kent Greenfield, “Saving the World With Corporate Law?” (April 3, 2007) Boston College Law School Research 
Paper No. 130, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=978242 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.978242: Jacoby, supra 
note 1; See also E. Merrick Dodd Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, (1932) 45 HARV L. REV 1145.   
37  See Hill, supra note 14.  
38  Jensen and Murphy, supra note 28. 
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 1. What is the magnitude of the current shift in governance thinking? 
 2. What does the required shift entail? 
 3. Is the shareholder primacy paradigm equipped to accommodate this shift? 
 
SECTION F: The Magnitude of the Current Shift 
 The overarching theme of controlling excessive risk-taking and advancing a longer term 
approach to running the firm calls forward an economic rationale on the part of directors that is 
inconsistent with efficiency and performance based norms of directorial conduct.  Despite the 
attempt by mainstream scholarship to reconcile some of the differences that appear in regulatory 
responses between jurisdictions as fitting within the optimal contracting paradigm, these 
differences, it is argued, represent fundamentally divergent approaches to market governance.  
 While this has potentially significant implications for the convergence-divergence debate 
which underlies post-crisis assessments of compensation reform, from a methodological 
standpoint the issue is two-fold. 39 First, it is important to assess whether differences in 
regulatory approach can be reconciled with shareholder primacy or whether they diverge.  The 
result of this determines the position we can take on whether corporate governance is continuing 
to converge towards a more liberal market based model or whether the approaches of certain 
jurisdictions are diverging.  
 While this in itself is instructive of shareholder primacy's efficacy in the post-crisis era, it 
does not demonstrate whether shareholder primacy in its own context reveals any internal 
consistencies with the need to constrain risk-taking and the pursuit of short-term profit. This 
gives rise to the second issue, whether post-crisis responses in the United States reveal at best a 
shift away from shareholder primacy and at least inconsistency with the need to run large public 
                                                 
39  For a seminal contribution to the convergence-divergence debate, see Jeffrey N. Gordon and Mark J. Roe eds., 
Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press: UK, 2004). 
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corporations sustainably and in the public interest. Here we ask a principle research question, 
how do post-crisis regulatory responses to compensation reform stand to impact the management 
orientations of large public companies in liberal and coordinated market economies? We examine 
the United States and Germany with respect to the regulation of executive compensation.  
 We find that regulatory responses in Germany reinforce stakeholder-based norms of 
conduct and strengthen directors' responsibilities towards protecting the corporate entity and 
advancing its long-term interests. The measures implemented are specifically aimed at 
preventing executive pay from rewarding short-term gains for shareholders or incentivizing 
short-term behaviour and excessive risk.  The level of discretion protected under the business 
judgement rule is constrained through new standards for executive pay. These are implemented 
through increased director liability rather than increased exposure to capital market pressures. 
 With respect to the US we find a greater emphasis on mandatory norms of conduct 
centred on protecting the corporate entity. This is evident with the enhanced claw-back provision 
requirement under Dodd-Frank requiring directors to implement policies for detecting and 
recovering executive pay based not only on misrepresented earnings but also on inaccurate data 
in the absence of fraud. 40 Despite not requiring directors to actually make recovery, this 
constitutes and enhancement of directors' responsibilities to the corporate entity. Likewise, the 
requirement to publicly disclose the CEO to worker wage ratio under the same Act demonstrates 
recognition of the role that workers play in the entity's long-term sustainability. 41 However, both 
provisions along with the others examined are reliant on the capital market's purported 
preference for non-financial assessment criteria and long-term sustainable corporate management 
as a means of enforcing these norms. We highlight the problematic aspects of this reliance. 
 This work concludes that German responses in several respects diverge from optimal 
contracting and a broader shareholder-based approach. Responses in the United States aside from 
demonstrating a greater emphasis on mandatory norms of conduct are to a large extent 
incompatible with what post-crisis compensation reform seeks to achieve, a long-term 
sustainable approach to running the firm in the public interest. 
                                                 
40  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010, s 954. 
41  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010, s 953(b). 
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SECTION G: What Long-Term Sustainable Governance Entails 
 This is the subject of a long-standing debate over how the corporation should be run, in 
the interests of whom and the most effective means of constraining managerial power. 42 How 
managerial power is defined and how the legal-institutional nexus of corporate law is 
conceptualized for the purposes of reform is also at issue. At the heart of this debate are 
competing theories of the firm which purport to deal with managerial power in differing 
capacities. It is crucial to understand the consequences of either approach, the historical 
relevance of each, and their relationship today.  To apply such a broad analysis to the executive 
compensation issue we need to step outside the law and economics paradigm and examine how 
executive pay has evolved within a historically shifting political economic and legal context. 
 The entity metaphor of corporate law evolved from the previous framework to deal with 
the problem of managerial power in the context of a neo-corporatist political-economy in the 
post-Great Depression era. 43 Referred to as the traditional legal model, this approach was the 
subject of intense academic debate around how directors’ duties ought to be defined and which 
management orientation should prevail. 44 At issue were the outwards effects of managerial 
power on stakeholder groups and the optimal means for ensuring shareholder value. 45 The 
debate touched upon the appropriate consideration of stakeholder interests in order for investors 
to achieve sustainable returns and whether the shareholder wealth maximization norm were 
suitable avenues to effective governance. Directorial discretion to consider multiple interests in 
accordance with the best interests of the corporate entity has consequently prevailed.  
 The contractual metaphor evolved in the 1970's to address purported weaknesses of the 
legal model at the time, namely the inability of this model to address the problem of managerial 
slack, characterized as inefficiency and sub-optimal risk in corporate operations. 46  These factors 
                                                 
42
  This goes back to the famous Berle-Dodd debate captured in three prominent Harvard Law Review articles written 
between 1931 and 1932. See Adolf A. Berle, “Corporate Powers As Powers In Trust” (1931) 44 HARV L REV 1049; E. Merrick 
Dodd Jr., “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45 HARV L REV 1145; Adolf A. Berle, “For Whom Corporate 
Managers Are Trustees: A Note” (1932) 45 HARV L REV 1365.  
43
  See William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, “Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the 
Modern Corporation” (2008) 34(1) J of Corp Law 99.   
44  Ibid.   
45  See Sciulli, supra note 2.  
46  See Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure” (1976) 3(4) J of Fin Econ 305.  
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were attributed by economists to weak market forces which failed to adequately constrain 
managerial power. 47 The lack of competitiveness amongst large public corporations in the LME 
context was cited as the source of the rampant economic stagnation of the 1970's that ushered in 
an era of 'Reaganism' in the US and 'Thatcherism in the U.K. This re-conceptualization of 
corporate law served as a basis for reforming corporate governance and also to explain the 
effects that the rapid growth of capital markets in the 1980s had on the orientations of corporate 
managers. 48 
 In sum the answer to this question of what sustainable governance entails is that a long-
standing debate continues on between competing theories of the firm and the differing 
approaches they represent. While these approaches purport to deal with different aspects of 
managerial power, performance versus rent extraction, the crisis shows that the goals they seek 
to achieve conflict with drastic repercussions for how managerial power is constrained. This in 
turn highlights the need to constrain the overemphasis of the profit motive and balance profit-
seeking against long-term sustainability, responsible risk-taking and stakeholder interests. 
 
SECTION H: Prospects of the Current Approach 
 Here we assess whether the shareholder-primacy paradigm is equipped to accommodate 
the needed changes identified for post-crisis executive compensation reform to be effective. It 
becomes apparent that the debate over how to proceed in corporate governance towards averting 
another crisis and creating sustainable capitalism is divided three ways. At the heart of deciding 
which to accept lays a choice between competing assessments over the governance orientations 
that develop from director's existing level of discretion and exposure to capital market pressures.  
 The first approach is to increase shareholder rights and re-balance power between 
directors and shareholders. This entails accepting that current market forces are inadequate to 
achieve effective constraints on managerial power and that shareholders are better equipped at 
                                                 
47  Ibid. See also Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance (OUP 2003). 
48  Roe, Ibid. 
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disciplining directors for excessive risk and unsustainable short-term profit seeking. 49 
The second approach accepts that the state of management's exposure to capital market 
pressures and directorial discretion are not only optimal market outcomes themselves but are 
suitable for constraining managerial power and ensuring sustainable profit-seeking provided that 
the model can be internally improved. 50 This entails getting the structure of executive pay right 
through better norms of conduct.  
 Drawing on contradictions found within these former approaches, an emerging third view 
holds that existing market forces and the current level of directorial discretion are untenable for 
ensuring corporate sustainability. 51 The current level of discretion protected under the business 
judgement rule in some respects is undesirable. Although it protects the Board's discretion to 
consider a multitude of stakeholder interests and rebuff investors' demands for short-term profit 
in favour of a longer term strategy, the Board's management orientation is equally susceptible to 
being influenced by demands for short-term profits and excessive risk-taking. Perverse executive 
compensation incentives are an outcome of these factors premised on the Board's overemphasis 
of the profit-motive and unfettered acceptance of performance-based norms of conduct. As long 
as directors have discretion to favour extreme profit-seeking as a goal on which to base 
compensation, unprecedented levels of pay will be justified by current share price. 52 
 We argue that this latter approach is the most accurate for approaching post-crisis reform 
and advance evidence to demonstrate its persuasiveness. This requires answering three questions: 
 
1) What arrangements do existing market forces under the current level of directorial 
discretion lead to? 
 The answer is that current market forces in conjunction with directorial discretion 
                                                 
49  This view is advanced by shareholder rights scholars. See for example Lucian A. Bebchuk, “The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power” (2005) 118(3) Harv L Rev 833. 
50  This view advanced by director primacy scholars. See for example Stephen M. Bainbridge, “Director Primacy” (May 
25, 2010), UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10-06, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1615838. 
51  This third view is what this work is advancing. There is no group of scholars that explicitly advocate for this position, 
however elements of it are apparent in the post crisis assessments of executive pay reform which argue that a paradigm shift is 
occurring away from performance based norms and market-based governance. But see James Shinn, “The Great Recession’s 
impact on global corporate governance” in William Sun, Jim Stewart, David Pollard eds., Corporate Governance and the Global 
Financial Crisis: International Perspectives (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2011).  
52  Post-crisis assessments of corporate governance have picked up on this point. See Millon, supra note 17.  
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produce results that are unsustainable. To support this premise we turn to scholarship on the 
'Double Movement' and its application and revival by political-economists and corporate law 
scholars. 53 Evidence is presented from progressive corporate law scholarship which shows not 
only that the current legal-institutional framework permits such governance orientations to 
develop but also that current market forces are incapable of producing sustainable firm 
governance and a more stakeholder inclusive approach to running the firm without more. 54 The 
prospects of corporate law under the current business judgement rule are assessed. 
 
 2)  What would increasing shareholder power result in? 
 The answer to this question is premised on much of the same scholarship as above, which 
addresses the argument to increase shareholder rights and reduce the power of the Board. The 
arguments against such an approach are presented and then assessed. The overarching conclusion 
is that shareholders are incapable of monitoring managerial power in a manner that will ensure 
sustainable firm development and the inclusion of stakeholder interests for both legal and 
structural reasons. 55 
 
3)  To what extent can directors consider the interests of other stakeholders in the face 
of capital market pressures? 
 Here the nexus between markets and management orientation is examined. The structural 
limitations of the existing legal-institutional framework for tolerating managerial slack have been 
well-documented.  In the absence of adequate pressures from product and capital markets, 
managerial slack is said to persist, rendering firms stagnant and unable to compete. 56 In the 
presence of robust market pressures, firms are said to find new efficiencies to improve 
                                                 
53  For an explanation of the Double Movement, see Polanyi, supra note 22. For its application to studying the crisis, see 
Jacoby, supra note 1. 
54  See Millon, supra note 17; Rotman, supra note 22; Stout, supra note 16. 
55  See Lynn A. Stout, “New Thinking on Shareholder Primacy” in in P.M. Vasudev and Susan Watson, Corporate 
Governance after the Financial Crisis (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2012) 24-41; Stephen M. Bainbridge, “Remarks on Say on 
Pay: An Unjustified Incursion on Director Authority”, UCLA School of Law (2008) Law & Economics Research Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 08-0; Alfred Rappaport, “Tens Ways to Create Shareholder Value” (2006) Harv Bus R, On Point Article 
1069. 
56  See Roe, supra note 49.  
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competition and satisfy investor demands. 57 By exercising discretion and considering the 
interests of other stakeholders, managers are said to generate agency costs, signalling to investors 
to discipline management through their market power. 58 This includes ensuring that corporate 
governance mechanisms tightly bond managers’ interests with shareholder wealth maximization, 
leaving little room for considering interests outside if this relationship. 59 
 Recent scholarship from Australia, a liberal market economy similar in many ways to the 
US, demonstrates that management is able to consider the interests of stakeholders beyond what 
is thought to be possible in the liberal market context. 60 Such 'high road to economic production' 
appears to be a feasible alternative for creating competitive firms which are sufficiently 
profitable to investors over time. 61 This demonstrates that the optimal line between shareholder 
value maximization and directors' discretion to consider other interests might need to be re-
assessed. However, as already mentioned, the current framework militates towards producing 
outcomes that are fixated on short-term returns that are unsustainable. Thus, to affect such a 
change, stakeholder based norms are needed along with a means for their enforcement. 
 
SECTION I: Thesis 
 After assessing the magnitude of the changes that post crisis compensation reform is 
calling for and what these changes actually entail, we can address the ultimate question this work 
seeks to address, whether the shareholder primacy model is equipped to accommodate this 
change or whether and to what extent directors should be required to consider the long-term 
interests of the firm and its stakeholder when setting executive pay? This work argues that the 
attempt of mainstream corporate legal scholarship to conceptualize and analyze the changes that 
have occurred with respect to executive compensation and its ongoing reform and regulation 
from the dominant paradigm is problematic because it ultimately reveals several inadequacies 
and inconsistencies in this approach and is an inaccurate rendition of the significance and 
                                                 
57  Ibid. 
58  Ibid. 
59  Ibid. 
60  Richard Mitchell, Anthony O’Donnell, Shelley Marshall, Ian Ramsay and Meredith Jones, Law, Corporate 
Governance and Partnerships at Work: A Study of Australian Regulatory Style and Business Practice (Ashgate Publishing 2011). 
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magnitude of these changes and what they represent for corporate governance.  This in turn has 
practical consequences because it informs the types of norms that will underpin corporate 
governance arrangements moving forward from the crisis which are supposed to prevent a 
similar economic meltdown and its widespread societal repercussions.  
 
SECTION J: Can the Current Approach to Compensation Reform Support Sustainable 
Governance? 
To apply the broader question of whether shareholder primacy is suitable for attaining 
sustainable governance, specifically to executive pay, we must ask the following two questions: 
 1.  Should agency costs be predominantly defined as a lack of performance and does  
 attempting to constrain managerial power through  performance-based norms of   
 conduct exacerbate its outwards effects? 
2.  Can excessive risk-taking and short-term profit-seeking be effectively constrained 
by adjusting the structure of executive compensation to better align shareholder 
and manager interests without changing the existing level of directors’ discretion 
and exposure to capital market pressures? 
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PART I- STEPPING OUTSIDE AGENCY THEORY 
 
CHAPTER THREE: 
Disentangling Narratives on Executive Pay 
 Several narratives can be identified in the literature which often overlap but are conflated 
in assessments of the executive pay problem. Disentangling the debate on executive pay in this 
manner allows us to identify which interests are at play, the underlying tensions between them 
and how the debate has evolved historically. This serves to further an understanding of the 
debate’s basic concepts and to orient our analysis outside the law and economics paradigm. The 
pay for performance perspective is but one paradigm for conceptualizing the problem. 
 
SECTION A: Excessiveness as Societal Fairness 
 This narrative represents a debate over the distribution of the firm’s value added amongst 
economic actors.  It raises the question, “how much do corporate executives really contribute to 
the firm’s success to deserve a disproportionate share of its wealth?” and juxtaposes the interests 
of the firm’s executives against the well-being of its employees.  More broadly, it represents a 
conflict between the wealth extracting function of the corporation and society’s interests in fairer 
wealth distribution.   
 From this perspective, critics call into question the size of the executive’s total 
remuneration and the issuance of stock option mega grants by Boards of Directors on the basis 
that production is a team effort and that excessive pay harms society by contributing to 
inequality. 62  This argument was dominant in the period leading up to the 1990’s when labor 
unions and public interest groups in the U.S. began to vociferously challenge the level of 
compensation being awarded to those at the helm of large U.S. publicly traded corporations. 63  
                                                 
62  Linda J. Barris, “The Over-Compensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay” (1992) 68 Ind 
L J 59; Mark A. Salky, “The Regulatory Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either or Neither 
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During this period which spanned the 1980’s executive compensation on average rose a 
staggering 212% which stood in sharp contrast to the preceding decade in which executive 
compensation on average rose only 30% between the years 1971 and 1981. 64 
 The 1990’s ushered in a period of economic recession which markedly impacted the 
performance of U.S. public firms who were forced to shed hundreds of thousands of jobs to 
maintain profitability.  While factory workers statistically received on average a 2.8% increase in 
wages for that year, inflation was pegged at 6.1%. 65  Corporate profits declined by 7% during 
the same period while the average total compensation for the top executive continued to rise. 
This line of the excessiveness critique highlights the juxtaposition that emerges in this period 
between the interests of workers, executives and shareholders. 66  
 This conflict is further exacerbated by executives receiving even higher levels of pay than 
the previous decade while invoking severe cost cutting measures in the recessionary economy 
that impact front-line workers. This rapid expansion in overall executive compensation is driven 
by the proliferation of stock option mega-grants justified by compensation consultants and 
Boards of Directors as paying for performance. 67 While, corporate profits on average are down, 
workers bear a disproportionate share of these economic losses, while executives are rewarded 
for making difficult decisions aimed at maintaining profitability for shareholders. 68   
 The excessiveness problem highlights how a conflict over fairness between managers and 
workers maps over a more fundamental debate on corporate purpose. The question of whether a 
particular level of pay is merited can be answered in reference to multiple iterations of 
performance goals corresponding to different visions of corporate purpose. One such possibility 
is to view the executive’s compensation as being merited because it rewards ruthlessly efficient 
and unmitigated exploitation of the resources necessary for the creation of wealth for investors 
without any regard for the societal effects of this strategy, the so-called shareholder value norm 
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67  Barris, Ibid. See also Yablon, supra note 26. 
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as some have criticized it. 69  Another such possibility is to view the executive’s compensation as 
being merited because it rewards the executive for being a ‘good corporate citizen’ and for 
implementing ‘partnerships-at-work’ style employee management systems where employees fare 
better overall in the enterprise. 70 
 
SECTION B: Excessiveness as Corporate Waste 
 A second branch of the “excessiveness” narrative is found within corporate governance 
discourse.  Directors entrusted to promote the corporation’s well-being and safeguard its assets 
are influenced by managers to approve compensation that grossly exceeds the reasonable and fair 
value of what the executive is worth.  Excessive pay damages the corporation because it 
generates waste and undue costs which affect its competitiveness. 71  It rewards executives for 
under-performing and encourages sub-standard effort which affects value over the long-run. 72   
 This narrative of the over-compensation problem is two-fold. On the one hand it 
represents a critique of managerial power in the firm, the problem of self-interested behavior and 
a lack of directorial oversight. It focuses on protecting the corporation’s assets from being 
appropriated by the firm’s managers.  This problem invokes the basic function served by 
fiduciary duties, to provide a mechanism for the stockholders to protect their investment from the 
most basic forms of malfeasance and to act as guardians of the corporation’s property.   
 Under statute, shareholders have the right to bring suit on behalf of the firm to discipline 
managers and recover any losses for the corporation. 73  In earlier suits by shareholders alleging 
                                                 
69
  See Nikos Passas, “Lawful but awful: ‘Legal Corporate Crimes’” (2005) 34 J of Socio Economics 771; See also, Stout, 
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that the executive’s compensation was unreasonable, courts would distinguish between interested 
and disinterested Boards. 74  If a substantial portion of the Board had an interest in the 
compensation being awarded, courts would not presume reasonableness or good faith on the 
Board’s part and would shift the burden onto directors to prove that the compensation was 
reasonable. 75  
 If the Board for the most part was made up of disinterested directors and no evidence 
existed that it failed to inform itself of all reasonably available material concerning the 
compensation then courts would presume that directors acted in good faith in a manner that they 
believed to be in the best interests of the corporation, extending the protection of the business 
judgment rule from liability for unreasonable or poor decisions. 76 Being concerned only with the 
quintessential problem of self-interested behavior, courts were careful not to heighten the ability 
of the stockholders to readily allege fraud and excessively scrutinize expenditures. 77     
 Realizing the problem with appropriation and opportunistic behavior of this type in the 
period following the Great Depression, legislators enacted requirements for public corporations 
to disclose compensation details. A variation of this problem still persists (and is arguably 
exacerbated) with incentive compensation and stock option plans.  Having been well 
documented since at least the early 1990’s executives have been known to manipulate earnings 
and engage in fraudulent misrepresentation of financial information to enhance the value of their 
options or hide internal problems that might lower their value. 78   
 Another related phenomenon documented since the 1990’s is “stealth compensation” 
which amounts to extractions of the corporation’s wealth in the form of high pay. 79 By failing to 
declare or account for the true costs of stock option grants to the corporation until several years 
down the road when these costs have multiplied, shareholders are in effect misled over the actual 
sums of money being paid to the executive and its impact on future share value when the options 
                                                 
74  Murrey, supra note 72. 
75  Ibid. 
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vest. Both the former and the latter practice has since been a target of legislation in the post 
Enron era. 80   
 On the other hand, recognizing the vulnerable position of stockholders, courts in some 
cases began to recognize that scenarios existed where directors even when acting in good faith 
failed to ensure that the compensation awarded was reasonably. 81 The earliest of such cases was 
Rogers v. Hill 82 in which a group of minority shareholders through a derivative suit challenged 
the level of pay awarded by American Tobacco’s Board to its CEO George Washington Hill. 
Despite being approved by a majority of the stockholders the Supreme Court recognized that the 
sheer amount of the compensation awarded could amount “to a spoliation and waste of corporate 
property” for which the corporation receives no equivalent benefit even if directors or a majority 
of shareholders approve the payments in good faith. 83 
 The requirement created by the doctrine of corporate waste, at least in the earlier cases, 
goes beyond the role that fiduciaries play in stemming self-interested behavior.  By prohibiting 
directors from wasting corporate assets, it seeks to protect the vulnerable position of the 
shareholder. Essentially the doctrine creates a positive, albeit limited, requirement for 
performance when dispensing with the corporation’s assets. Despite assertions the doctrine fails 
to go far enough, 84 the basic function of guarding against mismanagement without juxtaposing 
the interests of shareholders against the corporation is fulfilled. 
 The doctrine of waste represents a set of trade-offs between the rights and interests of 
shareholders and directors and between different groups of investors. By sanctioning poor 
judgment with how assets are deployed, the doctrine gives shareholders limited rights to protect 
their vulnerable position against more than just fraud, to ensure the corporation's economic 
survival.  Through procedural burdens and evidentiary thresholds, courts have drawn a line 
between excessive and meritorious litigation, both impediments to corporate organization. 85 
Courts have been careful to restrain shareholder power through a reluctance to substitute their 
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judgment for what ought to have been reasonable in hindsight. 86  Directors are allowed to be 
wrong as long as they acted informed and diligently. 87 
 Caution to not discourage risk-taking is balanced against the reality that shareholders are 
inherently risk bearers, can mitigate this risk and can benefit greatly if the risk pays off.  The 
doctrine therefore sets a minimum standard for the benefit that directors must endeavor to obtain, 
but stops short of requiring that benefit to actually materialize. For instance, high compensation 
levels can be approved to attain top talent and superior performance, yet there is no recourse if 
the performance fails to materialize.     
 In general, corporate law prevents shareholders from dictating that the profit motive must 
be emphasized. It affords discretion to balance competing interests in a manner directors believe 
in good faith benefits the corporation.  The courts have been careful not to enable shareholders to 
place their interests ahead of the corporation’s and limit their intervention to enforcing norms of 
trust, not efficiency. 88 However, the standard is broad enough to allow managers to favor 
strategies that are closely aligned with their own interests in extracting high compensation and 
expanding the firm to increase their power.  89 
 
SECTION C: Excessiveness as a Lack of Performance 
 This narrative problematizes excessiveness in relation to performance only and is not 
necessarily based on the overall size of the compensation being awarded. Accordingly, the largest 
detriment to the corporation of overindulging its top executive is the cost of lost economic 
benefit. Paying excessively in relation to performance means for the same amount of 
compensation directors could have obtained better results, which translates into better returns for 
the stockholders who invest on unspecified terms. Yet for several reasons directors either fail to 
obtain value for the firm when hiring the executive or fail to discipline the executive for poor 
                                                 
86  Ibid. 
87  Ibid. 
88  Ibid. 
89  Caywood, supra note 72. 
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performance. 90 
 Although not clarified in the literature, excessiveness as gauged by performance 
presumably exists on a spectrum at which one end the executive exerts a satisfactory effort in 
running the company efficiently and creating growth while at the other they drive growth 
aggressively to secure the maximum rate of return for shareholders.  There are short-term versus 
long-term trade-offs involved in either of these approaches and they impact the interests of the 
corporation’s constituents in various ways, depending on how performance is measured and 
defined. 
 Although intertwined with the discourse over improving incentives for performance, this 
is not a critique that pay incentives fail to properly motivate but that they fail to curb 
overindulgence by rewarding sub-standard performance. 91This viewpoint criticizes the size of 
executive compensation and views mechanisms such as incentive compensation as failing to 
ensure that executives are being rewarded for actual performance, regardless of how that 
performance is defined.  Thus, stock option plans fail to reward the executive for actual 
contributions and hard work because they tie overall pay to the market which rises and falls, 
allowing the executive to profit from lucky circumstances and crafty tactics. 92  
 This particular problem reflects the propensity of managers to exploit weaknesses in their 
compensation schemes and to extract rents from the firm. This is related to but differs from 
managerial slack.   It also serves to highlight the limitations of allowing capital markets to 
                                                 
90  This is attributable to the quintessential problem of self-interested behavior by managers and the influence they have 
on the Board which approves higher than usual compensation levels and fails to reprimand the executive or reduce pay when 
performance begins to stagnate. It has been noted that Boards are often nominated by the CEO and that strong social ties exist 
between directors and executives creating a counter-incentive for directors to hold unreasonable levels of compensation in check, 
bargain for better value, or adjust the remuneration when the state of the company deteriorates. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. 
Fried and David I. Walker, “Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation” (June 2002), 69 
University of Chicago L R 751; see also Randall S. Thomas, “Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or 
Market Driven? Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 02-19 (14 November 2002), Online: SSRN, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=353561 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.353561>. 
. 
91  Barris, supra note 62 at 65 (noting that “if executives are performing so well [to justify current levels of high pay] why 
are corporate profits stagnating or declining? Average corporate profits dropped 7% in 1990 while average CEO pay rose 7%, 
strong evidence that executives are being rewarded in spite of performance, not because of performance.”). 
92  See Barris, supra note 62 at 12. 
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determine what the executive is worth. 93 Finally it speaks to the reluctance and inability of 
directors to ensure that pay is in line with performance by making better bargains with executives 
and ensuring that pay remains proportionate to performance over time.  
 
SECTION D: Performance Perspective 
 The “performance” perspective builds on the latter by extending the problem to a lack 
shareholder wealth maximization. The excessive pay aspect is downplayed and superseded by 
the need to ensure executives are performing at the highest level possible. This approach places 
no maximum value on compensation and views high pay as a necessary tool for creating high 
levels of performance by capital market value.  The focus is on ensuring compensation is tightly 
linked to performance as opposed to reducing its size. 94   
   In response to the perceived inability of the corporate waste doctrine to curb excessive 
pay and the inadequacies of corporate law to solve the managerial performance issue, 95 the over 
compensation problem was re-conceptualized from being a corporate governance problem to a 
corporate governance tool. 96 Unlike positing that performance exists on a discretionary 
spectrum, this view posits management’s sole function is to maximize shareholder wealth. This 
entails redefining corporate value metrics and a narrow conceptualization of managerial power in 
the firm. 97 
 I. Optimal Contracting Model 
 The use of incentive compensation is supported by optimal contracting theory. This 
                                                 
93  Barris, Ibid. (noting that many compensation packages are constructed so that the executive profits in good times and is 
protected in bad). 
94  Jensen and Murphy supra note 28; Bebchuk and Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfilled Promise of Executive 
Compensation (First Harvard University Press: USA, 2004); Michael S. Weisbach, “Optimal Executive Compensation vs. 
Managerial Power: A Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried’s “Pay Without Performance: The Unfilled Promise of 
Executive Compensation” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 12798 (2006), Online: NBER, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=955231>. 
95  See Thedor Baums and Kenneth E. Scott, “Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the 
United States and Germany” (2005) ECGI, Law Working Paper No. 17/2003.  
96  Hill, supra note 14. 
97  For an explanation and analysis of this variation of the nexus of contracts metaphor and its implication for corporate 
governance, see William W. Bratton, “The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal” (1989) 47 Corn L Rev 407. 
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model defines managerial power as agency costs, which are created when managers deviate from 
the shareholder value norm. 98 Agency costs include the propensity of managers to withhold 
maximum effort, divert corporate strategy in non-efficient ways to further their own ends, and to 
take sub-optimal risks by playing it safe. 99  The aim of executive pay is to replicate shareholder 
incentives to take greater risks, maximize returns for shareholders and to refrain from 
considering non-shareholder interests. 100  This can be summarized as follows: 
 “At its most basic level, the granting of incentives is based upon the “greed” principle: An 
 executive will make decisions which he believes will increase the value of his corporation’s 
 stock, which in  turn will increase his personal wealth.  While the executive is busy assuring his 
 personal gain, he assures gain for all. 101    
 
 This narrow definition of managerial power minimizes the problematic perceptions 
around wealth extraction and corporate waste. If shareholders are experiencing high returns, 
significantly higher levels of pay are tolerated.  102 Excessive pay is relevant only in relation to 
performance as an indicator that incentive contracts are not functioning well enough. 103 High 
levels of pay are seen as being necessary for creating incentives that work. 104 The biggest cost of 
excessive and improperly structured compensation is lost performance.  105  
 Optimal incentive contracts are assumed to arise in the existing framework of corporate 
law if two essential conditions are met. 106 The first is that directors understand their duties are to 
maximize shareholder wealth and act accordingly. 107 The second is for capital markets to work 
                                                 
98  This is based on the shareholder primacy theory’s definition of the agency problem in the firm, see Jensen and Meckling, 
supra note 28; see also Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (First Harvard 
University Press: USA, 2006). 
99
  Jensen and Murphy, supra note 28; Joseph G. Haubrich, “Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent 
Problem” (1994) 102 J Pol Econ 258. For an explanation of empire building see Bebchuk and Fried, supra note 94. 
100  Haubrich, supra note 99. 
101  Barris, supra note 62 at 67. 
102  Jensen and Murphy, supra note 28. 
103  Ibid. 
104  Ibid. 
105  Bebchuk and Fried, supra note 94. 
106  This is a summary of the literature on optimal contracting and not presented as such by these authors. 
107  This entails that directors bargain at arm’s length with directors over compensation, remain disinterested in the process, 
limit the extent to which they consider other interests when setting pay, avail themselves of all material information and best 
practices, and focus more generally on conducting a fair process as opposed to considering the effects of the incentive plan.  To 
meet these conditions the Board typically delegates compensation to a separate committee.     
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efficiently and convey sufficient information about the firm to shareholders. 108 Provided that 
directors are professional, independent and disinterested they will heed to the demands of capital 
markets and bargain for compensation that is optimal in structure and size. Likewise if 
shareholders are privy to accurate and timely disclosure on earnings and other relevant data, they 
can gauge how agency costs are being managed. 109  
 This model relies on the efficient markets hypothesis (“EMH”) which posits that capital 
markets are efficient at pricing firms accurately and reflect available public data. 110 Moreover, 
the price changes instantly to reflect newly available public information such as quarterly 
earnings. 111 Thus, current market price reflects shareholders’ future expectations of the firm's 
performance. 112 Many have argued that capital markets are poor at reflecting hidden financial 
information about the firm, especially when the costs of short-term strategies materialize much 
later.  113 
 In 1990’s when high executive compensation became a popular solution to controlling 
agency costs as opposed to a product of managerial power itself, the principle problem identified 
was that compensation incentives were not high-powered enough. 114 This criticism advanced by 
Jensen and Murphy and others was levelled at the design of executive compensation and posited 
that if directors were truly acting in shareholders’ interests they would do away with bureaucratic 
compensation schemes. 115 The problem defined was not a failure of the market to place 
                                                 
108  This is achieved through mandatory disclosure rules and filing requirements imposed by most capital market 
regulators. They serve the purpose of conveying information to shareholders to protect them both from the fraudulent and self-
interested behavior of corporate managers including the propensity of some managers to appropriate wealth by misstating earning 
and to inform shareholders of the company’s performance so that capital markets can accurately price the firm’s value. 
109  Ronald J. Gilson, “Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?” (1996) 74 Wash U 
LQ 327; Jeffrey N. Gordon, “What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some 
Initial Reflections” (2002) 69(3) U Chicago L R 1233; Anne T. Coughlan and Ronald M. Schmidt, “Executive Compensation, 
Management Turnover, and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation” (1985) 7(1) J Acct & Econ 43. 
110
  For a detailed discussion of this theory see, Eugene F. Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets: II” (1991) 46 (5) J of Fin 157; 
See also Eugene F. Fama, “The Behavior of Stock Market Prices” (1965) 38(1) J of Bus 34. 
111  Ibid. 
112  Stout, supra note 57. Also noting that the financial institutions that collapsed in the 2007/2008 crisis and the firms in the 
2001 scandal, namely Enron, exhibited strong share price performance up until accurate information on the firm became known to 
the public. Enron for instance claimed $101 Billion in revenues in the year preceding the scandal and was voted “America’s Most 
Innovative Company” yet declared bankruptcy the following year due to a massive accounting fraud.  Likewise, the market value 
of Citigroup, AIG and Morgan Stanley before the financial crisis was at a record high and plummeted in the subsequent year, yet 
to recover.  
113  See Henry G. Manne, “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control” (1965) 73 J of Pol Econ 110. 
114  Jensen and Murphy, supra note 28.  
115  Ibid. 
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sufficient pressure on directors, as the clamour by shareholders over excessive pay was quite 
loud. It was that directors needed to develop better practices as opposed to giving into pressures 
from public interest groups to reduce the size of pay. 116  
       II. Managerial Power Approach 
 Another theory from within this paradigm is the managerial power approach. Like 
contemporary proponents of optimal contracting, these scholars attempt to explain why 
incentives fail to create performance in the long-run. While accepting the validity of the optimal 
model, this approach explains why optimal contracting fails to occur and proposes a solution for 
ensuring that Boards develop optimal compensation contracts. 117 
 The managerial power approach challenges whether markets within the existing 
framework of corporate law exert adequate pressure onto directors. While they acknowledge 
shareholders exert pressure on directors to set pay in their interests they posit that managers exert 
significant counter-pressure that undermines the sensitivity of pay to performance and interferes 
with the design of compensation as a form of rent extraction. 118 The implications of this are 
significant both inside and outside the performance paradigm because it highlights the limitations 
of what compensation incentives can achieve. It demonstrates that incentive compensation is not 
a comprehensive solution for all manifestations of managerial power. While incentives can 
motivate managers to pursue value maximization, they cannot prevent managers from undoing 
their own restraints. 
 The managerial power approach posits the design of executive pay not only as an 
instrument for addressing the agency problem but as part of the agency problem itself. 119 In fact, 
two agency problems exist. The first, between executives and the Board, while the second, 
between the Board and shareholders. Ineffective arrangements are negotiated when the Board 
succumbs to managerial influence through non-arm’s length bargaining. These include higher 
than optimal pay amounts, golden parachutes, executive loans and stealth compensation. This has 
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two consequences. One is that managers extract a rent from the firm by receiving higher levels of 
pay than those obtainable at arm’s length. The other is that performance is decoupled from pay 
resulting in forgone earnings and firm value which are substantial in size.  
 A key distinction is made between differing manifestations of managerial power and how 
they should be addressed. Managerial slack, suboptimal risk-taking and empire building is 
purportedly addressed by properly functioning compensation incentives. The effective control of 
rent extraction, executive greed and the propensity of managers to undo their own restraints 
depend on the Board’s willingness and ability to resist such pressures. 120 The Board’s propensity 
to negotiate pay that is highly sensitive to performance and to keep rent extraction in check is 
impacted by the extent of managerial influence on the Board, the quality of directors and their 
practices, and shareholders’ ability to effectively discipline the Board. Without adequate 
shareholder pressure on directors to resist managerial power, the Board is unable to negotiate 
optimal performance incentives. 121 
 
Section E: Stakeholder Perspective 
 The stakeholder perspective fits neither into the excessiveness nor performance based 
category of critique but instead looks at how the size and structure of compensation plans impact 
the corporation as an entity and its various constituents. Focusing more on the net benefits of 
compensation schemes and their outcomes, one sub-set of this narrative in particular 
problematizes the size of high-powered incentive schemes arguing that they undermine worker 
morale and productivity which in turn impacts the firm quite markedly in the long run. 122 These 
effects arguably outweigh the immediate benefits that high- powered compensation incentives 
might have on the firm’s performance and call on directors to carefully weigh the costs and 
benefits of compensation arrangements in accordance with their duties to the corporation. 123 
                                                 
120  Ibid. 
121  Ibid. 
122  See Randall S. Thomas, “Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?” (2002) 54 Hast L J 2.  
123  Professor Thomas suggests that “directors' duty of care obligates them to be reasonably informed about the value of 
these plans as that constitutes material information about their firm.” See Thomas, Ibid. 
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 Unlike the optimal contracting model which posits directors’ sole focus as creating 
powerful incentives for the CEO to maximize shareholder value through maximizing their own 
wealth, this perspective invokes directors’ discretion to determine whether the size of executive 
pay should be limited for the best interests of the corporate entity.  This is not necessarily for the 
purposes of controlling corporate waste but to account for how incentive compensation, or more 
generally the side effects of aligning shareholder and executive interests more closely, impacts 
other corporate constituents and how this in turn impacts the firm’s long-term performance. 124 
 In response to growing levels of CEO pay in the post-Enron period and the flurry of 
proxy activity by activist shareholders claiming that high levels of CEO to worker wage disparity 
are harmful to society, Professor Randall Thomas poses the question, should corporate directors 
respond to these claims and do such executive pay practices harm their firms and implicate 
Boards’ fiduciary duties? He argues that: 
 “Wide gaps between the top and bottom of the pay scale can, in certain circumstances, 
 directly and adversely affect firm value, that corporate boards should be informed about these 
 effects and in many cases they should reduce internal pay differentials to address them.” 125 
 
 Professor Thomas canvasses numerous empirical studies that link wide disparities 
between top management and front-line worker pay to poor long-term performance.  As these 
disparities grow, workers begin to feel resentment towards management and their own 
performance, productivity and commitment towards that firm begin to diminish.  Thomas cites 
that stock option mega grants, defined as grants of over $10 Million, are the primary contributors 
to such disparities.  
 These effects are further exacerbated in a recessionary economy when CEO’s begin to 
lay-off workers to maintain profitability. Often, massive corporate lay-offs will cause temporary 
gains in stock price, triggering the cashing-in of CEO stock options.  Executives, knowing that 
the future of their company is uncertain, utilize their inside knowledge to cash in their options at 
                                                 
124  See proposal by AFL-CIO to disclose internal wage disparity to shareholders. AFL-CIO “Conference Addresses CEO to 
Worker Pay Disparity” AFL-CIO (2011), Online: <http://www.aflcio.org/Blog/Corporate-Greed/Conference-Addresses-CEO-to-
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Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans” (2000) 35 Wake Forest L R 31 (noting that shareholders have noticed 
and reacted to the real cost of stock option mega grants). 
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the opportune time.  Thomas argues that “directors’ duty of care obligates them to be informed 
about the value of these plans as that constitutes material information about their firm.” 
 At its core this perspective calls on directors to weigh the benefits and costs to 
shareholders of short-term versus long-term modes of running the firm and ties the interests of 
stakeholders into the latter as being necessary of consideration for achieving this end. Given that 
the desired aim of incentive compensation is to effect sustained shareholder value, this argument 
questions whether key inherent features of the optimal contracting model such as the need for 
extraordinary levels of compensation and a sole focus on shareholder returns can actually 
achieve the task of creating value over the long-run.  In doing so, it makes an assertion that the 
firm should be run with the interests of stakeholders in mind and that mandatory norms in 
corporate law should play a more central role in the setting of executive compensation. 126 
 The same critical lens can be applied to analyzing some of the other effects that 
compensation incentives might have on managerial behavior such as increased risk-taking and 
aggressive pursuit of short-term returns and the consequences this has for stakeholders in the 
context of corporate organization. From this perspective the issue of perverse incentives can be 
problematized not as a misalignment between shareholder and executive interests, but as an 
inherent feature of incentive compensation and the optimal contracting model. 
 The phenomenon of managers extensively pursuing short-term goals instead of 
positioning the company for the future can be construed as an effect of using incentive 
compensation to improve a firm’s market value, of rendering shareholders more responsive to the 
short-term demands of shareholders and as a by-product of pursing the shareholder value norm 
without considering the impact of its externalities. In effect pursuing higher levels of profitability 
more aggressively through increased risk-taking has its own set of consequences for the firm 
which directors from this standpoint should be poised to assess and differs from the dynamic that 
arises when a more long-term approach to managing the firm is pursued.     
                                                 
126  This refers to the directors’ duty to act in the best interests of the corporate entity as an ongoing concern and not to 
jeopardize the entity’s well-being for the sake of short-term shareholder wealth.  The basic concept is that economic benefits 
should flow from the entity if directors act in its best interests, which necessarily entails profit maximization, as opposed to 
seeking profit maximization as an end in itself. 
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 Unlike the performance perspective from which the goal of incentive compensation is to 
limit the extent to which managers might consider other interests, which is defined as an agency 
cost 127 or as political interference in the effectiveness of the compensation incentive, 128 this 
approach allows us to examine the externalities of emphasizing the profit motive.  At the far end 
of the spectrum, these externalities have the potential to bear systemic risk by threatening the 
firm. By utilizing a stakeholder perspective to problematize incentive compensation and optimal 
contracting, several juxtapositions and trade-offs become evident. These can be analyzed across 
three key areas: 1) short-term versus long-term performance 2) excessive versus inadequate risk-
taking and 3) wealth appropriation versus inadequate performance. 
          I. Short-term versus Long-term Performance  
   Several trade-offs exist between pursuing short-term versus long-term performance and 
incentive compensation being tied directly to the capital market, renders executives sensitive to 
the short-term demands of shareholders. 129  In simple terms, incentive compensation is designed 
to induce managers to pursue more profit without differentiating necessarily between short and 
long term performance. 130  This raises an important question, what can corporate executives do 
to raise share price and what are the limits on how high profits can be raised? 
      II. Excessive Risk versus Inadequate Risk 
   Given that the purpose of incentive compensation is aimed at increasing risk-taking in the 
firm and not at curbing it, which could be perceived as an agency cost, it can be expected that 
this is exactly what executives would do, especially if they are rewarded for success and 
immunized from the costs of failure which are distributed to other constituents. 131  In fact, this is 
                                                 
127  Professor Roe equates social democracy which entails amongst other things the fairer distribution of wealth and risk in 
civil society to agency costs. Roe, supra note 47.   
128  Jensen and Murphy posit that the reason why compensation was excessive is because incentives for managerial 
performance were not high powered enough due to outside influence from the public and labor unions.  
129  As the company’s market value fluctuates, so does the value of the executive’s compensation package. Exercising options 
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131  It has been noted that incentive compensation and stock option grants reward executives for upside risk which are gains 
only in share price but not for downside risk which are losses in firm value beyond the original value of the options. It has also 
been noted that Boards will often re-price the original value of the CEO’s options if they go underwater. See Yablon, supra note 
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arguably what some shareholders seek, high gains for high risk-taking without being exposed to 
significant costs. 132 This is justified under the economic theory of the firm because other 
constituents are presumed to take these externalities into consideration when they bargain with 
the firm. 133 
However, it has been argued that this scenario in some cases poses a moral hazard in 
which shareholders and the CEO can afford to take greater risks because the consequences of 
failure are spread to several other parties who are not direct beneficiaries of the risk. 134 For 
shareholders this is not usually a problem until the risk becomes so great that it results in firm 
failure, undermining confidence in markets. On the flip-side, inadequate risk-taking leads to 
firms that cannot compete effectively in the global market economy because managers fail to 
innovate, find efficiencies, and instead extract high levels of pay for sub-substandard 
performance. 135  In economic terms, risk aversion can lead to sub-optimal allocation of 
resources 136  which is damaging to shareholders who invest for high rates of return. 137 
III. Wealth Appropriation versus Inadequate Performance 
The third key area where the inherent trade-offs of incentive compensation and the 
optimal contracting model can be analyzed is the constraining of managerial power. At one end 
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assess risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted returns available that are above the firm's cost of 
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of the spectrum, without the use of incentive compensation, managers have the propensity to 
appropriate excessive levels of pay and to put forth a sub-par effort in securing shareholder 
returns. At the other end of the spectrum, with the use of incentive pay, managers purportedly 
have an incentive to appropriate wealth by damaging the firm and imposing externalities onto 
economic actors outside of the firm. The potential effects of this are firm failure and systemic 
instability, both having drastic social consequences. The question that arises from this 
perspective is where should the line be drawn between the competing consequences of either 
approach? 
PART II-WHAT DOES SUSTAINABLE GOVERNACE ENTAIL? 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
Competing Theories of the Firm in a Political-Economic Context 
 
What does sustainable governance entail? Answering this question involves examining 
the broader significance of a shift in thinking for executive pay, from a corporate law problem 
associated with self-dealing to a solution for improving performance in the firm. The broader 
implications of this shift and its underlying impetus are seldom discussed in the literature on 
compensation reform, yet they represent a fundamental shift in thinking about corporate law, the 
legal nature of firm, how the rights and responsibilities of these actors should be defined, and the 
role of law versus the market in reconciling competing claims.  
The “entity” metaphor served as the dominant paradigm for conceptualizing managerial 
power in the post Great Depression era in the context of a “managerialist” framework of rights 
and powers in corporate law, 138 against the backdrop of neo-corporatist economic relations 
between capital, management, and the state, supporting a system of industrial capitalism. 139 The 
debate which ensued from within this paradigm, over which constellation of rights and powers 
best constrains managerial power, 140 underlies today’s debate over executive compensation, as a 
political contest between labor and capital, raising questions of how these interests should be 
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reconciled to facilitate effective economic organization.  
The “contractual” metaphor began to take hold in the late 1970’s to address some of the 
concerns that capital had with the existing system’s perceived deficiencies in the context of a 
relatively stagnant period of economic growth.  This was attributed in part to inefficient 
production and managerial slack attributable to high agency costs being imposed by social 
democratic pressures vying for a larger piece of the corporate pie. 141   
The model which began to take hold was referred to as “shareholder primacy” which was 
built largely on the existing “managerialist” framework but re-conceptualized how this apparatus 
functioned and where market-based corporate governance mechanisms needed to be employed to 
correct its perceived deficiencies and to alter how the benefits and risks of corporate activity 
were distributed. 142 
These changes occurred during a period of economic liberalization which witnessed the 
rapid expansion of capital and product markets which placed constraints on managerial 
discretion, 143 paving the way for the growth of financial capitalism, the dominant driving force 
behind corporate strategy since. 144  Focusing not on the externalities of managerial power, but 
on improving returns for shareholders, this approach removes labor from the equation, focusing 
on the relationship between capital and management. The debate centers on the extent to which 
the existing level of managerial discretion under corporate law is accepting of or resistant to 
market forces which demand increasing levels of efficiency and profitability 145  and how this 
model can be improved to better address certain aspects of managerial power defined narrowly in 
terms of efficiency, performance, and current market value.  146   
The debate between optimal contracting and managerial power 147  defines how executive 
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compensation has been problematized in the period leading up to the crisis. 148   Being 
historically related in the context of the shift from an industrial neo-corporatist regime to a 
liberalized market economy dominated by finance capitalism the entity and contractual 
metaphors define and purport to solve different aspects of managerial power in the firm and 
represent differing constellations of interests within and around the business corporation, a 
distinct yet interrelated set of debates, and a differing set of solutions to how economic crises and 
corporate scandals might be mitigated. 149 
In moving forward from the crisis, it is crucial to understand the prospects and 
consequences of viewing the executive compensation debate from either of these paradigms, to 
understand how and why these debates might conflict. In viewing this conflict we can either 
reconcile these differences or if irreconcilable then understand the sets trade-offs involved in 
overemphasizing either of the approaches they represent.  
Before venturing further into such an analysis, it is essential to introduce a framework 
based on comparative political economy to enlarge the assessment of competing bases for 
approaching executive pay. The Varieties of Capitalism (“VOC”) literature by Hall and Soskice 
is suitable to gain a better understanding of the relationship that institutions such as the market 
and the corporate legal framework have with particular corporate governance orientations, the 
structure of capital holdings, and the labor management style practiced by firms and to assess the 
significance and limitations of change within the current paradigm. 150 
 
SECTION A: Varieties of Capitalism Framework  
The principle innovations that Hall and Soskice bring to the table from the standpoint of 
comparative political economy are that economic behavior consists of multiple economic actors 
engaging in ‘strategic interactions’ in an effort to advance their own interests in a rational way; 
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that the institutions which condition this interaction are the most important to study; and that 
firms are the most crucial of these actors due to their overall effect on economic performance.    
    The key elements of the VOC approach relevant to this examination of executive 
compensation reform are: 1) its relational view of the firm 2) its hallmark distinction between 
liberal and coordinated market economies 3) the role it ascribes to institutions, and 4) its 
conception of institutional complementarities.  This approach takes a relational view of the firm 
which constitutes actors as seeking to “develop and exploit core competencies and dynamic 
capabilities” by establishing high-quality relationships with a wide range of economic actors and 
corporate stakeholders. 151  
Accordingly, this entails ‘coordination problems’ and the firm’s economic success 
depends on its ability to coordinate in five principle spheres: industrial relations, vocational 
training, governance, inter-firm relations, and with its employees. 152   
How effectively firms coordinate in the corporate governance sphere determines the 
availability of finance and the terms on which it can be secured while its ability to coordinate 
bargaining over wages and working conditions and to ensure that employees are highly 
competent and cooperative with the firm’s objectives determines the firm’s ability to produce 
efficiently and profitably. 153 The other key tenet of the Hall and Soskice approach is its dual 
model classification of capitalist economies distinguished by how these ‘coordination problems’ 
are resolved. This distinction between the ‘Liberal Market’ and ‘Coordinated Market’ economy is 
premised largely on the system of corporate finance utilized and the governance arrangements 
that develop in the presence of particular institutional constellations.   
To overcome the barriers to coordination in Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) firms rely 
on well-functioning and highly competitive markets to organize relationships based on supply 
and demand considerations and arm’s length formal contracting. 154  In ‘Coordinated Market 
Economies’ (CMEs) firms rely on non-market relationships and collaboration as opposed to 
competition, based on relational contracting and private information to coordinate their 
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endeavours and “to develop and exploit core competencies.” 155 The institutions of the political 
economy play a crucial role in providing support for how firms resolve coordination problems. 
156 It is this relationship between institutions and coordination strategies that forms the basis of 
the model’s ability to explain why firms in a particular national setting favour a given set of 
arrangements, pursue a particular set of strategies or develop a particular structure.   
According to the authors all capitalist economies “contain hierarchies that firms construct 
to resolve the problems that cannot be addressed by markets alone. 157  However, in CMEs firms 
rely more heavily on strategic interaction and networks (a third type of arrangement) to secure 
the commitment of the actors involved while firms in LMEs rely almost exclusively on markets 
and hierarchies.  In the corporate governance sphere the coordination problem that initially arises 
is the potential for shareholders to renege on their capital commitment and undermine an 
otherwise successful enterprise. 158 This problem is overcome by instituting a Board of Directors 
which is statutorily mandated in both types of economies. 159  This delegation of the firm’s 
management to a centralized organ gives rise to a further coordination problem, the potential for 
managers to act self-interestedly and against the interests of the organization. 
In addition to relying on the institution of corporate law and the ex-post solution it 
imposes through fiduciary duties, actors in LMEs rely on market mechanisms such as the 
markets for capital and corporate control to monitor and discipline managers while actors in 
CMEs rely on institutions that facilitate the sharing of information and collaboration such as 
business associations and trade unions that allow parties to make credible commitments. 160  It 
follows then that legal institutions in the LME context will tend to support market-based 
coordination through measures such as disclosure, securities regulation, and rules designed to 
facilitate arm’s length bargaining and competition such as anti-trust legislation and insider 
trading rules. 161  On the other hand, legal institutions in CMEs will facilitate the sharing of 
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inside information and grant legal rights to a wider group of corporate constituents to participate 
in the firm’s oversight. 162   
 Hall and Soskice claim that the type of monitoring arrangements prevalent in the political 
economy will also determine the terms on which investors supply capital. 163  In the context of 
well-established and deeply liquid capital markets with rules against insider trading, investors 
will commit capital based on short-term performance criteria. 164  This is also shaped by their 
ability to diversify risk through small holdings in multiple companies and to exit the investment. 
In a context where inside information is available, ownership is closely linked to management 
and employees have influence over the firm’s strategic planning horizon, investors will commit 
capital on a long-term basis. 165  This is also shaped by the difficulties investors face in exiting 
the investment and by the presence of business networks that facilitate the exercise of voice 
instead.  In sum, the structure of ownership and the types of monitoring supported by the legal 
framework influences the terms on which capital is supplied.  Accordingly, this also impacts the 
strategies that managers pursue to attract capital. 
   While the Hall and Soskice approach sketches out a complex relationship between 
institutional arrangements and how firms coordinate, it presents a crucial question that cuts 
across much of the work on comparative corporate governance. Why do firms ultimately 
gravitate towards one particular set of arrangements and what gives rise to particular institutional 
constellations in the first place?  The explanation provided is that firms attempt to gain 
advantages stemming from ‘institutional complementarities’ in that particular national setting, 
reinforcing the differences between LME’s and CME’s. 166  
Like complementary goods in economics where the price increase of one product affects 
the demand of the other, institutions of the political economy can mutually reinforce each other's 
existence if they confer advantages onto a group in the form of efficiencies created by the 
presence of both institutions.167 They cite the examples of disclosure and insider trading rules in 
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LMEs reinforcing the returns that investors can make trading on the stock market and of fluid 
labor markets and less employee protection being complementary to a highly developed stock 
market and higher levels of market-based coordination.  168  
Yet Hall and Soskice point out, it is not the presence of a particular set of institutions 
alone that determine the precise strategies pursued. Even in the presence of widespread 
ownership and deeply liquid capital markets, multiple equilibriums can exist, on which firms can 
coordinate. In other words, the presence of these institutions alone do not always dictate that 
investors will commit capital only on a short-term basis and will prefer exit over voice. 169  
Hall and Soskice identify history, culture and informal rules as having influence over 
which outcomes are pursued more prevalently. 170  This is due in part to a nation’s political 
economy being bound up with its history and culture which includes political contests or 
previous forms of cooperation between corporate constituent groups. The tensions between 
labour and finance in the U.S. for instance have been well documented. The waxing and waning 
of capital markets as the principle ordering mechanism for corporate relations has been to a large 
extent shaped by the political contest between capital and labour.  171 
This has important implications for understanding the trajectory and development of U.S. 
corporate governance since the late 19th century which has fluctuated within the LME context 
between a highly liberalized form of market capitalism in the period leading up to the Great 
Depression followed by a period of coordinated industrial capitalism which began to shift in the 
1980's towards financial capitalism characterized by “the self-regulating market writ large.” 172  
It militates towards the view that shareholder primacy is not necessarily the ideal solution for 
corporate law's perceived failures, but instead the end result of an evolutionary trend determined 
by an outcome of political contests and their resulting legal institutional matrices.  
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 In sum the direction of causality set out by VOC is that historical, legal and political 
actions shape the overarching institutional structures of the political economy, such as capital 
markets, which shape the opportunities available to firms which in turn conditions the strategies 
they pursue in areas such as corporate governance and employee relations. Accordingly, the 
presence of widespread ownership and liquid capital markets, rules that support market-based 
monitoring in corporate governance, and weaker protections for employees should make it 
advantageous for firms to coordinate on strategies that yield short-term gains as opposed to 
longer-term projects and likewise gravitate away from working in close partnership with their 
employees.   
However, if multiple equilibriums can exist and firms coordinate more prevalently on 
some of these due to history, culture, and the outcome of political contests, the question 
remaining is whether these factors can generate significant differences in what equilibriums 
firms can coordinate on within a particular national context? Can this explain swings in the 
prevalence and dominance of market-based monitoring mechanisms and corporate governance 
norms in the LME context?  Moreover, what is the potential for variation within this framework 
and to what extent can and should the market be constrained? From a broader perspective of 
political economy, executive compensation in the post-crisis era is located in this debate.   
 
SECTION B: Application of VOC to Corporate Legal Scholarship 
The Hall and Soskice approach to VOC has provided fertile ground for corporate legal 
scholarship to examine national divergences in corporate governance practice.  Amongst the 
more notable of these has been the work of corporate legal scholar Mark J. Roe on the ‘Political 
Determinants of Corporate Governance.’  173 Carrying through with the overarching theme that 
politics, society and the ordering of markets are interrelated Roe begins with the proposition that 
for a nation to produce it must attain a level of social peace otherwise “investors invest 
reluctantly, or not at all, and the factory is not built.” 174  He relates this macro-political claim to 
the firm’s micro-economic structure and to the micro-political dynamic between owners, 
managers and employees, acknowledging that these particular interests are often juxtaposed in 
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the course of production. Social conflict between these groups, he continues, leads to political 
settlements which impact directly the types of corporate governance arrangements pursued in a 
particular national economy.  The aim of Roe’s study is to examine the effects of one such 
political determinant, labour’s influence on management’s strategy and how it determines 
ownership structure in a national economic setting. His principal claim is that the manner in 
which social conflict has been settled “powerfully affects how firms are owned and how 
authority is divided [and that] politics at times requires boardrooms and ownership structures to 
be a certain way... making [a particular structure] less likely to arise and prosper.” 175   
He argues that the politics and legal framework of such an economy “wedges open the 
gap between shareholders and managers by pressing managers to expand, to avoid downsizing, 
and to go slow in taking risks that would affect the work place.” 176 This generates managerial 
agency costs for shareholders who gravitate towards a concentrated ownership structure as a 
means of controlling them.   In LMEs, politics and the legal framework support shareholder-
oriented goals and mechanisms that align shareholder and manager interests.  In fact, he suggests 
that for diverse ownership to have ever taken hold in the U.S. weak social democracy was a 
necessary precondition. 177  While this specific claim has been highly contested, it illustrates 
more broadly that certain regulatory climates are perhaps more conducive to the persistence of 
certain ownership patterns and hence governance strategies.   
The economic liberalization of the past three decades and changes to labour market 
regulation permitted immense reorganizations of corporate ownership structures to occur across 
LMEs wreaking havoc onto the organization of labour.  178 However, the question that remains to 
be answered, is to what extent does the presence of certain ownership structures necessitate 
particular orientations in corporate governance?  For instance, if managers endeavour to work in 
partnership with their employees in a broadly LME context and give them a larger piece of the 
corporate pie than shareholders might otherwise expect, does this necessarily translate into a 
push-back from shareholders to cut costs and maintain workplace flexibility?  Roe’s theoretical 
                                                 
175  Ibid. 
176  Ibid. 
177  This is also consistent with Jacoby’s claim that for the self-regulating market to be established as a corporate governance 
mechanism, institutions with a social democratic function need to be dismantled.  Consequently, his definition of the self-regulating 
market encompasses deeply liquid capital markets and the market for corporate control to which corporate governance mechanisms 
are tied. Jacoby, supra note 1. 
178  Such were the changes in Australia from in the 1990s and 2000s. See Mitchell et al. supra note 60 at 164. 
46 
 
application of VOC to corporate governance seems to suggest that it might. 
Roe posits that firms operate in environments where product and capital markets are 
either weak or strong. Weak product markets which lack competitive forces enable firms to raise 
the cost of their products and to reduce their supply to extract monopoly rents from their 
customers.  Under competitive circumstances, the firm’s revenue from its product sales covers its 
basic costs and the normal level of profit it needs to pay to capital. Consumers receive a surplus 
by obtaining a quality good at a competitive price. By reducing supply, firms lower their overall 
costs and by concomitantly raising prices they capture from the consumers who are still willing 
to buy at the higher price, this surplus.  Consumers who cannot afford to buy are deprived from 
having access to the product in the marketplace, the so-called ‘monopolist’s sin’.  The rent 
captured is referred to as the ‘monopolist’s rectangle’ and according to Roe, its gives rise to 
political contests between labour, management and capital. 
These contests impact not only how the firm is run but also corporate governance 
structures, laws and practices. Weak market pressures and the prevalence of monopoly rents 
loosen constraints on managers to produce efficiently and to favour the interests of shareholders, 
which they would otherwise be inclined do to where profits margins are narrow. 179  In the 
absence of such pressures management's interests are highly compatible with those of employees 
who favour a less aggressive pursuit of profits, lower levels of risk-taking, and a greater share of 
corporate wealth than otherwise obtainable. Thus coalitions are formed within the firm between 
labour and management on the one hand or management and shareholders on the other, which 
fluctuate based on the strength of market forces.  
According to Sanford Jacoby, the period between the Great Depression and the 1980’s 
was characteristic of a coalition between labour and management against capital which was 
marked by the lessened ability of shareholders to earn high levels of short-term profit from large 
industrial corporations who were managed predominantly for the long-term. 180 Product and 
capital markets were less developed at the time. The levels of wage inequality between the elite 
class of managers who ran these firms and the masses of employees who worked on the front 
line, was significantly lower than present. Corporate governance arrangements such as 
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performance-based pay incentives were less prevalent, which enabled higher levels of discretion, 
which in turn afforded protections against the exploitation of labour by capital.  
 Roe suggests that pressures from labor to capture rent and lessen the extent to which 
managers run the firm in shareholders’ interests generate high levels of costs for shareholders in 
the form of 1) rents directly extracted by managers (2) rents given by managers to labour and 3) 
slack in managerial performance which impacts the generation of shareholder wealth. 181  On the 
one hand, a modest managerial rent in corporate control can yield large monopoly rent losses to 
the shareholders. This is typically what legal rules designed to control self-dealing and conflict of 
interest transactions are designed to address.  Fiduciary duties for instance prevent managers 
from dispensing with corporate assets for their own or other constituents' interests. On the other 
hand, a small managerial rent resulting from slack could result in a huge monopoly rent in 
forgone profits for the shareholders.  Corporate law’s traditional legal mechanisms and its entity-
centric structure, it is argued, prevent this type of rent extraction from being effectively 
addressed and weak markets preclude shareholders from controlling these types of agency costs.  
As Roe indicates, “one powerful means to reduce managerial agency costs is for the 
stockholders to act cohesively in a block.” 182 This in turn explains why ownership patterns in 
Germany tend to be more concentrated. With co-determination being mandatory in large public 
firms and capital markets being less developed, capital in Germany, at least in theory, organizes 
into large blocks to ultimately secure less aggressive but steady long-term returns, maintaining a 
semi-stable equilibrium between labour, capital and management. However, where widely held 
ownership structures and their concomitantly supporting legal framework have been historically 
present and embedded in the political economic framework, it is less likely, in theory at least, 
that ownership structures would develop along these lines. Instead, the legal framework develops 
to compliment such ownership by providing greater protections to investors, placing greater 
demands onto managers to favour capital. 
Roe posits that in such a context where active product and capital markets create a 
competitive environment, managerial slack is constrained and the potential for labour to compete 
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for and extract a share of monopoly rents is virtually reduced, due to a lack of the monopolist's 
rectangle.  In effect, labour is removed from the equation and precluded from competing for a 
greater share of the corporation's wealth due to the narrower scope of profit available to 
shareholders. The contest within the firm for a greater share of resources becomes predominantly 
between shareholders and management, although labour still engages with fending off the 
imposition of risk and other externalities associated with aggressive profit-seeking. However, in 
this context shareholders are less concerned with capturing a maximum share of rents, as their 
entitlement to them is viewed as a given. Instead, the focus is on expanding the corporate pie 
through greater efficiency and risk-taking. However, the extent to which increasing returns to 
shareholders represents the creation of increased corporate value is questionable. 
In sum, the contest over corporate wealth in the firm becomes a struggle between capital 
and management to ensure managers perform at a maximum level. While corporate law's role in 
preventing rent extraction still holds relevance, if profit maximization is achieved, excessive rent 
seeking becomes a secondary concern. Effective performance incentives become the key 
mechanisms for making managers more profit-oriented.  This in turn equates to effective 
corporate governance, rendering corporate law redundant, as some have suggested.  
However, what remains unaddressed is the potential for negative consequences if these 
pressures to maximize profit exceed certain limits, which are unclear. Acting in both their own 
and shareholders' interests, managers can attempt to capture rents from the firm itself by 
sacrificing re-investment into long-term growth, impacting the firm's ability to provide long-term 
stable employment and to invest in production locally. The 'Political Determinants' literature 
inadequately addresses the extent to which the erosion of such benefits undermines the prospects 
for long-term sustainable firm governance. In other words, where is the line between a 
sustainable versus unsustainable governance approach and how it should be reflected in law? 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
The Organizational Model of the Firm 
 
It is necessary herein to deconstruct the legal/organizational model of the firm to locate 
the key facets of the sustainable governance debate, how they have evolved, the aspects of 
managerial power they seek to address and the trade-offs inherent in this approach. Before laying 
out how this model is constituted, it is important to review the political-economic functions 
performed by corporate law. To then locate these debates, the organizational model of the firm 
can be examined across three distinct layers, its structural, legal and normative components 
which shape the parameters of managerial power. Once identified, these debates can be 
correlated with the competing narratives of the executive compensation debate to realize the 
deeper implications of competing solutions to executive compensation reform. 
The entity model of the corporation is rooted corporate law’s traditional role of defining 
power in the corporation, the legal responsibilities of those who exercise it and the relevant 
standard of behavior. 183 It posits the corporation as an organizational structure and the law of 
corporations as serving a constitutional function. 184 By creating a separate entity with a 
collective set of interests embodied in the corporate form with an internal governance structure 
which determines how and to what end the corporation’s resources will be deployed, corporate 
law provides a legal solution to a set of organizational problems. 185 It represents a particular 
configuration of relationships between the law, markets and the state and between labor, capital 
and management, supported by a system of legal rights, processes, and structures that enable 
these constituents to overcome their competing economic and normative issues. 186  
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SECTION A: Corporate Law's Role in Economic Organization 
By giving rise to the basic corporate form and its internal governance structure and 
powers, corporate law enables a wide array of investors in the context of a regulated market 
exchange to pool their resources and commit capital on terms for which ordinary contracts 
cannot provide. 187  By the 1930’s the corporate landscape in the United States consisted of giant 
industrial conglomerates that were owned by a large and widely dispersed base of small 
investors.  Unlike business partnerships or closely-held corporations who were managed by their 
owners or delegates, these entities were run by a professional cadre of elite managers who were 
separated from the shareholder base, providing them with vast control over large pools of 
resources. 188 By supplying capital on uncertain terms of repayment, these constituents played a 
crucial role in enabling giant corporations in the post- Great Depression era of industrial 
capitalism to innovate, engage in necessary risk-taking, and to meet their fixed obligations. 189 
 However, these groups often had diverging interests and risk tolerances. 190 By providing 
a standard template for organization, insulation of management from capital and a guaranteed 
means of locking in capital, corporate law provided a vehicle for capital, labor and other groups 
to pool their resources and balance their competing interests. 191 This form of economic 
organization offered a more efficient alternative to single market transactions. 192 Labor market 
regulation influences corporate managers to maintain certain standards and incur certain costs 
while capital markets influence managers to focus on efficiency and on securing the benefits 
from the exploitation of labor. 193 The firm's governance organ acts as an intermediary to balance 
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these interests so that either party can commit their resources over the long-run.  194 Power in the 
firm is balanced between capital and management via the structure of rights. 195 This leaves a 
high level of discretion for the Board regarding major aspects of the corporation's existence 
including transactions, structure, strategy, how its resources are utilized and how it deals with 
outside stakeholders. 196 This is further constrained by legal norms of behavior through fiduciary 
duties which define and shape discretion. 197   
 
SECTION B: Structural Determinants of Managerial Power 
 The legal structure of corporate law gives rise to managerial power and establishes its 
parameters. Through defining the decision-making rights of shareholders, corporate law balances 
power between management and capital. 198  In the Anglo-American system, the broad decision-
making power of the Board is an outcome of how shareholder rights are structured. 199 The scope 
of directors' decision-making power is defined by de jure and de facto limits on shareholders' 
voting, appraisal and proxy rights.  Where the application of these rights is unclear or imprecise, 
fiduciary duties, as interpreted by the courts, attempt to fill in the gaps. 200 
 In LMEs corporate law provides shareholders with the right to vote on major structural 
transactions including dissolution, the sale of substantial assets and major restructurings. With 
exceptions, the right to initiate proposals rests with the Board. 201 Shareholders also have the 
right to sell or transfer their shares without the Board’s consent with some restrictions 202 and 
have the right to initiate and vote on dissolving the corporation if all consent. 203 However, there 
are restrictions on shareholders' ability to influence ordinary business operations. 204 
 Delaware corporate law further provides shareholders with a right to require the firm 
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repurchase their stock at fair market value. 205 Different jurisdictions have either expanded or 
curtailed this right. 206 As a remedy available to shareholders who dissent against fundamental or 
structural changes however, the right in practice, is limited by procedural barriers. 207 Proxy 
rights in Delaware derive both from corporate statute and federal securities regulation. 208   
 The right is two-fold. First, shareholders can nominate and elect members to the Board, 
however the right to nominate in practice is curtailed. 209 Second, shareholders can initiate 
proposals for matters other than election such as the removal of directors, dissolution and certain 
structural transactions. 210  Some proposals can be voted on by the shareholders while others 
require Board approval. 211  In practice, directors have numerous advantages over shareholders in 
nominating and electing members to the Board, such as greater access to the corporation’s proxy 
machinery and resources to wage proxy battles and elect an incumbent director. 212  
 
SECTION C: The Debate Over How to Structure Rights 
 The question of how to structure rights is at the center of an ongoing debate over 
corporate law reform. The key issue at stake is how to effectively constrain corporate power and 
which constituent group is ideally suited for this role. Three normative models exist, each having 
strengths and weaknesses. 
I. Shareholder Democracy 
 This model was canvassed as a post-Great Depression alternative and underpins the 
shareholder rights movement of today. It posits that shareholders are ideally situated for 
constraining corporate power by having greater decision-making power than management. 213 
Placing more power in the hands of shareholders disperses the concentration of power, 
democratizing corporate decisions with far-reaching effects and creating less conflict between 
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corporations and societal welfare. While this lessens the concentration of power in a few hands, 
some have suggested that shareholders are more interested in profit than corporate managers, 
creating a greater conflict between corporate power and civil society. 214 
II. Client Group Participation 
 This model posits that various constituents including labor, customers, suppliers and 
government could have joint decision-making power over corporate affairs, such as a sale or 
merger of an enterprise. 215 This would give client groups an opportunity to vote in a manner 
which represents how corporate decisions impact their well-being. It could also serve as a 
counterbalance to intense profit-seeking which conflicts with societal welfare. However, client 
groups would more than likely vote to serve themselves which could also conflict with the 
corporation’s goal of economic longevity. 216 If we accept that corporations exist to make a profit 
and need growth to prosper, groups such as labor might impede this goal by voting on 
transactions which favor less productivity and an unsustainable share of corporate wealth.  
III. Managerialism 
This model closely resembles corporate law's existing structure of rights. It concentrates 
immense power in the hands of managers. 217 Despite allowing large scale economic 
organization to occur, it has several weaknesses. One is the broad decision-making power of 
directors which concentrates power. 218 Widely dispersed shareholders are disinterested in 
exercising control and in fact are powerless over most decisions.  In terms of major structural 
decisions and director elections, directors wield enormous power over the proxy process by 
controlling votes. 219 Directors might own voting shares which can be exercised against new 
candidates who are already disadvantaged.  
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SECTION D: The Legal Determinants of Managerial Power 
 The existing structure of rights under corporate law creates wide discretion for managers 
when governing the corporation, entrenching managerial power in the corporate form. This 
creates positions of trust and dependence, requiring management's power to be defined and 
constrained by law.  220  Corporate law shapes the parameters of managerial action, primarily 
through prescribing management with fiduciary duties, owed to corporation. The application of 
fiduciary duties is contextual and is based on regulating particular types of behaviors in a range 
of situations. As Professor Kenneth Scott explains: 
One can postulate a continuum of situations involving conflicts of interest between 
controlling managers and owners, with the conflicts becoming less sharp (and perhaps the legal 
rules less useful). At one extreme would be outright theft, embezzlement, and misappropriation; 
without effective legal (usually criminal) sanctions in these cases, only the gullible would part 
with their money. A somewhat less transparent form of achieving the same end is the self-dealing 
transaction between the manager and his firm. By buying too low or selling too high, the 
controlling party transfers wealth from the firm to himself, but the picture can be confused by 
intricate transactions in nonstandard assets or subject to varying degrees of price unfairness. 
Enforcement becomes more difficult, but still seems essential if agency costs are to have any 
bound. The appropriation of corporate opportunities, excessive managerial compensation, and 
consumption of managerial perks can be still more judgemental, and probably the legal rules less 
effective, but the order of magnitude is also often less. 221 
 Two principle contexts, where longstanding debates over controlling managerial power 
can be located, are: A) the context of corporate takeovers, dominated by competing views on 
whether a duty exists to maximize shareholder wealth and B) the context of deploying the 
corporation's assets, dominated by the doctrine of corporate waste. Each represents a set of trade-
offs for how competing constituent interests can be reconciled and the consequences this has for 
managerial power. Both areas implicate the duties of loyalty to the corporation and the duty of 
care, juxtaposed against a broad interpretation of the business judgment rule. 
The duty loyalty is a mandatory norm of conduct and is owed to the corporate entity.  In 
breaching this duty, directors can be held personally liable for damages which arise in connection 
with the breach. The duty of loyalty “most fundamentally requires that a corporate fiduciary’s 
actions be undertaken in the good faith belief that they are in the best interests of the corporation 
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and its stockholders.” 222 While corporate law has typically protected valid business judgment 
from civil liability and judicial review, it imposes the condition that managers must exercise their 
powers in accordance with a valid a business purpose and not for personal gain. 223 
The duty of care exists to ensure that management operates the firm above a certain 
standard of conduct. As Baums and Scott explain: 
 A second aspect of the fiduciary duty of officers and directors comes under the heading of 
 the duty of care, which requires them to act “with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an 
 ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.” The standard 
 as thus expressed is one of reasonable or ordinary diligence, knowledge and skill, and would 
 seem to create possible civil liability for ordinary negligence. 
 
 Fiduciary duties are enforceable through a derivative action, available in the context of 
self-dealing and corporate decision-making that lacks a valid business purpose. 224  This includes 
blocking a transaction which creates value for shareholders in order to protect employee interests 
without a proportional benefit to the firm, 225 or selling the entire assets of a corporation and 
diverting the funds to employees to compensate them for their job losses as opposed to 
distributing the proceeds to shareholders. 226 Employees in the latter example benefit but cannot 
reciprocate because their jobs might no longer exist. There is no valid business purpose 
connected to giving employees this compensation. The derivative action enables shareholders to 
discipline managers on behalf of the firm and to protect their own interests in the process. 227  
In sum, the legal tools of corporate law are not a mechanism for achieving high levels of 
performance but for ensuring managers do not appropriate the firm’s assets, damage the firm in 
the context of deploying its resources, or resolve conflicting interests in a manner that neglects a 
valid corporate purpose, in which the need to make some level of profit is reflected. 
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 I. Takeover Context 
 While change of control transactions implicate both structural and legal constraints on 
managerial power, courts have been the battleground for settling competing claims in this 
context.  They involve an unsolicited bid from an acquiring entity for a target firm who is under-
performing in the market. Approval of the transaction is sought directly from the shareholders 
and a premium is paid for their shares, often substantially above market value. The acquiring 
entity's management calculates, despite the premium being offered, that the purchase is still a 
bargain given the efficiencies that can be found by restructuring the firm. This often involves 
substantial cost reductions, the sale of major assets or subsidiaries, the shedding of various 
operations and the closing down of plants. While takeovers implicate the right of voting class 
shareholders to approve major transactions and their right to remove and re-elect the Board, an 
issue involving fiduciary duties arises over the Board’s use of defensive tactics in response to a 
hostile takeover bid. Views diverge over the extent to which maximizing wealth in the takeover 
context is synonymous with the corporation's best interests and whether the duty of loyalty in 
fact extends into a duty to maximize shareholder wealth. 228  
 There are two competing theories, the shareholder interest hypothesis and the 
management entrenchment hypothesis. The first theory holds that defensive tactics are used 
beneficially by management because shareholders would prefer to hold out so that management 
can defeat a low bid, bargain for a higher offer, or attract other bids. 229 This is based on the view 
that takeovers are exploitative and fail to create the high value purported. The following reasons 
have also been advanced to justify the right of target management to defend a takeover: 1) tender 
offers fail to increase welfare for shareholders over the long-term 2) target shareholders gain 
more value when the hostile bid is defeated and 3) target managers have obligations to other 
groups who might be negatively impacted. 230 
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The second theory holds that defensive tactics are used abusively by management as a 
means to entrenching their positions. 231 If takeovers result from a potential value gap between 
the current level of agency costs and the acquirer’s plans to restructure the firm, then managers 
surely face loss of their employment. 232 Thus, managers have an interest in perpetuating their 
power and insulating themselves from the market for corporate control which consists of firms 
seeking to exploit new found efficiencies in large public corporations.  Proponents of this view 
argue that fiduciaries duties should be interpreted as a duty to maximize shareholder wealth. 
State courts in the U.S. have typically favoured the latter theory. Although, under 
Delaware jurisprudence, courts have upheld the rule in Revlon Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings Inc., 233 requiring management’s duty to the corporation to shift from canvassing 
alternatives to a sale to maximizing shareholder value, once the company’s sale has become 
inevitable. 234  The functioning of a market for corporate control and its effect on managerial 
behaviour can be further understood by looking at the third layer of factors, the set of normative 
determinants which exist outside of corporate law's reach.  
 II. Corporate Waste Context 
 As discussed, the development of the corporate waste doctrine is characterized by a 
tension between protecting the corporation from management's improper use of corporate 
resources on the one hand and insulating managers from liability for failed risk driven by 
shareholders' hindsight bias on the other.  The weakness of this balance is the moderate 
protection it provides against managerial rent-extraction and its failure to address the problem of 
managerial slack for shareholders.  However, as discussed, this balance necessarily insulates 
shareholders from the firm's central governance organ by upholding managerial discretion and 
enabling directors to balance competing claims in the corporation's best interests. 
 The executive pay debate, when located in the organizational model of the firm, 
necessarily implicates a broader debate over the trade-offs inherent in the corporate waste 
doctrine on the one hand and the inability of this legal tool to address the problem of poor 
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managerial performance and rent diversion on the other. This can be further viewed as a conflict 
arising within the collective entity between interests. While excessive pay in this context can 
constitute mismanagement (a breach of duty of care) or self-dealing (a breach duty of loyalty), 
the question raised is what standard should directors be held to?   
 One scenario is to hold management strictly accountable to the profit motive when setting 
executive compensation and ensure that executive pay spurs high levels of performance despite 
its grossly disproportionate size to workers’ pay. Doing so could have negative consequences for 
social welfare by contributing to inequality. If management is motivated to seek out new 
efficiencies, it could result in job cuts, wage freezes, and a reduction in benefits. 
  The Board has power over two essential variables, the overall size of the compensation 
and the corporate goals to which it corresponds. 235 The corporation's labor constituency has an 
interest in constraining both what the CEO makes and such corporate goals. 236 In general, labor 
is opposed to large bonuses which reward gains in share price and risk-taking which might be 
synonymous with reductions in the workforce, the scaling back of benefits and a shift to more 
flexible labor arrangements. 237 
Shareholders on the other hand benefit most from a norm that requires directors to do 
what is economically superior for the corporation. Executive pay that encourages high efficiency 
improves competitiveness and enhances firm value. 238 This is consistent with the firm’s profit 
motive. Yet doing so entails that directors suppress the corporation’s social role. However, 
approaching executive pay as an equity issue between workers and executives might not result in 
sufficient accountability to the profit motive. 239  
Notwithstanding the broad limits on executive compensation under both the doctrine of 
waste and business judgement rule, there is currently no legal standard for balancing competing 
interests when setting executive pay. The debate over which goals to reward and how, ultimately 
falls outside of corporate law's reach. The question then is what are the consequences at either 
end of the spectrum for how managerial power is constrained? 
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SECTION E: The Normative Determinants of Managerial Power 
The debates over what directors' duties should be in the takeover context and which goals 
are appropriate to reward in the corporate waste context both have dimensions outside of the 
narrow legal debates discussed above. At the operational level of the firm, these debates have 
fundamental implications for determining which management orientation should prevail. It is 
essential to recognize two points regarding these contexts.  
One is the importance of identifying what drives particular executive pay arrangements at 
this level, their consequences for how managerial power is constrained and how they should be 
constrained, if at all. Two is recognizing the analogous points between the executive pay debate 
and the evolution of the takeover debate, namely the response of corporate law to the negative 
effects of the market for corporate control as compared with the negative externalities of 
incentive pay and the potential for corporate law to provide a solution.  
 Outside of the corporate law box, directors' discretion is subject to forces competing over 
which interests managers should consider. The primary drivers of this orientation are varying 
norms of directorial conduct driven by market forces. These range from the shareholder value 
norm to more stakeholder-inclusive norms underpinned by market versus entity-based norms of 
directorial responsibility. The level of risk taken and the time horizons set by management are 
economic considerations that hinge on market conditions, the availability of inputs, managerial 
skill, capital market pressures and the pervasiveness of particular norms. Courts typically will 
not second guess these decisions and are reluctant to involve themselves in running business. 240 
While shareholders are vulnerable to exploitation, they also act as bearers of residual risk 
and accept this position with the understanding that if management acts with a valid corporate 
purpose, which includes profit maximization, then shareholders could realize above average 
returns if the firm is efficient. The question that remains is, how do shareholders ensure that 
managers perform adequately? 
 Market based mechanisms are available to shareholders for addressing the performance 
issue. These are disclosure rules, the ability to sell in a deeply liquid capital markets exchange, 
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and the ability to diversify their holdings.  There are prospects in theory for the Board to act as a 
protector of shareholders’ interests in “maintaining good performance and limiting self-dealing 
and other private benefits”. 241 While director elections and the proxy contest in the closely held 
corporation is an effective means of influencing the role of the Board, in the widely held firm, 
the Board must be influenced by other means. 242 
The basic assumption of director orientation is that “directors will meet their legal and 
moral obligations out of sense of duty and internalized norms”. 243 At the very least they seek to 
preserve their reputations. 244 However, there is no clear imperative for whose interests should 
take priority. 245 Directors are also motivated by the desire to keep their position and might be 
inclined to serve the interests of those who put them on the slate which in the closely held 
corporation might be the majority shareholder while in the widely held firm the CEO. 246   In the 
absence of strong market pressures, labor could have a significant influence in management 
orientation, as labor's interests in low risk, stability and slow growth are compatible with 
management's. Three roughly categorized modes exist for the role that the Board can play in 
operating the firm. 247 They are identified as the following: 
1. An advisory role to top management in which the Board attempts to oversee 
 management and ensure its compliance with the law but otherwise defers to its judgement 
 in how it balances interests in conjunction with a valid corporate purpose. 
2. A shareholder agent role in which the Board acts only on shareholders behalf, 
 replacing under-performing managers and implementing contractual measures that ensure 
 maximum performance and shareholder returns. 
3. A stakeholder role in which the Board consistently reconciles the interests of those 
 parties that are regularly impacted by the firm’s actions. 
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All three roles are consistent with profit maximization for shareholders but to differing 
degrees and time horizons.  Each mode has consequences for managerial performance, 
controlling self-serving and managing the outwards effects of pursuing the profit motive. Viewed 
on a spectrum of how managers can govern the public corporation, at one end the potential exists 
for management to take high levels of risk and to focus exclusively on profit maximization while 
at the other, they can balance profit maximization with other factors such as environmental 
stewardship. There is no evidence that corporate managers alone wish to expose the environment 
to high levels of risk and carelessness by taking excessive risks and aggressively pursuing 
profits. 248 In fact, corporate managers in the absence of any incentives or stimuli prefer to play it 
safe and maintain their reputations as good corporate citizens. 249  
 II. The Effect of Market Forces on Normative Discretion 
 It is crucial then to recognize how market forces operate in the legal model. Rights of 
election could enable shareholders not only to discipline a poorly governed Board but also to 
exert pressure to improve efficiency, risk-taking and profit. However, because the ability to 
nominate and remove directors is curtailed in practice, an internal market for corporate control is 
impeded from operating. 250 Corporate law strikes a balance between capital and managerial 
prerogative namely to enable constituents to commit their resources for the long-term. Giving 
shareholders effective rights to demand greater profit might conflict with long-term corporate 
organization after a certain point. 
 The effect of external market forces on operational strategy depends on the liquidity and 
prevalence of capital markets. 251 It is also important to realize that historically these forces have 
differed. In the New Deal period capital market pressures were weak. 252 Under deregulation in 
the Reagan era, they flourished. 253 While this is an oversimplification of the complex factors 
present at the time, the general trend can be observed. This is evidenced by the wave of corporate 
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takeovers in the 1980's. 254 Firms who were under-performing in the capital market were bought-
out by corporate raiders through hostile takeover bids. 255 These investors would make 
sometimes drastic changes to how the target company was structured and operated in an effort to 
find new efficiencies and raise the firm's current market value. 256 It has been suggested that such 
investors would use the hostile bid as a form of arbitrage to extract short-term wealth from the 
target. 257 
 In response to this frenzy of takeovers, corporate legal scholars theorized into existence 
the market for corporate control. 258 They posited that the threat of being taken over prompted 
management to run the firm efficiently as possible to keep corporate waste and rent extraction in 
check, otherwise it would be removed and replaced. 259 It is important note that while this market 
exerts pressure on management's normative discretion, the threat of takeover can be realized only 
when shareholders have the ultimate right to approve an incumbent hostile bid for the 
corporation and directors cannot legally block such a sale. 
 II. The Role of Executive Pay 
 Normative views on how directors should run the firm pervade the culture of business 
and finance, translating into certain performance and governance metrics. 260 The shareholder 
value norm underpinned by an elaborately theorized law and economics justification has been 
influential to this end. 261 Incentive compensation combined with finance-based metrics has been 
a powerful tool for shaping managerial conduct. 262 As theorists have suggested, the current 
framework of rules and market forces have supported such arrangements.  263  
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 III. The Consequences of a Labour-Oriented Executive Pay Norm 
 Germany's system of Board co-determination provides an example of how labour-
oriented pay norms impact corporate constituents and constrains managerial power. 264 Both the 
size of CEO pay and its underlying goals reflect a focus on long-term, stakeholder-inclusive 
management. 265 Shareholder wealth maximization is not the overriding imperative and rent 
extraction by management is constrained relative to the US approach. 266 Co-determination gives 
labor almost half the seats on the Supervisory Board. 267 Share ownership is closely held, 
enabling capital to monitor the Board more effectively. 268 However, shareholder power is not 
absolute, but balanced against Board discretion. 
 Having well-functioning rights to appoint the Board, both capital and labour influence 
directorial discretion through their representatives on the Board. The outcome tends to be a 
negotiated compromise between labor and capital's competing interests leaving less room for 
interpreting what valid a business purpose should be.  269 The result of this balance is a labour-
oriented executive pay norm that entails lower overall compensation and less short-term profit 
seeking and risk. 
 Viewed comparatively Germany's corporate governance framework is less tolerant of 
excessive pay and performance goals which reward short-term profit-seeking. 270 While the 
content and application of Germany's business judgement rule is similar to that of the US, 271 the 
scope and substantive impact of its application differ, at least in the area of executive pay. It has 
been recently settled in Germany, in the Mannesmann case, that creating short-term profits is not 
a valid corporate purpose that can be used to justify large bonus payments to executives. 272  
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 In Mannesmann the German Federal Court elaborated on the permissibility of Anglo-
American style pay bonuses rendered for extraordinary gains in shareholder wealth. 273  Despite 
creating over 50 Billion Euros for the shareholders, the bonuses were deemed excessive because 
they failed to benefit the corporation. 274 Shareholders in this case stood to make an 
unprecedented short-term gain and were complicit in resisting the awards despite their detriment 
to the firm itself. Approving the awards in this case represented a conflict between shareholders' 
and the corporation's interests.   
 Even in Germany's stakeholder model, where compensation levels are comparatively 
moderate and coupled with lower-risk strategies, shareholders have the propensity to favour 
higher levels of compensation in exchange for greater short-term profit. 275 On the one hand, this 
case demonstrates that where the Supervisory Board fails, shareholders also lack the incentive to 
discipline Boards when they stand to benefit immensely from short-term gains. On the other 
hand, the response to Mannesmann, illustrates that such orientations are perceived as 
undermining the labor constituency's interests and the co-determination model's ability to 
constrain rent-extraction or create a fair distribution of wealth and risk amongst corporate 
stakeholders.  
 The period preceding the rise of finance and the shareholder-value norm was marked by 
lower overall compensation for executives and so-called bureaucratic compensation schemes in 
public firms. 276 This began to change in the 1980's with the deregulation of markets and 
subsequent rise of incentive pay, culminating in 1990 when the need for high-powered pay 
incentives was theoretically justified and embraced. 277 
 It was documented by several theorists that high levels of executive pay, albeit not so 
high by today's standards, were problematic mainly in relation to firm performance. 278 In other 
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words, excessive pay was symptomatic of a larger gap in potential firm growth and wealth 
creation caused by managerial slack. 279 Boards of large public companies, it was said, were 
sensitive to public pressures to reduce executive compensation which precluded companies from 
incentivizing top managers to maximize shareholder wealth. 280 Stimulating economically 
stagnant sections of the economy to become more efficient became the focus of executive 
compensation reform in the LME context. 281 
 While it is clear that a labour-oriented pay norm in the US contributes to high levels of 
managerial slack, it is equally unclear to what extent it can be repudiated and replaced by a 
shareholder value norm. A certain degree of restraint on both the profit goal underlying CEO pay 
and its size might be essential to sustainable corporate performance. 282 The amount of rent that 
management could extract before the proliferation of incentive pay, was arguably less than under 
the current approach. While incentive compensation both in theory and fact stands to create 
higher firm value, much larger amounts arguably create greater incentives for rent-extraction. 
 IV. The Consequences of a Shareholder-Oriented Executive Pay Norm 
 Boards can potentially approve compensation schemes that are connected to a relatively 
modest set of performance goals that maintain moderate efficiency levels, and a pro-labour 
management style. 283 Such compensation schemes and their underlying performance goals can 
enable managers to withhold their maximum efforts, avoid taking risk, and undertake inefficient 
strategies to safeguard their positions while extracting high levels of pay. This mainly impacts 
the shareholders. Alternatively, a shareholder value norm impacts non-shareholder groups and 
creates a counter-effect for how managerial power is constrained.  
 In the context of industrial capitalism, the debate centred on reducing the size of 
remuneration and bonuses. 284 A financially modest iteration of corporate purpose was valid from 
an entity perspective and compatible with the existing corporatist labour-capital-state nexus that 
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dominated this period. 285 It focused on slow growth, stable operations, and prudent levels of 
risk-taking which ensured the survival of the enterprise as an institution of the industrial-based 
political economy, benefiting more than just the stockholders. 
 In the context of greater market pressures under financial capitalism, whether domestic or 
transnational, shareholders are purportedly better served by ensuring that high levels of 
compensation actually reward high levels of performance. 286 Thus increasing managerial output 
is the desirable solution from the standpoint of the shareholder who seeks greater value from the 
executive's pay check. Several consequences emanate from this. 
 Shareholder wealth maximization as the overriding imperative to gauge the 
appropriateness of executive compensation narrows the scope of goals that could otherwise be 
used to justify rent-extraction. This approach presupposes that the level of executive pay is only 
justifiable in relation to profit. Yet to earn high levels of profit, appropriate corporate goals need 
to be set and the CEO remunerated accordingly with the requisite pay arrangements. The more 
profit produced, the higher the pay arguably deserved.   
 Holding managerial power accountable exclusively to profit when setting executive pay, 
shifts shareholders' focus away from the corporation’s internal governance and reinforces the 
parallel role they play as outside constituents who implicitly contract with the corporation to 
meet their own financial needs. 287 This former role benefits all constituents involved with the 
corporation by enabling shareholders to protect the corporation from harm and ensuring its basic 
survival. The latter approach begins to separate the interests of shareholders from the well-being 
of the corporate entity along separate threads. Instead of viewing profit as a product of a 
successful corporation, this approach views profit as an end in itself and seeks to assess the 
appropriateness of executive compensation solely in relation to what shareholders gain from the 
corporation and nothing more. 
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 Since constraining wealth appropriation and corporate waste in the setting of executive 
compensation is assessed against profit maximization, shareholders have minimal incentive to 
control the former if the latter materializes. 288 Thus, if an adequate share of the corporation’s 
surplus is being diverted towards satisfying the needs of capital, as they perceive their needs in 
the context of a competitive market, and away from other groups including the corporation’s 
retained earnings which it uses to plan and invest for the long-term, then capital has a limited 
concern over how much wealth management actually extracts. 289   
 The challenge with holding the size of the executive’s remuneration accountable to the 
profit motive as opposed to a more moderate articulation of the corporation’s best interests is 
establishing a balance between short-term wealth creation and a longer-term approach to creating 
sustainable wealth.  If the size of the executive’s paycheck is of minimal concern to shareholders 
receiving high rates of return, then what interest would shareholders have in restraining profit-
seeking that is overly risky, unsustainable, or damaging to the corporation?  The answer to this 
question is complex and dependent on the risk tolerances of individual shareholders, their level 
of sophistication as investors, and the quality of information they receive. To propose that capital 
should assert greater influence on Board decision-making is to assume that shareholders would 
be able to discern when the profit motive is being overplayed and would be inclined to question 
the firm’s sustainability when current profits are exceptionally high. 290 In deeply liquid capital 
markets selling, diversifying and holding for the short-term are effective risk-mitigation 
strategies by which shareholders can address these concerns.  291  
Accepting that a threshold exists, past which emphasizing the profit motive undermines 
the firm’s long-term prospects, provided that such a line can be identified, suggests that the size 
of the executive’s maximum potential remuneration should be capped at the point where it 
corresponds with this threshold. In other words, the maximum potential earnings of the CEO 
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cannot be unlimited if after a certain point shareholder wealth maximization begins to harm the 
corporate entity. Yet, courts have been reluctant to limit executive compensation as long as it 
corresponds with a valid business purpose. 292 
  
CHAPTER SIX: 
The Nexus of Contracts Firm 
 
The nexus of contracts model re-conceptualizes the organizational model of the firm. At 
the 'structural' level, contractarian orthodoxy proposes to change the structure of shareholder 
rights by giving shareholders more power. Notwithstanding minor rights, such as the precatory 
vote on executive pay, contractarians have been largely unsuccessful on this front.  At the 'legal' 
level, contractarians propose that directors' fiduciary duties to the firm, obligate them to 
maximize shareholder value. As many have argued, there is no basis in law to support this claim. 
Some contractarians have responded by suggesting that courts should recognize such a duty in 
'change of control' transactions and by failing to do so are blocking the disciplining force of the 
market for corporate control.  At the 'normative' level, contractarian orthodoxy has its most 
serious traction. By justifying shareholder wealth maximization as the principle operating norm, 
it seeks to approach good governance through the implementation of self-regulating, contractual 
tools for spurring high performance, namely high powered executive compensation incentives. 
In brief, the contractual metaphor defines the corporation and the relationships between 
corporate actors in narrowly economic terms. It views the corporation as a nexus of contractual 
relationships entered into voluntarily by shareholders, creditors, managers, employees, customers 
and suppliers as opposed to a governance structure that contains positions of trust and 
dependence. 293 Firms are less costly alternatives to market transactions where various parties 
join their assets in production. 294 Corporate relationships and the allocation of rights, benefits 
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and risks are determined by the markets in which the firm operates.  295 The sole purpose of the 
corporation is to maximize wealth for the shareholders.  Likewise, the aim of corporate 
governance is to control the agency costs that arise from the implicit delegation of authority from 
shareholders to management. 296 This is justified on three grounds. 297 Contractions put faith in 
market mechanisms to impose constraints on management’s tendency to divert wealth from 
shareholders or to withhold their maximum effort.  Due to the contractual nature of corporate 
relations and the view that forces of competition in markets constrain the private choices of the 
parties, corporate law is seen as playing an enabling role. 298  
 
SECTION A: Shareholder Primacy's Normative Claims 
Proponents of the nexus of contracts model and the concomitant norm of shareholder 
primacy theorize that running the corporation in the interests of shareholders creates maximum 
societal welfare. The basis for this claim stems from neoclassical economic assumptions best 
encapsulated as follows: 
“A successful firm provides jobs for workers and goods and services for consumers. The more 
 appealing the goods to consumers, the more profit (and jobs).  Prosperity for stockholders, 
 workers and communities goes hand in glove with better products for consumers. Other 
 objectives, too, come with profit. Wealthy firms provide better working conditions and clean up 
 their outfalls; high profits produce social wealth that strengthens the demand for 
 cleanliness...wealthy societies purchase much cleaner and healthier environments than do 
 poorer nations-in part because well-to-do citizens want cleaner air and water, and in part because 
 they can afford to pay for it.” 299 
 
 The alleged triumph of the shareholder primacy model came to a climax in 2000 with the 
publication of the seminal and heavily disputed article by corporate legal scholars Henry 
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Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman “The End of History of Corporate Law” also known as the 
'end of history claim'. The following excerpt reflects the crux of the claim: 
“Despite the apparent divergence in institutions of governance, share ownership, capital markets, 
and business culture across developed economies, the basic law of the corporate form has already 
achieved a high degree of uniformity, and continued convergence is likely. A principal reason for 
convergence is a widespread normative consensus that corporate managers should act exclusively 
in the economic interests of shareholders, including non-controlling shareholders. This consensus 
on a shareholder-oriented model of the corporation results in part from the failure of alternative 
models of the corporation...Other reasons for the new consensus include the competitive success 
of contemporary British and American firms, the growing influence worldwide of the academic 
disciplines of economics and finance, the diffusion of share ownership in developed countries, 
and the emergence of active shareholder representatives and interest groups in major jurisdictions. 
Since the dominant corporate ideology of shareholder primacy is unlikely to be undone, its 
success represents the "end of history" for corporate law.” 300 
 
SECTION B: Shareholder Primacy's Internal Conflict: The Case of Takeovers 
The shareholder primacy model's internal conflict is manifest in the hostile takeover 
debate over the correct role of law in either protecting or constraining directors' discretion to 
resist a hostile bid. It divides contractarians essentially into two camps, shareholder-rights and 
director-primacy contractarians. These viewpoints in turn underpin competing accounts of the 
executive compensation issue in the nexus-of-contracts paradigm, the managerial power and 
optimal contracting approaches respectively. 
I. The Contractarian Justification for Takeovers 
The nexus of contracts model began to emerge in the late 1970's to explain and legitimate 
the wave of corporate takeovers that began to sweep across the U.S. corporate world. Law and 
economics scholars embraced this newly emerging form of capital market activity as the 
disciplining function of efficient markets against managerial slack and the rents of corporate 
control. 301  
Efficient capital markets coupled with effective disclosure rules in theory signaled to 
investors the presence of high agency costs which would prompt them to purchase control of the 
firm at what they perceived to be a bargain. This strategy, made possible by a competitive market 
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for capital, provided a solution for the various difficulties that shareholders faced in monitoring, 
replacing or disciplining directors who failed to reduce agency costs in the firm. 302 
 II. The Politics of Discretion: Stakeholder Statutes 
 In response to the wave of takeovers that swept the US business world in the 1980s, 
several states enacted stakeholder statutes as a means of strengthening directors' ability to resist 
hostile bids and to mitigate the harmful outwards effects of hostile takeovers. 303 Given that such 
transactions were feasible in the current framework of directors' discretion, Boards were able to 
block takeover bids for their firms, allowing them to protect their positions, despite generating 
agency costs. 304 The divide in contractarian thinking in the takeover context is underpinned by 
two competing theories discussed for blocking hostile bids. These in turn can be situated into 
broader theoretical frameworks that represent a fundamental disagreement over the role of 
directorial discretion in corporate governance and the efficacy of market forces.  
This engendered conflict between capital and incumbent Boards, the former of which 
would often allege that directors were in breach of their fiduciary duties. An early debate 
emerged on whether the existing level of discretion under the 'business judgment' rule represents 
an optimal and enduring arrangement produced by the market or whether it constitutes an 
arrangement which interferes with how the market functions. 305 The key issue was whether 
corporate judiciaries should uphold a legal duty to maximize shareholder wealth in the takeover 
context or whether discretion to pursue the long-term best interests of the corporation should be 
protected. 306 
 
 III. Shareholder Rights Contractarians 
A core premise of this perspective is that legally protected discretion amounts to State and 
judicial interference in the market for corporate control which leads to weak constraints on 
managerial power. Alternatively, allowing the market for corporate control to operate unimpeded 
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would control agency costs and lead to optimal arrangements between shareholders and 
management. Shareholder rights advocates propose several changes to increase shareholder 
power, their most pressing agenda is to 'unfetter' the market for corporate control. Arguing that 
shareholders should be able to exercise undistorted choice when faced with a takeover bid, 
Professor Bebchuk advocates for legal limits on takeover defenses. 307  When a takeover bid is 
made against a firm, management's and shareholders' interests sharply diverge, as directors' 
independence is threatened.  308   
 IV. Director Primacy Contractarians 
A core premise of this perspective is that the current configuration of corporate law, 
including legally protected discretion is an optimal outcome of market forces. State and judicial 
protection of directorial discretion to block a hostile bid stems from self-imposed limitations on 
the market for corporate control. While the end governance goal is shareholder wealth 
maximization, existing market forces and legal arrangements are said to be ideal for achieving 
the requisite norms of directorial conduct for achieving this end. 309 
 
SECTION C: The Outcome of Existing Market Forces 
Gordon Smith argues that the shareholder value norm remains the operative decision-rule 
for managing the firm, due to market forces, despite uncertainty whether a legal duty to 
maximize profits exists. Smith's fundamental position is that “changes in corporate law cannot 
eradicate poverty or materially change existing distributions of wealth, except by impairing the 
creation of wealth” and that changes in corporate law that will have an effect on labor inequality 
and the environment will make things worse not better.  310 In effect he argues that the claims 
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made by progressive corporate law scholars that changing corporate decision-making by either 
changing the structure of the Board or the shareholder value norm will not improve aggregate 
social wealth.  More specifically, Smith argues that changing the composition of the Board to 
include stakeholder interests “would not significantly change the profit-maximizing orientation 
of those firms” due to the power of product, capital, and managerial labor markets which 
“severely constrain the options available to managers”. 311  
Smith argues that existing Board structures persist because Boards recognize that the 
current structure and the discretion it affords to directors to pursue efficiency and profit-
maximization as the corporation’s predominant goal, are what ultimately makes sense for 
shareholders because it yields the most value and the best use of the corporation’s productive 
capacity.  Smith addresses the assertion made by Greenfield and other scholars that corporate law 
should not prevent directors from taking into account the societal interests that the corporation is 
ultimately meant to serve. 312 He argues that such a statement is actually irrelevant because the 
shareholder primacy norm in corporate law “is both unenforced and unenforceable” meaning that 
it is not an outcome of the law but of markets. 
I. Team Production Theory 
 Lynn Stout and Margaret Blair advance Team Production Theory (“TPT”) which is 
ultimately rooted in the nexus-of-contracts model of the firm. Like the above claim, it posits that 
the rules governing corporate actors, namely Board power and discretion is an efficient outcome 
of market forces. 313 However, TPT departs somewhat from shareholder primacy's core concepts. 
 TPT rejects the principle-agent theory of shareholder-management relations and posits 
the Board of Directors as a mediating hierarchy with shareholders necessarily having limited 
power over corporate decisions. 314  TPT claims that economic organization often requires the 
combined investment and coordinated effort of multiple groups. 315 If these inputs are firm 
specific and cannot be separated from the collective enterprise, serious problems arise with how 
to divide-up the economic surpluses generated, especially where the corporation's activities and 
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environment are highly dynamic and complex. 316 Preset rules guaranteeing claims encourage 
parties to reduce optimal efforts. 317 Attempts to divide surpluses during production, create 
opportunities for rent-extraction by managers, shareholders or labor. 318 
 Corporate law is an institutional substitute for explicit contracting. Parties opt into a 
governance structure, what Blair and Stout call, a mediating hierarchy, giving up property rights 
over their inputs and the venture's joint outputs to the corporate entity. A key function played by 
corporate law is to ensure the Board's independence from team members. Shareholders are given 
voting and legal rights only to discipline ineffective Board governance. TPT fundamentally 
differs from the organizational model in that it rejects the imposition of mandatory norms of 
behavior onto the Board that are shareholder or stakeholder based. 319  
 The most intriguing part of TPT is that it recognizes the effects of political forces on 
management orientation, coalition formation in the firm, and on how the Board allocates 
resources and risk between stakeholders. 320 Implicitly it recognizes a nexus between politics and 
market forces and attempts to explain why management orientation before the 1980s favored 
labor in the US. They suggest that shifting market and political forces in the 1980s re-configured 
the extent to which the Board considered shareholders' interests over those of labor, resulting in 
the current framework of director primacy. While they posit that director primacy has persevered 
due to the efficiency and optimality of this arrangement, they recognize a wide range of 
possibilities for how the firm can be run. 
 
 
SECTION D: Shareholder Primacy’s External Conflict 
Outside the nexus-of-contracts paradigm, State and judicial protection of directorial 
discretion can also be viewed as regulation against the outwards negative effects of the market 
for corporate control. Accepting that takeovers create efficiency and shareholder value, this view 
recognizes that such forces simultaneously impact societal welfare in a negative way. Rejecting 
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shareholder primacy’s normative claims that profit-seeking maximizes net societal welfare this 
perspective views the effects of capital market expansion as undermining the well-being of the 
firm’s non-shareholder constituent groups.  
Proponents of both director primacy and shareholder rights models periodically engage 
with the normative claims made under this perspective. A well-known exchange between Gordon 
Smith and Kent Greenfield accurately characterizes this debate. Greenfield employs an 
organizational/regulatory view to argue that other stakeholders such as creditors and employees 
should have legal rights in corporate law in some capacity. 321  Greenfield's view can be distilled 
to two general proposals to change corporate law. One is to change the decision rule which 
currently guides managerial conduct. The other is to change the decision-maker or at least re-
configure the existing framework of decision-makers to include stakeholders' voice.  
Greenfield focuses on the pervasive effects of corporate power on society which he refers 
to as “breaches of the public trust or the imposition of costly externalities on stakeholders or 
communities.” 322 Greenfield's concern is that “as globalization intensifies, the narrow 
shareholder/executive focus of U.S. corporate law is increasingly exported, displacing the more 
expansive, public-oriented view of corporations in other nations.” 323 He argues that the divide 
between internal shareholder and external stakeholder regulation is misguided and that non-
shareholder interests are better protected by internal rules governing managerial conduct. 324 
 
 
SECTION E: Executive Pay from a Contractual Perspective 
When applied to executive compensation, the contractual metaphor shifts the interests of 
shareholders to the forefront, misaligning their interests from the corporate entity. It focuses on 
the relationship between shareholders and management and problematizes managerial power as 
agency costs, defined as a failure of managers to pursue only strategies that maximize 
shareholder value.  At the Board level, this translates into a failure of directors to ensure that 
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managers adhere to shareholder interests alone. This suppresses the relevance of other interests 
to overall corporate performance and precludes governance orientations that serve a balancing 
function, justifying the shareholder value norm.  
 I. Why Bureaucratic Compensation Schemes? 
Contractarians claim that corporate governance was previously ineffective due to 
pressures from labor and pro-social groups to reduce the size of executive compensation.  This 
resulted in bureaucratic compensation schemes which failed to reward high levels of profit-
maximization. This gives rise to a puzzling question, if market forces lead to optimal outcomes, 
then why did such schemes pervade the corporate landscape before the 1990's? Contractarians 
explain that a lack of takeover activity previous to this model's emergence is attributable to a 
legal framework highly supportive of protections and benefits for labor, which interfered with 
optimal market outcomes. Moreover, market pressures were previously weak and allowed for 
managerial slack, making it easier for labor to influence management orientation.  In corporate 
governance, the underlying paradigm shift that needed to occur was for directors to understand 
their role as agents of the shareholders and to set compensation schemes that would compel 
efficiency, greater levels of risk, and profit-seeking.  
 II. Why Is Executive Pay Still A Problem? 
The optimal contracting and managerial power approaches previously addressed, 
represent competing views within the contractarian model over why this model fails to create 
good corporate governance through efficiency, high performance and maximum profits. These 
approaches can be overlaid onto the competing assertions of director versus shareholder primacy 
theorists.  
The optimal contracting approach is supported by director primacy's claim that the 
current balance of power between shareholders and management and the existing level of 
directorial discretion do not interfere prohibitively with how markets function. 325  Current 
market forces exert adequate pressure on directors to focus on shareholder value maximization 
and to create optimal pay incentives between executives and the corporation. In other words, 
notwithstanding inadequacies in design and best practice, there is no fundamental problem with 
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compensation contracts from a director primacy perspective. Proponents of optimal contracting 
attribute the role that incentive compensation played in the short-sighted management and 
excessive risk-taking that contributed to the crisis to perverse incentives. The potential role of 
capital markets and myopic inventors in precipitating perverse incentives is not acknowledged by 
this approach. Instead, optimal contracting theorists view the solution as better incentive 
structures and practices that more closely align shareholders' and management's interest without 
canvassing the possibility that many short-term investors might be satisfied with extracting short-
term wealth at the corporation's long-term expense. 
 The managerial power approach is supported by the claims of shareholder rights theorists 
that corporate law, namely the business judgment rule and the current balance of power between 
shareholders and the Board interferes with the disciplinary force of the market. 326 Despite the 
liberalization of markets that occurred in the 1980s, corporate law needs further reform to ensure 
that corporate takeovers occur without regulatory and judicial interference. The result is weak 
market forces which fail to exert pressure onto Boards to serve shareholders' interests by creating 
optimal performance incentives and controlling rent extraction. Executives exert counter-
pressure onto directors, permitting then to extract excessive levels pay and undermine incentives 
designed to constrain their own behavior.  
 
 
 
 
SECTION F: An Alternative Approach to Conceptualizing the Executive Pay Problem? 
 A third possible approach posits that if markets do exert significant pressure as the 
optimal contracting model suggests than the advent of these forces are responsible for the current 
phenomena of short-term behavior and excessive risk. Incentive compensation in fact does work 
as intended and effectively ties managerial behavior directly to the capital market. Being highly 
responsive to market forces managers exploit fundamental flaws in this market model.  
 The combination of significantly higher levels of pay and market forces prompt managers 
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to extract greater levels of rent while necessarily satisfying market demands. Thus, high powered 
incentive pay creates two sets of conflicting incentives. One, to create results in share price and 
two, to extract high amounts of rent. This is more a product of tying performance incentives to 
the capital market than a result of flawed design. In contrast, where market pressures are weak, 
the easier alternative is for executives to bargain for generous pay and take less risk, exert less 
effort, or engage in empire building. The fact that managers actually pursue short-term gains 
indicates that market pressures do significantly influence managerial conduct.  This approach be 
summarized as follows: 
 In order to maximize his personal wealth, the executive has a perverse incentive to focus 
 on only those programs and factors most closely affecting the amount of his compensation.  Since 
 his compensation depends on the company’s performance, and the company’s performance is 
 measured primarily by earnings-per-share or market price, the executive has incentive to do 
 whatever is necessary to prop up this quarter’s earnings or increase the market price of shares.  
 Instead of positioning the company for the future, which is an important objective of the  
 the executive’s attention is diverted to positioning the company to meet short-term goals.” 327 
 
 Unlike the managerial power theory, which holds that managers weaken the terms which 
bind them to perform optimally, this approach posits that managers do not manipulate their pay 
incentives to bind themselves to excessive risk-taking and extreme short-term strategies. This is 
better explained by powerful market forces and a pervasive shareholder value norm which 
compel directors to develop incentives which succeed in compelling executives to raise share 
price and take-on more risk.  
 
 While incentive compensation purports to solve the performance issue, it fails to address 
and potentially worsens other aspects of managerial power. Furthermore, it conflates differing 
aspects of managerial power, such as rent extraction and the outwards effects of risk-taking, with 
a lack of adequate performance. In sum, this third approach posits that the current outcome of 
market forces, short-sighted management and excessive risk-taking, is an inherent flaw of the 
market-based governance approach itself stemming from an over-reliance on efficiency and 
profit-based governance norms. The proposed solution then would be to introduce long-term 
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oriented norms of conduct for Boards to follow when setting executive pay to counter short-term 
orientations. This could include limiting the size of maximum compensation payable to insulate 
executives from myopic market forces.  
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PART III- Can Shareholder Primacy Accommodate Sustainable  
Long-Term Governance? 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: 
The Executive Compensation Debate as Competing Theories of the Firm 
 
These distinct perspectives of corporate law’s role are simultaneously instantiated in 
corporate legal statutes. 328 They are also reflected in the corporate judiciary’s treatment of 
corporate governance disputes which at certain times can be viewed as facilitating contracting 
while at others as imposing mandatory norms. 329 However, since its rise in the late 1970’s the 
presence of law and economics thinking in corporate law has increasingly challenged established 
corporate law doctrine. 330 By rejecting the imposition of behavioral norms in favor of market-
based solutions to a narrowly defined principle-agent problem between shareholders and 
management, the contractual view advocates for a 'laissez-faire' approach to corporate 
governance that suppresses the relevance of the entity metaphor under which the interests of non-
shareholder constituents can be accounted for. 331 
 Where the contractual approach attempts to prevail is the limitation it places on 
management's normative discretion to consider interests other than shareholder wealth 
maximization in the context of running the firm.  Yet, up to a certain point, it is not necessary for 
this prerogative to conflict with what corporate law attempts to achieve in terms of defining and 
imposing appropriate norms of conduct. However, we have reached a point at which we now 
stand in the post-crisis debate over executive compensation which has demonstrated that this 
                                                 
328  See Puri et al., supra note 196. 
329  Corporate legal statutes in the U.S. and Canada contain rules that establish non-negotiable terms for those choosing to 
adopt the corporate form while also providing “standard form contractual terms”.  For a discussion of the CBCA, see, Puri supra 
note 207. While some of these rules have proven to be ambiguous, the lines between what is mandatory and what can be contracted 
around have been established over time by courts.  See Bushell v. Faith, [1970] A.C. 1099, [1970] 1 All E.R. 53 (H.L.) and Kelly 
v. Electrical Construction Co., 1907 CarswellOnt 248, 16 O.L.R. 232 (Ont. C.P.).  
330  For a detailed discussion of the influence of law and economics thinking on corporate law and the tensions that exist 
between this view and previously established corporate law doctrine, see generally David Sciulli, supra note 2.  See also William 
Bratton, supra note 104. 
331  It does this directly by including in its definition of agency costs the consideration of non-shareholder interests.  Because 
this approach posits the market price of a firm as an accurate proxy for how well agency costs are controlled, actions taken to 
convey benefits onto stakeholders as part of a long-term strategy to create sustainable returns might signal the presence of agency 
costs because they lower current profitability.  
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prerogative has gone too far. The quest for higher performance has exacerbated managerial 
power and has significantly undermined the function that corporate law plays in protecting the 
corporation from damage at the hands of its management.  
Not only is this reflected in the post-crisis theoretical debate over the shareholder 
primacy norm that has since ensued, but it is central to the debate over executive compensation 
reform which to a large extent has failed to acknowledge the significance of this conflict for the 
optimal contracting paradigm from which compensation reform is being approached.  As the 
dominant approach to solving the managerial power problem in the firm, incentive compensation 
arguably has succeeded in displacing the entity model, thus weakening its mitigating function 
between the competing demands of capital and labor markets. While this approach of enabling 
capital and product markets to discipline managers was the inevitable consequence of the 
corporatist legacy, the important question raised is whether it addresses the full extent of 
managerial power in the firm or whether it provides further opportunities for managers to 
appropriate wealth by overemphasizing the profit motive and transmitting risk to other 
stakeholders? 
While strong product and capital are inevitable results of the LME framework’s historical 
development, the danger lies in allowing managers to advance shareholder interests in the 
interim, past the point where it begins to harm the corporate entity.  There needs to be a 
mechanism for reconciling the competing demands of these market forces with the interests of 
other groups to achieve an overall level of stability in the political economy.  While the previous 
solution has attempted to achieve this end by allowing for some level of agency costs, placing 
limits in effect on profit maximization, the current dilemma for achieving an appropriate 
discretionary balance is between increasing shareholder rights or accepting a ‘director primacy’ 
model of the firm. Questions arise whether either model results in sustainable governance and 
management practices.  
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SECTION A: What Would Increasing Shareholder Power Result In? 
 A relevant line of inquiry in the post-crisis context is whether the existing structure of 
corporate law conforms to a shareholder or director-centric model of governance. While this 
debate is academic, it underpins a normative debate on whether the current balance of power 
between capital and management should be maintained. 
 I. Theories of Director Governance 
  Professor Lynn Stout poses a challenge to the existing presumption that the shareholder 
primacy model best explains corporate law.  She argues that “shareholders do not have ultimate 
control over directors, directors do not always seek to maximize share price [and that] the rights 
granted to shareholders are limited in scope and they do not enable shareholders, as a matter of 
law or fact, to insist that managers act as their agents serving only their interests.” 332 She further 
asserts that promoters of companies will often seek to weaken shareholder powers and that 
shareholders do not object. 333 While the thrust of Stout’s argument is to assess whether corporate 
law and the corporation’s structure is consistent in actuality with the shareholder model, she also 
lays out several theoretical arguments against shareholder primacy as a basis for corporate 
governance reform.  
 The most relevant is the ‘Market Inefficiency and Director Primacy’ model.  This view 
highlights the weakness of agency theory's assertion that efficient markets price a company’s 
stock accurately so that it accounts for future risks and returns.  Emerging literature points to the 
fact that stock prices diverge from real value creating the opportunity for strategies to boost value 
in the short-term but harm the firm in the long-term. 334 This theory holds that all shareholders 
are better off to give control to a Board so that it can run the company for the benefit of long-
term stakeholders. 335 Thus, reforming corporate governance should not entail further reliance on 
capital markets but on stronger directorial decision-making and arguably on clearer norms of 
conduct. 
 
                                                 
332  Lynn Stout, supra note 16.  
333  Ibid. 
334  See Peter Boettke, “What Happened to “Efficient Markets”? 14 The Independent Review 363.  
335  See William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, “The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment” (2010) 158 U of 
Penn LR 653.  
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II. The Merits of Shifting Power to Shareholders 
 Professor Bainbridge argues that increasing shareholder involvement in corporate 
decisions can disrupt the mechanisms that make the public corporation feasible, the vesting of 
authority in the Board of Directors. 336 He cites that such a model is based on an organizational 
model of decision-making premised on consensus and authority. 337 Consensus is employed 
when voting stakeholders in a firm have similar interests and information and occurs at low cost 
while authority is exercised by the Board when the interests of voting stakeholders conflict and 
information is uneven. The Board balances interests in a manner consistent with the 
organization’s interests as a whole and stakeholders must live with this compromise, as it’s the 
most efficient. 
 III. “Ten Ways to Create Shareholder Value” 
 In response to the claim that increasing shareholder rights will increase shareholder 
value, the work of Alfred Rappaport suggests many firms sacrifice sustained growth for short-
term gain to satisfy short-term earnings expectations. He cites that 80% of executives would 
sacrifice critical R & D spending to bolster quarterly earnings, limiting opportunity to create 
enduring value for shareholders. He identifies 10 principles that firms can follow to create lasting 
value: 
 1) Do not manage earnings or provide earnings guidance; 
 2)   Make strategic decisions that maximize expected value, even at the expense   
  of near-term earnings; 
 3) Make acquisitions that maximize expected value, even at the expense of near-  
  term earnings; 
 4) Carry only assets that maximize value; 
 5) Return cash to shareholder when there are no credible value-creating    
  opportunities to invest in the business; 
 6) Reward CEOs and other senior executives for delivering superior long-term   
  results; 
 7) Reward operating-unit executives for adding superior multi-year value;  
 8) Rewards middle managers and front-line employees for delivering superior   
  performance on the key value drivers that they influence directly; 
                                                 
336  Stephen M. Bainbridge, “Remarks on Say on Pay: An Unjustified Incursion on Director Authority” (4 March 2008) 
UCLA School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-0. 
337  Bainbridge, Ibid. (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, “The Limits of Organization” (1974) 68-70).  
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 9) Require senior executives to bear the risks of ownership just as shareholders do; 
 10) Provide investors with value-relevant information. 
 
In sum, these principles are underpinned by a strong claim that director primacy is 
necessary to allow Boards to implement lasting long-term sustainable performance. Shareholders 
themselves lack an incentive to sacrifice short-term gains in the manner described. Thus, 
incentive contracts which tie shareholder expectations directly to management strategies 
preclude managers from implementing long-term strategies. Reliance on incentive contracts by 
Boards displaces the exercise of discretion to create long-term shareholder value.  
However, the case against increasing shareholder power advanced by director primacy 
theorists fails to assess whether the manner in which directors currently balance the interests of 
voting versus non-voting stakeholders in the presence of existing market forces leads to 
sustainable wealth creation. If directors succumb to short-term pressures and implement policies 
which tie shareholders’ myopic expectations directly to managerial decision-making, can existing 
compensation arrangements be said to be optimal? Bainbridge seems to suggest that overall 
current arrangements are optimal. However, these are not entirely consistent with Rappaport’s 
principles for creating shareholder value. 
 
SECTION B: What Arrangements Do Existing Market Forces Lead To? 
The key question then is what director primacy actually looks like in practice and how 
recent events surrounding the crisis and executive pay should be explained. Is rejecting greater 
shareholder control in favour of allowing Boards to retain their discretion suitable for 
constraining short-term behaviour, excessive risk-taking and the outwards effects of corporate 
power? The claim of E. Merrick Dodd in the post-Depression context is essentially the claim of 
director primacy theorists today. However the effects of existing market forces on management 
orientation need to be better accounted for. 
I. The Politics of Finance 
The politics of finance literature offers an explanation for why and how the shareholder 
primacy model is unsustainable. Being rooted in political economy, it overlaps with newly 
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emerging corporate legal theory that challenges shareholder primacy. Its key contributions are 
that it alternatively explains what drives the market and what the prospects are for market based 
governance norms. 338 Written after the financial crisis, the work of Sanford Jacoby on finance 
and labor is concerned more generally with examining patterns of economic development and 
crises on the one hand and financial inequality and the distribution of economic risk in society on 
the other to explain how corporate governance might be changing in response to the latest 
financial crisis.  In particular the literature seeks to explain the increased economic and political 
significance of finance and the shift that most developed countries have made away from 
“industrial capitalism” towards “financial capitalism” and how it might be changing in the post-
crisis period.  The changes associated with this shift that he refers to as financial development 
pertain mostly to how business corporations are operated and governed.  They include, the 
expansion and fluctuation of capital markets since the 1980’s; the rise in finance-derived 
incomes and occupations; the increasing role of corporations as short-term investment vehicles 
and; the dominant influence of shareholders over corporate decision making and executive pay. 
The literature also seeks to explain the concomitant rises in income inequality, 
employment risk, wage and employment volatility, and the shifting of responsibility to 
employees for pensions that have also occurred since the 1980’s and whether they have any 
relationship to this process of financial development and the changes that have occurred in 
corporate governance.  In attempting to account for and explain these changes it explores the 
relationship between a rise in financial capitalism and levels of income and risk inequality.  In 
doing so it challenges the dominant view of 'economic liberalism' that purports to explain these 
phenomena as a natural expansion of the self-regulating market. In particular it focuses on the 
corporate governance aspects of these phenomena by examining the relationship between how 
business corporations are governed and why swings in financial development and inequality 
occur.  Its premise directly challenges not only the law and economics assertion that markets can 
adequately regulate corporate agents but also the view put forth by contractarians that the 
solutions to reforming corporate governance to avoid or mitigate future crises lie in bolstering 
how these liberal market mechanisms work.  
                                                 
338  For a detailed explanation of the 'Politics of Finance' see Jacoby, supra note 1.  
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The crux of the argument is that the past and current trajectory of economic development 
and patterns of crises can be explained as a political contest between those who drive and benefit 
from financial development and those who experience income and risk inequality. The 
prominence and decline of finance and financial interests over the last century and the rise and 
fall of inequality are interrelated by cause and effect and are driven by a political process.  This is 
referred to as “the politics of finance” which holds that the economic changes since the 1980’s 
can be explained as a prominent period for finance which creates a rise in inequality and risk. 
Elite beneficiaries of finance exert political pressure on governments and regulators to develop 
policies that favor the expansion of finance and the establishment of the unregulated or “self-
regulating market”.  This is evidenced by corporate governance arrangements that emphasize 
short-term returns for shareholders, executive pay incentives aimed at creating short-term value, 
self-regulatory governance arrangements such as stock options aimed at aligning shareholder and 
manager interests and much of the corporate takeover activity in the 1980’s which resulted in 
firms being used as short-term investment vehicles and arbitrage.   
This in turn causes wealth to flow to top income groups in the form of increased 
investment gains and finance-based incomes such as executive pay.  At the same time a wide 
coalition of groups in the lower income brackets such as workers and sometimes middle class 
income earners exert political pressure to resist financial expansion and sometimes succeed in 
causing finance to contract.  This is evidenced by labor union activity and the prevalence of 
institutions aimed at smoothing inequality and risk such as pension schemes and employer 
funded safety nets for employment and health risk. 
To politics of finance premise is founded on the work of Karl Polanyi written in the 
1940’s about a phenomenon called the “Double Movement” which provides the underlying 
theory for the relationship between financial expansion and inequality. 339 Accordingly Polanyi’s 
theory challenges the economic liberalism paradigm by showing that the expansion of the “free” 
and “self-regulating” market is actually embedded in the politics and culture of a society and that 
markets themselves are ineffective at correcting the negative effects of market expansion.  As 
market expansion intensifies, counter-movements against market expansion erupt to resist these 
negative effects. Elites in society aim to establish an unregulated market that operates in their 
                                                 
339  Polanyi, supra note 22. 
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favor until that particular market reaches a turning point signaled by a crisis or failure at which 
its negative effects are the most intense.  This is usually followed by a movement to contain the 
market failure and establish a new economic order which better protects society.   
The politics of financial development view not only applies to contests that happen in 
policy arenas but inside the corporation as well. Within corporations there is a contest over the 
allocation of a corporation’s surplus or “value-added” between shareholders, executives, workers 
and the corporation’s retained earnings. Corporate governance arrangements affect this 
distribution.  Different actors within the corporation over time have been arranged into different 
factions.  The historical arrangement of these factions within the firm is consistent with and 
explains the swings in financial development and inequality over the last century.  The period 
before the Great Depression was characteristic of a coalition of shareholders and executives 
against worker interests.  Consequently, income and risk inequality for workers was increasing 
up until the crisis in 1929.  After this period, there was a progressive shift towards the alignment 
of executive and worker interests against shareholders, which saw significant improvements in 
income inequality and the establishment of mechanisms to smooth and mitigate the wage and 
unemployment risks faced by employees.  This arrangement continued until 1980 which marked 
a turning point at which shareholder interests started to become aligned with executives against 
the interests of workers due to the deregulation of policies that supported wealth distributing and 
risk smoothing mechanisms. The period since 1980 saw an unprecedented rise in financial 
development which has come to an end with the financial crisis. 
 A key premise of the liberal market claim is that the alignment of executive and 
shareholder interests requires self-regulating market mechanisms. Managerial power is held in 
check through the self-interest and greed of shareholders.  The politics of finance demonstrates 
that profit seeking as a means of holding managers accountable damages the long-term prospects 
of the firm in which employees, communities, and the public have a long-term interest.  In other 
words the self-regulating market as a governance mechanism is prone to failure because it allows 
some constituents to extract significant wealth from the corporation at the corporation’s expense 
which damages other interests in the process. This challenges the view that inadequate adherence 
to shareholder interests leads to breakdowns in corporate governance and also that existing 
market forces lead to optimal outcomes. 
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II. Post-Crisis Assessments of the Market’s Governance Prospects 
 The post-crisis debate over corporate governance amongst leading corporate law scholars 
engages with the debate in corporate law “over whether directors should consider the interests of 
shareholders only or a wider constituency of stakeholders that includes groups such as 
consumers”. 340  While this question is at the heart of the matter, the consequences of how this 
question is answered relate directly to the question of what types of economic arrangements put 
the corporation’s productive resources to their best use; ensure that those who exercise power 
and control over deploying these resources do so in a responsible manner; and enhance our 
aggregate social welfare. Written in the context of the financial crisis where we saw the near 
demise of long-standing financial institutions, this debate questions some the key tenets that 
underpin our current economic systems.  It calls into question our current approach to the social 
control of economic life, the self-regulating market, and our understanding of what the business 
corporation is.  Several of the scholars who engage with this debate respond directly to 
Hansmann and Kraakman’s “End of History of Corporate Law” claim which asserted in 2001 
that shareholder primacy was the dominant uncontested form of economic ordering.  341 
 One line of inquiry advance by Professor David Millon, looks at the shareholder primacy 
model more in terms of how the corporation is run as a matter of governance. It focuses on the 
interplay between corporate law and how the corporation is run and also on the non-legal factors 
that shape corporate behavior. It provides a basis for proposing how the corporation should be 
run as a matter of practice, which governance theory provides a better working model, and 
whether the practice of shareholder primacy, defined here as running the corporation in 
shareholders’ short-term interests, is changing. Millon assesses whether a shift is occurring in the 
post-crisis period away from shareholder primacy towards a model called Enlightened 
Shareholder Value which holds that “the corporation should pursue shareholder wealth with a 
long-run orientation that seeks sustainable growth and profits based on responsible attention to 
the full range of relevant stakeholder interests”. 342 His main argument is “risk management 
practices are helping in reinterpreting the corporate goal and in promoting the consideration of 
                                                 
340  See Vasudev and Watson, supra note 17.  
341  See Hansmann and Kraakman, supra note 158.  
342  David Millon, supra note 17.  
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stakeholder interests in ways that resonate with notions of corporate social responsibility”. 343 He 
asserts as a testable hypothesis that market forces are exerting pressure onto business to shift 
away from myopic labor and environmental tendencies because of the realization that these 
practices carry significant risk.  He concludes that market forces are currently not oriented 
towards affecting a significant shift towards ESV and legislation and corporate law must 
therefore play a role in influencing corporate behavior.   
 
 Another line of inquiry advanced by Professor Leonard I. Rotman, focuses more heavily 
on assessing the efficacy of the shareholder primacy norm as an underlying basis for corporate 
governance.  This view looks more at shareholder primacy’s track record, its impact on social 
wealth, and its effectiveness in constraining managerial power and whether corporate governance 
should continue to rely on the shareholder primacy norm or embrace a longer-term more 
stakeholder-inclusive view to managing the corporation. Rotman argues that the two major 
corporate law cases that shareholder primacy theorists rely upon to make their case, Dodge v 
Ford Motor Co (1919) and Revlon Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc (1986) do not in 
fact establish a shareholder primacy norm and are more consistent with a stakeholder inclusive 
view of governance.  From this he concludes that the foundational corporate law issues of 
corporate identity (what is the corporation in law?) and corporate purpose (who should the 
corporation be run for?) are not resolved as Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman 
suggested a decade earlier.  He addresses some flaws he sees in the shareholder primacy model, 
namely that “shareholder primacy unduly skews the focus of corporate directors” and refers to 
Enron and the recent financial crisis as examples of how “market pressures and managerial 
incentives cause unwarranted risk-taking that benefits management and shareholders in the short-
term, but may ultimately lead to the demise of the corporation.” 344 
 
 
 
                                                 
343  Ibid.  
344  See Rotman, supra note 21.  
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SECTION C: To What Extent Can Directors Consider the Interests of Other Stakeholders? 
 Both director and shareholder primacy contractarians argue that market forces lead, or 
could lead if unfettered, to optimal management orientations. The extreme view, that of Gordon 
Smith, is that such forces cannot be readily resisted by management and militate towards profit 
maximizing activities. Shareholder rights advocates accept implicitly (by failing to refute) that 
such forces are strong enough to counter pressure from labor to form a coalition with 
management, but argue that such forces are not strong enough to counter managerial slack and 
rent extraction itself. By removing obstacles to effective operation of the market for corporate 
control, Board veto and poison pills, market forces would inevitably compel greater profit 
seeking. The Varieties of Capitalism literature, earlier discussed, also predicts that managers and 
capital are more likely to coordinate on short-term strategies, as institutional complementarities 
like fluid labor markets, highly liquid capital markets, strong investor protection, and widely held 
ownership make these strategies more feasible in the LME. However, there is reason to question 
the extent to which capital market pressures can be resisted by directors and whether doing so 
could still result in productive and efficient firms.   
 A recent study from Australia, typically an LME, demonstrates that management of 
public and privately owned corporations, although strongly affected by product and capital 
market pressures, can for the most part, resist pressure from investors for immediate gains and 
still be successful over the long-run. The particularly intriguing aspect of this study is that firms 
with widely held ownership in the context of strong investor protection and fluid labor markets 
can develop partnership style relations with their employees defined as “situations in which 
business organizations are seen to work closely and cooperatively with their employees rather 
than contrary to their interests.” 345 The authors focus their study on three principle factors 
dominant in the Varieties of Capitalism literature: corporate governance arrangements, the 
ownership structure of firms, and systems of employment and examine their intersection within 
the context of the legal-institutional environment to assess their impact on employee-
management partnerships. Their findings challenge the dual model classification that underpins 
the comparative capitalism literature, demonstrating that significant variations of governance 
arrangements can exist within a particular LME due to other sets of factors that give rise to 
                                                 
345  Richard Mitchell, Anthony O’Donnell, Shelley Marshall, Ian Ramsay and Meredith Jones, Law, Corporate 
Governance and Partnerships at Work: A Study of Australian Regulatory Style and Business Practice (Ashgate Publishing 2011). 
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partnership type scenarios between workers and the corporation. 
Several of the companies in the study, despite undergoing significant internal change as a 
result of their capital reorganization were able to exercise a fair degree of autonomy over 
corporate strategy. Using a company study and survey of corporate directors, the authors tested 
the presuppositions they made based on the VOC literature that the governance of a widely held 
company is more likely to correspond with prioritizing shareholder over stakeholder interests 
while a closely held company is less likely to be governed in the short-term interests of its 
shareholders. 346 Some of the results of the survey were that 44% of directors ranked 
shareholders as their first priority while 40.4% ranked the company as their first priority. 347 
More notably, 55% percent of directors viewed acting in the best interests of the corporation as 
balancing stakeholder interests including employees despite the ownership structure of the 
company. 348 Interestingly, the authors found that employees were highly ranked in other areas of 
the survey and where a shareholder-oriented governance outlook persisted it was not at the 
extreme end of the spectrum. 349 
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PART IV-What is the Magnitude of the Current Shift in Governance Thinking? Is it 
Compatible with a Market-Based Approach?      
                                                                                                                                                                      
CHAPTER EIGHT: 
Indicators of a Post Crisis Shift in Thinking 
 
  After analyzing how the current approach conflicts with corporate law's function in 
protecting the entity, we can examine post-crisis responses to compensation reform with a view 
to determining the extent to which the existing paradigm can accommodate the challenges 
identified. This is performed as a comparative exercise between two governance regimes, 
Germany's coordinated market economy and the liberal market economy of the United States.   
 The significance of comparing these jurisdictions is not only that their approaches to 
market regulation contrast but that they're equally subject to the Financial Stability Board's 
directive on executive pay reform. While several assessments of post-crisis responses to 
compensation reform, namely the implementation of the FSB Principles on Sound Remuneration 
Practices across the LME and CME spectrum, gravitate towards the conclusion that market-
based norms of governance need to be improved through better contracting, 350 a deeper 
assessment stands to reveal that such changes cannot be accommodated from this paradigm.   
 The overarching theme of controlling excessive risk-taking and advancing a longer term 
approach to running the firm, when implemented in either jurisdiction, calls forward an 
economic rationale on the part of directors that is inconsistent with efficiency and performance 
based norms of directorial conduct.  Despite the attempt by mainstream scholarship to reconcile 
some of the differences that appear in regulatory responses between jurisdictions as fitting within 
the optimal contracting paradigm, these differences, it is argued, represent fundamentally 
divergent approaches to market governance.  
 While this has potentially significant implications for the convergence/divergence debate 
which underlies post-crisis assessments of compensation reform, from a methodological 
                                                 
350  For post-crisis assessments of regulatory responses to executive pay that gravitate towards this conclusion see 
Hausmann and Bechtold-Orth, supra note 18; Ferrarini and Ungureanu, supra note 23. See also Stephen Bainbridge, supra note 
82 (arguing there is no real problem with executive pay in the post crisis context).  
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standpoint the issue is two-fold. First, it is important to assess whether differences in regulatory 
approach can be reconciled with shareholder primacy or whether they diverge.  The result of this 
determines the position we can take on whether corporate governance is continuing to converge 
towards a more liberal market based model or whether the approaches of certain jurisdictions are 
diverging. While this in itself is instructive of shareholder primacy's efficacy in the post-crisis 
era, it does not show whether shareholder primacy in its own context reveals any internal 
consistencies with the need to constrain risk-taking and the pursuit of short-term profit. This 
gives rise to the second issue, whether post-crisis responses in the United States reveal at best a 
shift away from shareholder primacy and at least inconsistency with the need to run large public 
corporations sustainably and in the public interest. However, to determine whether such a shift is 
evident, we need a basis of comparison to determine where along a spectrum of governance 
approaches they might fit, hence again the need to rely on a comparative approach. 
 
SECTION A: Framework of Analysis 
 The principal criterion of selection for these regulatory responses is that they have some 
type of impact on the Board of Directors’ role moving forward from the crisis.  These initiatives 
are not necessarily direct changes to directors’ duties, although in the German context this seems 
to be the case. Many of these initiatives represent changes or refinements in the context that 
director’s duties are understood.  To examine these initiatives the following questions will be 
asked:  
 
1. Does the provision represent a new behavioral norm for directors requiring additional due 
diligence, a consideration of new circumstances or the following of new procedures when 
setting or approving compensation? 
  
2. Is it mandatory or enabling? Does it impose extra-economic or efficiency based norms of 
conduct?  Does it require directors to account for how executive pay impacts the corporate 
entity or to engage predominantly in arm’s length bargaining? 
 
3. Is the effect of the provision such that it results in the interests of other stakeholders being 
taken into account by directors when setting executive pay and does it result in directors 
prioritizing the firm’s well-being over immediate shareholder returns? 
 
4. Is the effect of the provision such that directors utilize performance criteria other than share 
price to gauge whether executive compensation schemes are acceptable? 
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SECTION B: Norm Generation at the International Level: FSF Principles 
 As a response to the events that led to the crisis, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) 
developed 9 principles for remuneration which pertain to senior employees in large firms. 351 At 
the time of their release and anticipated implementation by national banking and securities 
regulators in OECD nations, there was speculation that these principles would extend to large 
and systemically important firms outside the financial sector. 352 The 9 principles are as follows: 
 
 1. The firm’s board of directors must actively oversee compensation system  
    design and operation. 
 
 2.  The firm’s board of directors must monitor and review the compensation system  
      to ensure the system operates as intended. 
 
 3.  Staff engaged in financial and risk control must be independent, have  
      appropriate authority, and be compensated in a manner that is independent of  
      the business areas they oversee and commensurate with their key role. 
 
 4.  Compensation must be adjusted for all types of risk. 
 
 5.  Compensation outcomes must be symmetric with risk outcomes. 
 
 6.  Compensation payout schedules must be sensitive to the time horizon of risks. 
 
 7.  The mix of cash, equity and other forms of compensation must be consistent with  
      risk alignment. 
 
 8.  Supervisory review of compensation practices must be rigorous and sustained,  
      and deficiencies must be addressed promptly with supervisory action. 
 
 9.  Firms must disclose clear, comprehensive and timely information about their  
      compensation practices to facilitate constructive engagement by all stakeholders. 
 
 
 In its final report which was a product of several consultations and reports engaged in by 
its Workstream Group, the FSF set-out its rationale behind such changes and particular issues 
that needed to be addressed. 353 Of general importance was the shared belief by market 
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participants that executive remuneration practices were responsible for driving inappropriate 
risk-taking practices which culminated in the crisis. 354 Of specific importance is the recognition 
that up until the crisis compensation systems for senior executives have been viewed 
predominantly as performance or risk-enhancing tools not related to risk management and 
governance. Risk management was handled outside the corporate governance realm and 
executive compensation was conceptualized as the principle governance tool, implemented to 
control managerial slack by spurring short-term profit creation. 
 This process of norm creation at the supra-national level, has identified the need to focus 
on how compensation systems can encourage managers to overwhelm existing risk management 
and control systems. 355 In line with this rationale, is the need to recognize the risk implications 
of basing compensation systems strictly on the profit motive. The FSF makes it clear that the 
traditional risk management policies of financial institutions which focus on prudent credit 
granting and underwriting practices are not adequate to address the issue of risk-taking and the 
pursuit of aggressive short-term growth at the upper echelons of the organization. 356  Thus, the 
norms developed by the FSF have broader implications for corporate governance practices 
outside the typical purview of banking regulation and financial sector governance.  
 The 9 principles can be divided across three areas. 357 The FSF provides further rationale 
for why these are necessary: 
1. Effective governance of compensation contained in principles 1 to 3. 
2. Effective alignment of compensation with prudent risk-taking contained in principles 4 to 7. 
3. Effective supervisory oversight and engagement by stakeholders contained in principles 8-9. 
 
 I. Effective Governance 
 According to the FSF, improving the effectiveness of how compensation is governed 
entails recognizing that directors must account for how compensation interacts with the 
institution's risk governance. Otherwise firms enacting enhanced risk governance measures risk 
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not complying with the substance of the required changes. 358 A key development in this area is 
that Boards should be responsible for the compensation system's design and operation. The key 
thrust of this change is that delegation of compensation to independent experts or auditors is not 
a substitute for the Board's requirement to have their own expertise at understanding issues 
pertaining to risk in compensation.  Boards can no longer rely on the self-regulating nature and 
design of executive pay incentives and must take actual charge in monitoring how compensation 
contributes to risk and to readily control and adjust compensation in relation to the firm. 
 The actual outcomes of compensation must be assessed against the compensation's intent 
with a view to ensuring these outcomes don't harm the firm. Of principal importance is to that 
current credit is not given for future revenue or growth within the compensation arrangement. 
Directors must actively monitor compensation systems to ensure they do not reward performance 
which hasn't yet materialized and concurrently to ensure that failed yet non-materialized risk is 
accounted for in the compensation structure. 
 II. Effective Alignment 
 According to the FSF, the second area focuses on the risk imposed by the senior 
employee on the firm which has not yet materialized. 359 It highlights the need to make 
compensation sensitive to future risk outcomes, especially in the case of short-term profits 
generated by that employee. This is especially important where the executive's tenure is near its 
end and it pays for the executive to engage in short-term behavior and risk-taking, knowing that 
he will escape the consequences under current arrangements. Moreover, poor risk management 
results should in theory result in directors reducing payment to managers. With respect to 
ensuring that compensation is aligned with prudent risk-taking, FSF Principles 4-7 seek to ensure 
that directors assess outcomes of compensation against risk-management goals, ensuring 
compensation pay-out schedules reflect the potential for future risks. 
 These principles are a direct response to the problems in existing compensation schemes 
consisting largely of stock ownership. The FSF recognizes that such incentives expose managers 
to losses in stock value for poor performance, resulting in excessive risk-taking potentially to 
offset these losses, with little attention being paid to downside risk. Accordingly if weak relative 
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performance from managerial slack or exogenous forces punishes managers, then taking more 
risk is a way to offset this by boosting short-term performance. This is driven by the fact that 
many shareholders are focusing on short-term results, making equity prices sensitive to short-
term performance criteria. The FSF concludes that traditionally structured options and bonus 
grants create incentives to take too much risk and that the goal should be to match executive 
incentives with the long-term stewardship of the firm. The FSF recognizes that the use of such 
tools would likely have to be curtailed and that this might have an impact on incentives for 
performance and talent retention.   
 III. Effective Supervisory Oversight 
 The FSF identifies the need for long-term supervisory oversight to offset countervailing 
pressures, presumably for short-term returns. 360 It advocates for greater engagement by the 
firm's stakeholders in compensation related decisions which includes but is not limited to a 
greater role for shareholders. It can be reasonably inferred that this is not meant as a substitute 
for other measures proposed, but as a complementing measure. Principles 8-9 relate directly to 
the need for greater information disclosure, not only to shareholders but to regulators and 
governments where firms are systemically important, and for greater engagement with 
compensation decisions. Principles 8-9 in effect represent the FSF's endorsement of non-binding 
say on pay provisions. The FSF also identifies the need for supervisory authorities such as 
banking and securities regulators to actively monitor and identify and bring to the Board's 
attention, deficiencies in a firm's compensation arrangements. Direct intervention in 
compensation practices that are unsound from a risk standpoint is recommended for large 
systemically important financial institutions and possibly for other large non-financial 
institutions.  
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SECTION C: Norm Generation at the EU Level: CEBS Guidelines 
 The European Banking Authority “EBA” is an independent EU authority tasked with the 
prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions in EU member states and for 
harmonizing prudential rules into a European Single Rulebook. The predecessor of the EBA was 
the Committee of European Banking Supervisors “CEBS” established in 2004 as an independent 
advisory group on banking supervision by the European Commission “EC”.  Tasked with a 
directive of facilitating the convergence of financial supervisory practices in the EU, the 
committee played a key role on the European scene, developing standards for reforming 
executive compensation practices in response to the financial crisis. Mirroring to a large extent 
the principles disseminated by the FSF, the CEBS developed the 'High-level Principles for 
Remuneration Policies in response to the crisis. 361 The set of principles is as follows:  
 1.  The financial institution should adopt an overall remuneration policy that is in line with  
  its business strategy and risk tolerance, objectives, values and long-term interests. It  
  should not encourage excessive risk-taking. The remuneration policy should cover  
  the institution as a whole and contain specific arrangements that take into account the  
  respective roles of senior management,  risk takers and control functions. Control  
  functions should be adequately rewarded to attract skilled individuals. 
 
 2.  The remuneration policy should be transparent internally and adequately disclosed  
  externally. 
 
 3.  The management body, in its supervisory function, should determine the remuneration of  
 the management body in its management function. In addition the management body,   
 in its supervisory function, should approve the principles of the overall remuneration   
 policy of the institution and maintain oversight of their application. The implementation   
 of the remuneration policy should be subject to central and independent review. 
 
 4.  Where the pay award is performance related, remuneration should be based on a     
 combination of individual and collective performance. When defining individual      
 performance, factors apart from financial performance should be considered. The       
 measurement of performance, as a basis for bonus awards, should include adjustments for  
 risks and the cost of capital. 
 5.  There should be a proportionate ratio between base pay and bonus. Where a significant  
  bonus is paid, the bonus should not be a pure up-front cash payment but contain a  
  flexible, deferred component; it should consider the risk horizon of the underlying  
  performance. 
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 Of key importance in these principles, is a focus on clearly separating supervisory and 
managerial roles at the upper echelons of the organization. 362 This distinction is characteristic of 
most corporate entities, but more pronounced in some EU members' corporate governance 
regimes such as Germany's co-determined board system. Following this distinction, the CEBS 
guidelines further emphasize the need to insulate performance-based aspects of an organization's 
internal governance from risk-management aspects. 363 Thus, employees in risk-management and 
oversight positions are not to be rewarded based on the financial performance of the enterprise 
but on sound governance practices instead. 
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CHAPTER NINE: 
Conflicting Views on the Significance of Post-Crisis Responses to Compensation 
 
 Implementation of the FSF principles was intended to be executed by banking and 
securities regulators of OECD states and in the case of the CEBS Guidelines, by regulators in EU 
member states. Corporate law was to play a role, but its extent was unclear at the time. In the 
twelve month period after the crisis began to subside, legislators began to roll out various 
measures aimed at regulating executive compensation. This provided an opportunity for 
corporate scholarship to analyze these legal provisions and the approaches to governance they 
represent. The debates inherent in this analysis require further exploration to understand the 
conflict entrenched in narratives of compensation reform. Several differences and similarities 
exist with how nations choose to regulate compensation in response to the goals identified by the 
FSF and CEBS.  These, for the most part, are accounted for as differences in the scope and 
intensity of the application of these principles and differing sets of compromises between rules 
versus principles based approaches. 364 While comprehensive, such a legal analysis is limited for 
understanding the deeper issues at play. A legal analysis superficially reconciles differences in 
approach and takes for granted the underlying paradigm shift that might be occurring. 365 
 In the post crisis analysis of compensation reform across several jurisdictions, two views 
to appear to exist. One is that current regulatory approaches are consistent with the shareholder 
primacy paradigm and represent improvements to how the optimal contracting model functions 
while the other is that post-crisis responses represent a paradigm shift away from optimal 
contracting. In the LME context each approach corresponds with either leaving directorial 
discretion intact or constraining business judgement with stakeholder based norms. In the case of 
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corporate governance in the CME context, namely Germany, the debate manifests as either a 
continuation of convergence towards market based governance norms, with the consensus that 
the self-regulatory approach needs to be improved versus the view that coordinated market 
economies have renewed their path of divergence away from such norms. 366 
 
SECTION A: Compensation Reform as Market-Based Regulation 
 One branch of the literature can be viewed as fitting into a perspective on post-crisis 
regulation that accepts the optimal contracting model's efficacy as its core assumption. This view 
reconciles differences in approach using a legal perspective and by doing so is able to conclude 
that post-crisis responses are aimed at better aligning shareholder and manager interests to 
achieve better performance. 
 The fundamental objective of compensation reform identified is sustaining market 
confidence and promoting financial stability by removing incentives for inappropriate risk-taking 
by managers. Yet this analysis falls short of recognizing key differences between mandatory 
versus enabling rules. 367 Without this distinction the law and economics approach's dominance 
can be taken for granted. A greater focus on whether enabling rules are being displaced by 
mandatory norms of conduct could lend itself to a more accurate analysis of whether a paradigm 
shift is occurring. While this approach clearly recognizes the need for firms to focus on long-
term rather than short-term performance, 368 it fails to assess how this is possible, what it actually 
takes and why it hasn't occurred up until now under current market-based arrangements. 
 The assumption seems to be that adjustments to compensation incentives can be made 
without considering the magnitude of such a shift or its structural significance. A primary means 
identified to long-term firm stewardship is the linking of total variable compensation to the 
overall condition of the firm. 369 Yet, the extent to which a long-term governance orientation in 
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the LME context is possible is not assessed let alone acknowledged, taking for granted what a 
long-term shift actually entails in the current legal institutional-framework. The question arising 
is whether such a proposal can be accommodated or whether it requires a different set of norms 
that insulate directorial decision-making from the economic dictates of the market. 
 
SECTION B: Compensation Reform as Regulation of the Market 
 Another branch of the literature fits into the perspective that post-crisis regulation of 
executive pay represents a paradigm shift away from the non-interventionist approach. 370 This 
approach recognizes the significance of executive pay being a corporate governance problem 
before the 1990s after which it was re-conceptualized as a corporate governance tool.  371 By 
recognizing the primary focus of this paradigm as the design of optimal contracts, this view is 
able to take account of any shift in approach that might be occurring.  
 The evidence to support the premise that such shift is occurring is multifaceted and can 
be found in a limited number of post crisis analyses of compensation reform. The first point 
observed from this viewpoint about the post-financial crisis landscape is that unlike Enron, 
executive pay is a major focal point of reform. 372 This is significant because under the previous 
post-Enron round of regulation, the focus was on the CEO's entitlement to their compensation 
and the misstating of earnings to appropriate more pay. 373 This response tackled issues of fraud 
which to a large extent fell under the purview of fiduciary duties. The expanded focus on 
compensation incentives in the post-crisis round demonstrates a focus on how incentives work. 
  Given that short-termism and excessive risk are problematized as issues with wide 
ranging societal implications, this preoccupation extends well past the issue of performance and 
managerial slack. The framework used to analyze post-crisis regulatory responses by OECD 
nations is telling of a paradigm shift that might be occurring. However, the analysis is still 
limited by the legal lens employed. However, it is recognized that the choice between the arm’s 
length bargaining or managerial power approaches presented in the previous version of this 
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debate has shifted. 374 Thus by appreciating the evolution of the pay debate and its transition into 
the law and economics paradigm, this approach is equipped to recognize developments outside 
of its confines, making it possible to identify several regulatory themes which serve as evidence 
that compensation reform currently focuses on a wider set of actors. 
 
SECTION C: Regulatory Themes Identified 
This viewpoint identifies incentive compensation and the performance-based approach as 
giving rise to previously uncontemplated governance problems. Professor Hill identifies five key 
regulatory themes aimed at tackling these issues. 375 They are as follows: 
1. A risk-based approach to setting executive pay. 
 
2. A focus on long-term sustainability of the corporation when setting pay. 
 
3. A re-evaluation of the previous concept of interest alignment. 
 
4. A re-evaluation of previous short-term market-based performance measures. 
 
5. A focus on income inequality when setting pay. 
 
 
 I. Risk and Executive Pay 
Further evidence of an emerging risk-based approach includes a focus on the outwards 
effects of risk, namely the public’s exposure to financial market risk. This includes recognition 
by mainstream law and economics academia that compensation incentives create a moral hazard 
situation for risk-taking by top executives 376 accompanied by the now prevalent view that 
compensation incentives have themselves become a risk management problem. The Federal 
Reserve for instance emphasizes the importance of incentive compensation not jeopardizing the 
soundness of an institution. 377 
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 II. Short-termism versus Long-termism 
Evidence of a shifting focus from short-termism to long-termism that supports this 
perspective can be found in the scholarship. 378 The concern amongst regulators is that incentive 
compensation currently drives executives to focus on short-term profits while creating long-term 
organizational risk. 379 A consensus seems to be emerging that the new goal of executive 
remuneration is to promote sustainable corporate performance. 380 This is consistent with the 
FSB’s principles and is also acknowledged by the self-regulatory approach as a key goal of 
compensation reform. It is not, on its face, evidence of a paradigm shift. Contractarians argue 
that a longer term focus is possible with the market-based approach. 381 However, the broader 
approach to reform taken by contractarians, gives rise to questions over what a long-term 
sustainable approach entails. Yet these questions fade into the background when the broader 
scope of executive pay’s conceptual evolution in the LME context is not taken into account.  
The consensus on how to achieve a longer-term approach is two-fold: modifying 
compensation design and claw-back provisions. 382 A solution in the former area is for Boards to 
re-design pay by tying total remuneration to long-term outcomes. This includes using mandatory 
holding periods for equity pay and deferred vesting of options built into contracts. 383 Claw-back 
provisions while implemented in the wake of the Enron scandal in the U.S. have been proposed 
as a regulatory constraint on short-termism in several jurisdictions. 384  This includes the 
requirement for all public firms to have a claw-back policy regardless of misconduct. 385 This is 
an extension of the previous measure permitting the Board to recover compensation awarded as a 
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result of misstatement or fraud. 386 In sum, several jurisdictions have adopted the claw-back 
measure to address negative long-term developments which crystallize as a result of short-term 
strategies aimed at bolstering the executive’s compensation in the current period. 387 
 III. Re-evaluation of Interest Alignment 
This compelling observation demonstrates a possible paradigm shift away from optimal 
contracting towards a regulatory-oriented model implicating mandatory norms as opposed to a 
‘governance by self-interest’ approach. Hill cites that aligning shareholder and executive 
interests through compensation is no longer the principal rhetoric of governance reform. 388 The 
evidence includes statements by the U.S. Treasury that pay should be aligned with the interests 
of taxpayers who provided financial assistance to bail-out the largest firms.  389 Again, the 
justification cited was that the shareholder-centred approach to governance, in the case of banks, 
allows shareholders to benefit from and exploit a greater level of risk than what is appropriate for 
the corporation’s stability. 390 Accordingly, part of this re-assessment includes determining 
whether the size of pay is publicly defensible. 391 
 IV. Re-evaluation of Performance Measures 
The observations supporting the view that a shift is occurring away from optimal 
contracting include the adoption of non-financial performance criteria in several jurisdictions 
which represent goals tied to sustainable performance. 392 Accordingly, the CEBS guidelines hold 
that unethical behavior should trump positive financial performance 393 and the AICD guidelines 
in Australia state that improved workplace safety should be a criterion for evaluating the CEO’s 
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performance. 394 While these examples are not mandatory in LME jurisdictions, they depart from 
the optimal contracting model's focus on shareholder returns as the principal measure of good 
governance.  The issue is whether Boards will adopt such measures and whether shareholders 
have an incentive to do the same. 
 V. Income Inequality 
The final regulatory theme evident in the literature is an increased focus on the link 
between income inequality and the CEO’s pay. 395 The crux of this concern is that a high level of 
income disparity between the work force and top management of the firm demotivates front-line 
workers and contributes to poor long-term sustainability. 396 This observation is congruent with 
the stakeholder perspective on executive pay discussed earlier in this paper. Part of this focus has 
been on the actual fairness of compensation and not just on how production is affected.  
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CHAPTER TEN: 
Executive Pay in the United States 
 
SECTION A: Background and Context 
 The context of US pay reform involved addressing particular practices that led to the US 
financial collapse. In 2007 the prevalence of excessive risk-taking practices in major US banks 
came to light when the market for mortgage securities, including Collateralized Debt obligations 
(“CDOs”) experienced major downgrades. 397 Similar failed debt securities prompted major 
bank-write downs, causing even triple “A” rated debt to lose its value. In January of 2008, the 
market for CDOs collapsed throughout the world causing more than $2 trillion of wealth to 
evaporate overnight. The social effects of this market instability were far reaching. 
 From the outset, perverse executive compensation incentives were purported to have 
caused managers to engage in extreme profit-seeking which overwhelmed the checks and 
balances of existing governance systems in banks. 398 Unlike the Enron debacle which reflected a 
concern over inadequate checks and balances in the accounting and disclosure realms and with 
the ability of managers to extract rents from the firm by misstating earnings, this time around the 
focus was on the drivers of such behaviours. 399 
 Another back-drop against which specific and general measures to compensation reform 
were engaged with, was the recognition of the widespread systemic effects of such events and 
the significance they have for how capitalism in the US is organized. 400 Legislators were 
concerned quite intensely with the prospect that taxpayer money was used to bail-out the biggest 
banks in the US who arrived at this position by their preoccupation with short-term earnings 
fuelled essentially by investor and managerial greed.  401 Initial responses demonstrated an effort 
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to protect future taxpayers from such an event reoccurring, evident in the acute response by the 
US Department of Treasury to controlling the size and structure of executive compensation in 
firms requiring government bail-out assistance. 402 Managers' of such firms could not avoid such 
harsh regulatory measures without first paying back the government and exiting the program. 
 
SECTION B: The U.S. Response to Compensation Reform 
The response in the U.S. consists of an initial response to the specific issues surrounding 
executive pay in distressed firms falling under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (“TARP”)  403 
followed by general reforms to corporate governance through the “Dodd-Frank” Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”). 404 Other responses include the 
Compensation Fairness Act and the Corporate Governance Reform Act 405 which was passed by 
Congress only to be defeated by the Senate. The provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act to a certain 
extent mirror the goals and provisions of these acts notwithstanding the changes made.  
 
SECTION C: Specific Measures (Overview) 
 Being a temporary and drastic measure, the TARP program and specific measures taken 
to stabilise the economy are outside the scope of this analysis. Instead, general measures will be 
analysed in detail as they relate to executive compensation because they represent purported 
long-term changes to corporate governance geared towards preventing another crisis. Briefly the 
specific measures can be categorised as followed: 
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 A. TARP Program 
i. Office of the Special Pay Master 
ii. Claw-back Requirements 
iii. Limitations on Bonuses 
iv. Limitations on Severance Pay 
v. Say on Pay 
 
 B. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies 
i. Balanced risk taking incentives 
ii. Compatibility with effective controls and risk-management 
iii. Strong corporate governance 
iv. Proposed supervisory initiatives 
 
SECTION D: General Measures (Overview) 
The Dodd-Frank Act as it relates to the reform of executive compensation in the U.S. can 
be assessed across 5 key areas. These areas act as general measures to reform how executive 
compensation is set in public companies regulated by the SEC. The key provisions in the area of 
executive pay are as follows: 
 Say on pay 
 Publication of worker to CEO wage ratio 
 Enhanced disclosure obligations 
 Mandatory claw-back policy for public companies 
 Independent compensation committees 
 
SECTION E: Say on Pay 
 Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act provides shareholders with an advisory vote on 
disclosed executive compensation plans. 406  The provisions amend the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 407 by inserting section 14A.  It provides shareholders with a right to approve executive 
compensation not less frequently than once every 3 years at the annual general meeting or other 
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meeting where SEC rules require compensation disclosure. 408 The vote must be exercised 
through a separate resolution included in proxy, consent or authorization materials. 409 The 
provision also requires shareholder approval of golden parachute compensation in a separate 
resolution and disclosure of any such arrangements or understandings between an executive 
officer and an acquiring firm.  The rules of construction under this provision prevent the 
shareholder vote from being binding on the Board or the corporation. Having final say, the Board 
cannot be overruled on matters relating to executive pay and directors’ fiduciary duties are not 
extended or changed in any way either explicitly or by implication. 
 
SECTION F: Enhanced Disclosure Obligations 
Section 953 (a) of the Dodd-Frank Act creates enhanced general disclosure requirements 
for executive compensation in publicly listed corporations. 410 The final rules require 
corporations to disclose how they handle and reward safe and excessive risk-taking. The aim of 
this amendment is to curtail undue risk-taking by providing greater information to shareholders 
who can exercise their right to sell or not to buy. 411 With enhanced disclosure of such risk, the 
capital market in theory can discount a corporation’s share price where excessive levels of risk 
are rewarded by the compensations structure. The disclosure threshold is whether the 
compensation for any employee in the firm is reasonably likely to create a materially adverse 
effect on the company. Another key feature is the requirement to provide “a non-exclusive 
situational list of when a compensation practice is reasonably likely to create materially adverse 
risk to the company.” 412 
SECTION G: Publication of Worker to CEO Wage Ratio 
                                                 
408  For a summary of this provision's proposed content, scope and application see Gary Shorter, “Say on Pay and Other 
Corporate Governance Reform Initiatives” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report to Congress (13 August 2009), Online: 
https://waxman.house.gov/sites/waxman.house.gov/files/documents/UploadedFiles/Say_on_Pay_and_Other_Initiatives.pdf 
409  Securities Exchange Commission, “Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute: Final 
Rule” SEC (4 April 2011), Online: <https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9178.pdf>; See also Securities Exchange 
Commission, “Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, “Investor Bulletin: Say on Pay and Golden Parachute Votes” SEC (11 
March 2011), Online: <http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/sayonpay.pdf>.  
410
  Dodd-Frank Wall Reform and Consumer Protection Act, s 953.  
411  For a summary of this provision's content, scope and application see Securities Exchange Commission, “Proxy 
Disclosure Enhancements: Final Rule” SEC (28 February 2010), Online: http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-9089.pdf.  
412  Ibid. 
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Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act creates additional disclosure requirements, 
requiring publicly listed firms to disclose a) the median annual compensation of all employees, 
b) the annual total compensation of the CEO and c) the ratio between these two figures. 413 The 
provision requires the SEC to create rules implementing a requirement for firms to disclose these 
figures. 414 On Sept 18, 2013 the SEC released proposals to implement such requirements.415 The 
disclosure is mandatory on a quarterly basis. The aim of this amendment is to provide public data 
that is more comprehensive with regard to the effects of wage disparity on corporate 
performance, with the expectation that shareholders and the public will pressure corporate 
Boards to be more restrained. 416 The provision addresses a Board-CEO dynamic where directors 
feel beholden to the CEO. The managerial power approach provides theoretical support for the 
problem this provision seeks to address. However, this solution is at odds with the optimal 
contracting approach which posits that CEOs operate in a competitive marketplace in which the 
value that they give to shareholders is fairly compensated. Also consistent with managerial 
power theory, the provision enables public outrage constraints to operate by enhancing the ability 
of consumers, labor groups, and pension funds to assess whether compensation is appropriate in 
relation to workers’ compensation. 417     
 
SECTION H: Mandatory Claw-back Policy for Public Companies 
Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act dealing with “recovery of erroneously awarded 
compensation” establishes a requirement for publicly listed companies to develop and implement 
claw back policies which obligate the Board to recover excessive pay obtained through the 
misrepresentation of earnings or the inaccuracy of assessment criteria. 418 By imposing a 
                                                 
413
  Dodd-Frank Wall Reform and Consumer Protection Act, s 953 b. 
414  See Gary Shorter, “The “Pay-Ratio Provision” in the Dodd-Frank Act: Legislation to Repeal It in the 113th Congress” 
Congressional Research Service, CRS Report to Congress (28 October 2013), Online: 
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415  Securities Exchange Commission, Pay Ratio Disclosure: Proposed Rule” SEC (18 Sept 2013), Online: 
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416  AFL-CIO, supra note 124.  
417  See Bebchuk and Fried, supra note 94. 
418  Section 954 of Dodd–Frank adds a new section 10D to the Securities Exchange Act 1934. The new provision instructs 
the SEC to issue rules directing each national securities exchange to require every listed company to put in place a claw-back 
policy to recover certain incentive compensation paid to executives when the firm is required to prepare an accounting 
restatement. See Davis Polk & Wardell, “Compensation Claw-back Under Dodd-Frank: Impact on Foreign Issuers” Davis Polk 
Memorandum (7 September 2011), Online: Davis Polk, 
<www.davispolk.com/.../2011.09.Dodd.Frank.Compensation.Clawback.v3. sep11.pdf>. 
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requirement for directors to directly confront the problem of managerial rent extraction, this 
provision deals with the excessiveness problem and is consistent with protecting the corporate 
entity.  The claw-back provision is not intended to address factors which purportedly exacerbate 
the propensity of managers to commit fraud, such as perverse incentives, but instead seeks to 
raise a greater barrier to such conduct. 419 The approach is also consistent with the understanding 
that this particular manifestation of managerial power cannot be fully restrained through an 
improved version of performance based incentive compensation.  
In contrast to the claw-back provisions under section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(“SOX”), the Dodd-Frank Act provisions do not enhance the SEC's authority to prosecute for 
excessive compensation obtained through misconduct. 420 This existing SOX provision remains 
intact. Cited as the most significant federal intervention into corporate governance since the 
1930’s, section 304 of SOX gives the SEC the power to require a CEO or CFO to return any 
bonuses or incentive compensation, including profits from the sale of stock, if the firm is 
required to prepare an accounting re-statement due to material non-compliance. 421 There 
however, must be an accounting re-statement and a finding of misconduct otherwise the SEC 
cannot act if the compensation awarded is simply excessive. 422  The SOX provision also 
provides the Board of Directors with the right to recover excess pay stemming from the use of 
improper assessment criteria or errors in calculation. 423 This legal tool benefits shareholders by 
helping to recover funds that would otherwise constitute earnings, improving pay-to-
performance sensitivity by making rent extraction less feasible and counterbalancing incentives 
to engage in fraudulent conduct which can weaken or destroy a firm. 424  
The SOX claw-back provision is purported to have several weaknesses some of which the 
Dodd-Frank Act seeks to improve upon. Despite, the SEC’s ability to require a firm’s CEO or 
CFO to disgorge the benefits obtained from misstated earnings, the SOX provision can only be 
deployed in cases where the SEC can demonstrate misconduct which is often difficult to 
                                                 
419  Ibid. 
420  Hill, supra note 14. 
421  See Jill Radloff, “Dodd-Frank, Sarbanes-Oxley and Claw-backs” Stinson Leonard Street (6 August 2010), Online: 
Dodd-Frank.Com, <http://dodd-frank.com/dodd-frank-sarbanes-oxley-and-clawbacks/>. 
422  Ibid. 
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424  See Fried and Shilon, supra note 80. 
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establish. 425 Neither directors nor shareholders have a right to sue on behalf of the corporation to 
enforce this provision. 426 Even without the SEC’s involvement, directors are highly reluctant to 
implement claw back policies let alone enforce their provisions. 427 A majority of excess claw-
back policies before Dodd-Frank Act came into force gave discretion to directors not to re-coup 
excess pay even if the executive had engaged in misconduct. 428 
 
 
SECTION I: Analysis 
 
 Does the provision represent a new behavioral norm for directors requiring additional 
due diligence, a consideration of new circumstances or the following of new 
procedures when setting or approving compensation? 
 
I. Say-on-pay 
While say-on-pay requires taking additional procedural steps when setting executive pay 
there is no direct impact on directors’ duties. In fact, the rules of construction prohibit fiduciary 
duties from being construed as altered or enhanced. 429 However, the precatory vote does exert 
some degree of pressure onto directors, by expressing at the very least that shareholders disagree 
with the size of the executive’s compensation or whether it rewards risk. As many critiques have 
suggested, the effectiveness of this pressure remains to be seen. 430 
Accepting that a potential exists for the precatory vote to influence directors’ discretion, 
the amendment can be viewed as either enhancing shareholders’ ability to discipline managers on 
behalf of the entity or as increasing their ability to endorse higher levels of pay and risk-taking 
for the chance to make short-term profits. This is dependent on shareholders’ willingness to 
disapprove of high levels of pay and risk-taking, which will likely be influenced by current share 
price and individual investment horizons. 
                                                 
425  Ibid. 
426  Ibid. 
427  Ibid. 
428  Ibid. 
429  SEC, supra note 545.  
430  See Shorter, supra note 465. For a critique see Bainbridge, supra note 80.  
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II. Enhanced disclosure obligations 
By creating additional requirements to disclose risks that are materially adverse to the 
firm and how they are rewarded, this provision introduces a new behavioral norm from a 
procedural standpoint only. Otherwise, it merely provides shareholders with greater information 
on which they can assess risk. While this information includes specifically how executive pay 
impacts risk-taking by executives, directors are not faced with following a new behavioral norm, 
however are forced to think about how executive pay corresponds to risk, which might have an 
indirect effect on their decisions. This has not been studied let alone proven. 
 
III. Publication of Worker to CEO Wage Ratio 
The publication of the CEO-to-worker pay ratio does require directors to consider new 
circumstances, namely the relationship between front line worker and CEO pay and how this 
might affect long-term firm performance. The potential exists for directors to act according to a 
new set of stakeholders-based norms. This entails considering how worker morale might be 
affected by high levels of internal wage disparity, how poor worker morale might impact 
workers’ productivity and commitment to the firm and how this impacts sustainability and 
overall firm performance in the long-run. 431   
 
IV. Mandatory Claw-back Policy for Public Companies 
This provision represents a strengthening of existing norms centred on protecting the 
corporate entity. This serves as an extension of the post-Enron response to fraudulent conduct by 
managers. The response itself focuses on raising a stronger barrier to fraudulent conduct and not 
on curbing pay incentives which create a stronger incentive to misrepresent earnings.  
 
 
 Is it mandatory or enabling? Does it impose extra-economic or efficiency based 
norms of conduct?  Does it require directors to account for how executive pay 
impacts the corporate entity or to engage predominantly in arm’s length bargaining? 
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I. Say-on-pay 
From a procedural standpoint, the provision is mandatory in that Boards must provide for 
and allow the shareholder vote. However, there is no substantive right for shareholders to enforce 
their preferences and no mandatory norms of conduct are imposed. 432 Given that pressure 
arising from a majority vote against compensation could influence directors’ discretion, 
shareholders could exhibit pressures to favor efficiency based governance norms, approving only 
compensation that is structured to reward high levels of profit and risk-taking and not necessary 
sound risk management practices. However, the possibility exists for shareholders, as a majority, 
to approve only those compensation arrangements that include stakeholder-friendly norms such 
as non-financial performance criteria and lower levels of pay more generally. 
 
II. Enhanced disclosure obligations 
Again, from a procedural standpoint, the provision is mandatory, however no additional 
extra-economic norms based on trust, loyalty, stewardship of the entity, or stakeholder well-being 
are imposed by this requirement.  
 
III. Publication of Worker to CEO Wage Ratio 
In short, disclosure of the CEO-to-worker pay ratio imposes mandatory norms of conduct 
but in a procedural sense. Aside from prompting directors to consider how executive pay impacts 
stakeholders and how this in turn impacts long-term performance, the enforcement of these 
norms rests in the hands of shareholders who may see a benefit in reducing the corporation’s 
internal pay gap. 433  Extra-economic norms of conduct are not imposed and neither are directors 
required to consider how executive pay impacts the entity. In fact, shareholders would likely 
implement these norms only if it translates into greater efficiency and profit. 
 
IV. Mandatory Claw-back Policy for Public Companies 
The norms underlying this provision are consistent with an extra-economic understanding 
of directors’ duties.  The provision requires directors to assess how fraudulent behavior by 
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management amounts to appropriation of the firm’s assets. This is consistent with corporate 
law’s traditional role in controlling self-interested behavior. In fact, the enforcement mechanism 
behind this provision, the threat of de-listing for non-complying issuers is arguably an effective 
and less onerous process than the derivative action available to shareholders. However, directors 
are not required to actually reduce pay under this provision, only to implement a policy for how 
such pay should be reduced. The enforcement mechanism for achieving a substantive result is 
still within the discretion of directors, subject to pressure from shareholders. 
 
 Is the effect of the provision such that it results in the interests of other stakeholders 
being taken into account by directors when setting executive pay and does it result in 
directors prioritizing the firm’s well-being over immediate shareholder returns? 
 
I. Say-on-pay 
Again, the provision creates no substantive rights for shareholders nor does it instruct 
directors to follow a particular set of norms. Shareholders might indirectly influence directors, 
however there is no certainty that shareholders will advocate for stakeholder interests being 
taken into consideration or that executive pay incentives are aligned with long-term sustainable 
management of the firm. 
II. Enhanced disclosure obligations 
In assessing the relationship between the executive’s pay and different levels of risk 
taking for the purposes of disclosure, directors might be required to assess the risk on different 
stakeholders, including taxpayers, workers, shareholders and the corporation. Thus, for the 
purposes of disclosure they might contemplate the entity’s well-being over those of shareholders. 
However, assuming that shareholder pressure through the precatory vote exists, directors might 
prioritize short-term profit ahead of the corporation’s well-being to gain the support of 
shareholders in the vote.  
 
III. Publication of Worker to CEO Wage Ratio 
As mentioned the provision does require directors to consider how CEO pay might 
impact workers, but only for the purpose of satisfying a procedural requirement. There is no 
certainty that disclosing this stakeholder-based measurement criteria will result in directors 
117 
 
prioritizing the firm’s well-being over immediate returns. The potential for such a management 
orientation arises from two sources. One is the propensity of directors to act on stakeholder-
based norms of conduct if they fall in line with the corporation’s best interests. The consideration 
of this new relationship between stakeholders and long-term firm performance might prompt 
such an orientation. Two is pressure from shareholders to lower CEO pay to reduce internal wage 
disparity. This depends on shareholders recognizing the possible detriments of not lowering pay.   
 
IV. Mandatory Claw-back Policy for Public Companies 
In short, this provision does not result in the interests of stakeholders being taken into account. It 
is a straightforward application of fiduciary duties towards the entity. Because it focuses on a 
narrow aspect of managerial power, fraud, the provision is limited in scope to addressing the 
symptoms of managerial power and not the causes. This fails to recognize that other governance 
measures, namely the high-powered pay incentive, can exacerbate managerial power and conflict 
with the goal of this provision. 
 
 Is the effect of the provision such that directors utilize performance criteria other than 
share price to gauge whether executive compensation schemes are acceptable? 
 
I. Say-on-pay 
Directors have the same discretion as before to establish and reward a wide range of 
corporate purposes. There is no guidance provided to shareholders or standards articulated to 
utilize non-market based performance criteria. This is strictly optional. Although the disclosure 
of the CEO-to-worker pay ratio and materially adverse risks discussed above, might inform how 
shareholders assess the appropriateness of the pay they are voting on.    
 
II. Enhanced disclosure obligations 
While, disclosing the relationship between executive pay and adverse risks to the firm 
introduces new and potentially long-term criteria for assessing performance, directors are not 
required to act on this criteria.  Provided that directors take cues from shareholder voting when 
setting executive pay, they might not consider these criteria if shareholders opt for more risk-
taking and larger executive pay for the promise of aggressive growth.  
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III. Publication of Worker to CEO Wage Ratio 
Again, by requiring directors to calculate and disclose this ratio, they are prompted to 
contemplate non-financial criteria as a basis for assessing the corporation’s best interests. If a 
positive correlation is contemplated between high CEO pay and unsustainable long-term 
performance then directors might assess such compensation negatively and reduce it. Another 
factor not previously discussed, is the effect of managerial power on directors and how strong 
managerial influence might prevent directors from acting on this alternative criteria.  
 
IV. Mandatory Claw-back Policy for Public Companies 
In short, this provision is not geared towards assessing the appropriateness of pay, nor 
does it address its substantive effects. It deals instead with mitigating the effects of inappropriate 
incentives by strengthening directors’ role to discipline rent-seeking. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ELEVEN: 
Executive Pay in Germany 
 
SECTION A: Background and Context 
Recent developments in Germany around executive pay follow a period of relative 
controversy surrounding both its size and structure. 434 Amidst uncertainty and intense debate 
over the path of corporate governance in Germany, executive compensation has emerged as a 
regulatory contest between the influence of Anglo-American liberal market pay practices and the 
stakeholder-oriented goals which underlie how German executives are paid. German corporate 
governance in the years before the Financial Crisis was marked by a heated debate over the 
appropriateness and legality of paying large, American-style bonuses to German executives on 
the Management Boards of public corporations, for orchestrating stupendous short-term gains for 
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shareholders. At the heart of this debate was the Mannesmann ordeal which several 
commentators referred to as placing Germany’s entire system of embedded capitalism on trial. 435 
 
 I. The Broader Context of EU Market Integration and Reform  
 The broader context in which to assess the drivers of executive pay reform in Germany is 
the European Commission's market building initiative. Ongoing since 1986, the Single Market 
project has increasingly integrated European product, financial and labour markets, giving rise to 
various rounds of harmonization of regulatory norms and practices. 436 Beginning with the First 
Council Directive in 1968, European company law regulation and its push to provide an 
equivalent level of investor protection across member states has played a crucial role in this 
process of harmonization and integration. 437 
 The Commission's Modernization of Company Law and the Enhancement of Corporate 
Governance body has been an active site for the generation and dissemination of corporate 
governance norms and practices. 438 The source of several proposals, recommendations, high-
level reports, and action plans, this diverse and amorphous collective of state and non-state 
experts have driven the process of European Corporate Governance Regulation (ECGR) along its 
current trajectory. 439 Having entered the scene in 2001 with the Commission's White Paper, the 
concept of EU governance is now entrenched in the semi-autonomous field of ECGR. 440  
 The European Corporate Governance Forum (ECGF), established in 2004 by the 
European Commission, consists of member state representatives, issuers of securities, investors 
and academics that meet regularly to advise the Commission on the effectiveness of members' 
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monitoring systems and to assist in developing corporate governance codes. 441  Of notable 
importance before the crisis was its “comply or explain” principle, now a key feature of the EU 
approach to governance. 442  A flexible alternative to detailed regulation, the principle underpins 
non-binding rules or recommendations found in members' corporate governance codes. 443  
 Interestingly, the Forum took the position that the 'comply-or-explain principle should be 
enforced by Member States as a mandatory norm of conduct either through their corporate law or 
regulatory authority, but that regulators should limit their role to verifying the existence of the 
disclosure while deferring to the business judgement of directors with respect to its content and 
the prerogative of shareholders to enforce the disclosure's quality. 444 The Forum's ongoing role 
in ECGR has impacted the German Corporate Governance Code (“GCGC”) and legislative 
initiatives in German corporate governance.  
 Developed in 2002 by the German Government Commission the GCGC contains 
“essential statutory regulations for the management and supervision (governance) of German 
listed companies [and] internationally and nationally recognized standards for good and 
responsible governance [and] aims at making the German corporate governance system 
transparent and understandable [and] promotes the trust of international and national investors, 
customers, employees and the general public in the management and supervision of listed 
German stock corporations.” 445  Most of the rules are not legally binding, but companies who do 
not comply must publicly disclose “how and why their practices differ from those recommended 
by the Code.” 446 
 The GCGC has six main components: 1) the shareholders and general meeting; 2) the 
cooperation of the Management Board and Supervisory Board; 3) tasks and responsibilities of 
the Management Board; 4) tasks and responsibilities of the Supervisory Board; 5) transparency 
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and; 6) accounting and auditing of annual financial statements. 447 Key developments in the 
GCGC include changes to the shareholders' annual general meeting and to the Management 
Board's remuneration in 2006. 448  The latter reflects amendments made to Management Board 
compensation under the German Board Member Monetary Compensation Disclosure Act 
“VorstOG". 449   
 Pertaining to enhanced disclosure requirements for Management Board pay, the VorstOG 
resulted from a heated debate over the policy goals served by requiring such disclosure. 450 The 
major change effected by this provision was to require the publication of Management Board 
members' individual salaries as opposed to mere disclosure of total pay to the shareholders. Also 
worthy of mention is the 2005 relaxing of the business judgement rule to better insulate directors 
for decisions with respect to increasing company performance and taking additional risk. 451  The 
ten-point program in the UMAG amends the German Stock Corporations Act in several respects. 
Under the first point, management decisions will no longer constitute a breach of directors' duties 
where the Board member “reasonably believes that he acted for the good of the company and if 
his decision was based on appropriate information.” 452  
 II. The EU Takeover Directive   
 Of notable importance to the broader story surrounding executive pay in Germany was 
the process leading up to the EU Takeover Directive's defeat. Unfolding contemporaneously with 
the Mannesmann ordeal during a tumultuous period for German corporate governance, this 
regulatory contest exemplifies the politics of corporate governance liberalization in the decade 
preceding the crisis. Characterized as a “broad political backlash led by managerial and labour 
interests against the adoption of Anglo-American shareholder capitalism” the directive's defeat 
can be viewed as a push-back against concessions made to neo-liberal trends under the Control 
and Transparency Act “KonTraG” which rendered German firms more vulnerable to hostile 
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takeovers. 453 The simultaneous unfolding of the Mannesmann ordeal can be viewed as a parallel 
narrative characterized by a push-back by Mannesmann prosecutors against the infiltration of 
liberal market pay norms into Germany Inc.'s corporate culture. Professor John Cioffi states the 
following in response to the defeat of the Commission's 13th Directive on Takeover Bids: 
 “The draft Directive was the clearest and most far-reaching attempt to introduce Anglo-American 
 concepts of shareholder value, and shareholder capitalism generally, into the European 
 political economy. And for this reason, the Directive became one of the most divisive pieces of 
 legislation to ever come before the European Parliament, sparking fierce opposition and unusual 
 alliances that reveal the substantial social and political differences between Anglo-American 
 neo-liberalism and the legacies of Continental statist and corporatist political economic 
 institutions.” 454 
 
 
 Tensions between a broader EU-driven integration into competitive global markets and 
the embedded capitalisms of EU member states are deeply implicated in these processes. 
Germany's experience with the EU Takeover Directive, viewed as regulatory reflex to earlier 
pressures to liberalize its corporate governance regime, is a telling example of these tensions at 
play. Likewise, the unfolding of the executive pay debate in Germany leading up to the crisis 
tells a parallel story and provides a background against which to assess post-crisis reforms. 
 III. The Mannesmann Ordeal 
The Mannesmann ordeal illustrates a friction between Germany Inc.'s corporate culture 
and shareholder-centric pay practices which reward management exclusively for serving 
shareholder interests. 455 Prosecutors in an unprecedented move resorted to using Germany’s 
criminal code to sanction the approval of excessive compensation, typically dealt with under s. 
87 of the German Stock Corporations Act, the Aktiengesetz (AktG), as a breach of fiduciary 
duties. In response to Supervisory Board directors approving unusually large bonuses for the 
Chief Executive's role in facilitating a takeover, prosecutors alleged that five supervisory board 
directors and one executive “breached their duty to the broader interests of the company, which 
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consequently damaged the company”. 456     
 Prosecutors alleged a criminal breach of fiduciary duty, carrying a maximum sentence of 
ten years. Some have commented that despite condemning the size of the bonus payments 
awarded, prosecutors were more concerned with sanctioning the use of Anglo-American style 
pay incentives designed to reward short-term price appreciation. 457 While the outcome of the 
trial resulted in the acquittal of all six defendants for criminal wrongdoing, the judge concluded 
that the bonuses awarded to outgoing executives were inappropriate and violated Germany’s 
stock law governing executive compensation. 458   
In determining whether the accused managers committed “a criminal breach of duty to 
manage the assets of another” the German Federal Court looked to section 87(1) as a guideline to 
determine whether the bonus awards constituted a misappropriation of the company’s assets and 
fixed reserves. 459  Absent a clear standard under s.87 for determining a breach of fiduciary 
duties in the remuneration context, the Court was unable to overcome the burden of proving a 
criminal breach, leading to the 2006 acquittal of all defendants.  460  
The accused managers had argued the awards were justifiable in light of the staggering 
wealth created by management's facilitation of the takeover. While the awards totaled an 
unprecedented 50Million Euros, over 50 Billion Euros had been created for shareholders, many 
of which were foreign entities integrated into capital markets outside of Germany. In doing so, 
they repudiated Germany's model of stakeholder capitalism in favor of a shareholder value norm. 
The Court found however, that the awards failed to benefit the corporation first despite the gains 
created for shareholders and held them as falling below the standard set out in the AktG.  
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property of a third party and thereby disadvantages whomsoever's property interests had been entrusted to him, shall be imprisoned 
for up to five years or fined”). 
460  Kolla, supra note 436 at 834; See also A key factor in determining legality was whether the bonuses conformed to section 
87(1) of Germany’s Stock Corporations Act (AktG) which stated at the time, that executive compensation must be appropriate in 
relation to the tasks of the executive and the state of the company. See AktG, s. 87(1) 
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Despite the vagueness of s.87 for determining the appropriateness of the bonus awards, 
the prosecution argued for an interpretation based on Germany's broader context of stakeholder 
capitalism, which the judge eventually accepted, though the criminal threshold had not been 
breached.  It became clear during the trial to commentators that prosecutors were attempting to 
serve the broader goal of deterring large executive bonuses that threatened to create improper 
incentives for management in Germany to maximize short-term shareholder value. 461  These 
sentiments, however, did not crystallize into binding norms until after the financial crisis. 
 IV. The Commission's Pre-Crisis Remuneration Initiatives 
 While much of the business and legal community in Germany and abroad awaited the 
final Mannesmann verdict, the Commission released its 2004 recommendations on director 
remuneration. Focusing mainly on disclosure and shareholders rights, it represented a continued 
push towards aligning shareholder and manager interests, a development resisted in the 
Mannesmann debate. The recommendations, which were subsequently adopted, set-out 
guidelines for disclosure and shareholder control with respect to director remuneration. 462  The 
Internal Market Commissioner recognized the conflict in executive directors setting their own 
pay. At the time, this initiative was consistent with US developments in corporate legal 
scholarship, namely the debut of the managerial power approach, outlining this same 
phenomenon. 463 The Commissioner further recognized that shareholders should be better 
informed and able to ensure that sufficient incentives exist for directors through proper 
disclosure and effective control rights. However, the initiative focused on providing guidance to 
Member States on implementing such soft or hard law provisions supporting greater shareholder 
involvement. 464  
 Tensions between the role of corporate and capital market law on the one hand and the 
competing interests of labour and finance on the other are less visible in this thread of corporate 
governance norm generation aimed largely at standardizing disclosure practices and investor 
                                                 
461 The Economist, “Fall-Out from Mannesmann: Breach of Trust?” The Economist (20 February 2003), Online: 
Economist, <http://www.economist.com/node/1760645>.  
462  European Commission, “COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 14 December 2004 fostering an appropriate 
regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies” EC (Dec 29, 2004), Online: EC, <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:385:0055:0059:EN:PDF>. 
463  European Commission, “Press Release: Directors’ pay – Commission sets out guidance on disclosure and shareholder 
control” EC (Oct 6, 2004), Online: EC, <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-1183_en.htm?locale=en>. 
464  Ibid. 
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rights across the EU. This initiative seems to highlight the frictions instead between managers 
and investors in a push to bolster and restore confidence to European markets. 465  
However, in the background of these multilevel consultations, exists visible threads of a 
debate over the size and subsequent fairness of executive compensation. The eventual unfolding 
of the Mannesmann verdict in 2006 amplifies these tensions between the need to harmonize 
executive pay levels in a manner compatible to the liberal market dynamics of ECGR on the one 
hand and Germany's embedded system of capitalism and concomitant corporate culture on the 
other.  
 These concurrent developments concerning executive pay in Germany bring these 
tensions into sharper relief by pitting the need to create sufficient incentives for shareholders on 
the one hand, against the need to keep executive pay reasonably in-line with labour's sensitivities 
over the distribution of corporate wealth in society on the other. The point where pressures to 
adopt a liberal market approach to executive remuneration appear to converge in the 
Mannesmann ordeal, is the ambiguously worded s. 87 of the German Stock Corporations Act in 
its previous format, a weak-point in Germany's corporate-legal matrix which allegedly placed 
Germany's entire system of embedded capitalism on trial. 
 V. The Exposure of German Banks to the Crisis 
 Given these developments at the European level to ensure that directors are adequately 
incentivized to perform in the context of a need to restore confidence to European markets, it is 
not surprising that German banks were exposed to and implicated in some of the risky 
transactions which led to the crisis.  This was likely contributed to by the fact that a rejection of 
the liberalization trend in Mannesmann failed to crystallize into governance norms until after the 
crisis, when the ambiguity in s. 87 AktG was eventually clarified in the VorstAG. 
 Despite the origins of the crisis being in the US, German legislators were concerned over 
the exposure of German banks to its effects. It became apparent early on that German banks had 
engaged in risky strategies and failed to assess the risks associated with their investments in US 
toxic assets. According to Kaal and Painter, some of Germany's largest banks “made these 
investments through special purpose entities and other conduits in foreign jurisdictions that held 
                                                 
465  Ibid. 
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CDOs and other long-term mortgage loans that had been financed with the proceeds of short-
term financed Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) and Asset Backed Securities (ABS).” 466  
 Because of the complexity of these investments, many fell outside the jurisdiction of the 
German banking regulators but came apparent when the market for CDOs collapsed. 467 Such 
unprecedented exposure to risk by German banks prompted regulators to implement 
comparatively harsher reforms against risk-taking not only in the banking sector but also in the 
governance of large public corporations.  
 VI. The Commission's Post-Crisis Remuneration Initiatives 
 In 2009, both the European Commission and the FSF developed a set of 
recommendations on executive remuneration in the financial sector in response to Financial 
Crisis. 468 The Internal Market Commissioner recognizes the prevalence of perverse incentives in 
the financial industry leading up to the crisis and their role in encouraging excessive risk-taking. 
469 In this case, the Commission has accepted the FSF's principles on remuneration and is taking 
the lead on their implementation. 470 Interestingly, while the need to maintain performance based 
incentives is recognized, the need to constrain such incentives in line with long-term sustainable 
performance and sound risk management is the dominant feature of this approach. 471 
 The ECGF also set-out its recommendations on executive remuneration in the wake of 
the crisis.  472 Articulated as a set of best practices that should govern the remuneration of 
executive directors going forward, the ECGF released the following principles: 473 
 
 
                                                 
466  See Kaal and Painter supra note 135.  
467  Ibid. 
468  European Commission, “COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION on remuneration policies in the financial services 
sector” EC (Apr 29, 2009), Online: EC, <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/directors-
remun/financialsector_290409_en.pdf>. 
469  European Commission, “Financial services sector pay: Commission sets out principles on remuneration of risk-taking 
staff in financial institutions” EC (Apr 29, 2009), Online: EC, <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-
674_en.htm?locale=en>. 
470  Ibid. 
471  Ibid. 
472 EUCGF, “Statement of the European Corporate Governance Forum on Director Remuneration” EUCGF (23 March 
2009), Online: EU, <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf-remuneration_en.pdf>. 
473  Ibid. 
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1.  The level of variable pay (typically with both a short term and a long term element)  
 should be reasonable in relation to total pay level. Generally, the larger the variable  
 pay element is, the stronger the focus on the beneficiary's personal interests becomes,  
 to the possible detriment of the  long term interests of the company and its shareholders.  
 Companies should develop a clear policy on variable pay, within the remuneration  
 policy subject to approval by shareholders. That policy  should set maximum limits on 
 all elements of variable pay. 
 
 2.  Variable pay should be linked to factors that represent real growth of the company and  
  real creation of wealth for the company and its shareholders. The factors to be taken into  
  account for variable pay should be independently reviewed by non-executive directors.  
 
 3.  In order to reduce the short term focus of variable pay, companies should consider  
  deferring a substantial part of annual bonus payments to be released subject to continuing 
  positive performance by the company over a period of, say two to four years.  
 
 4.  Stock options (rights to acquire shares for a pre-determined exercise price) carry an  
  increased risk of market manipulation and gaming as the upside potential is   
  leveraged. These risks can be mitigated if vesting of the options is deferred and subject  
  to performance conditions. Underperformanced stock options should be excluded  
  from the remuneration policy. 
 
 
 5.  Shares granted to executive directors under long term incentive plans should vest only  
  after a  period during which performance conditions are met. At least a certain number of 
  those shares as  determined by the non-executive directors (e.g. two times the value of  
  total annual pay) should be held by directors until the end of their employment, with  
  the exception of such part of those shares that need to be sold in order to be able to  
  pay taxes due as a result of the grant of shares.  
 
 6.  To the extent possible under applicable employment laws and companies’ legislation,  
  the company should reserve the right, at the discretion of non-executive directors, to  
  reclaim performance linked remuneration elements which were paid to or vested on  
  executive directors on the basis of results that afterwards were found to have been  
  significantly misstated because of wrongdoing or malpractice. 
 
 7.  Severance pay for executive directors should be restricted to two years of annual  
  remuneration and should not be paid if the termination is for poor performance. The  
  two years restriction should not be circumvented by long notice periods or otherwise.  
 
 8.  Entitlements should be fully disclosed and discretionary increases for departing   
  executives should be avoided. Any benefit in kind should also be part of the remuneration 
  package and should be fully disclosed. 
 
 9.  Benchmarking the remuneration of executive directors with the remuneration of directors 
  of companies in a peer group, combined with the practice of aiming to reward directors at 
  the median or upper quartile of such peer group, creates an autonomous upward pressure  
  (“ratchet effect”) on the remuneration of directors of all companies which has no relation  
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  to underlying performance of these companies or personal performance of directors. Non- 
  executive directors should not only benchmark the remuneration of executive directors  
  externally with peers but should also benchmark their remuneration internally with the  
  remuneration of other employees within the company in order to ensure a consistent and  
  fair remuneration policy throughout the  company.  
 
 10.  Non-executive directors should have and exercise discretion to change the actual   
  remuneration calculated on the basis of formulae, targets and benchmarks in order to  
  ensure that the total pay executive directors receive is fair in relation to the company's    
                          and their personal performance and not excessive. Any adjustment to the operation of  
  established remuneration schemes should be fully disclosed.  
 
 
SECTION B: The German Response to Compensation Reform 
 
In the wake of the financial crisis, the German government enacted new legislation on the 
appropriateness of Management Board compensation, clarifying the role of existing law in a 
manner consistent with the court’s interpretation in Mannesmann. The new Act regarding the 
Appropriateness of Management Board Remuneration (“VorstAG”), 474  imposes amendments to 
the German Stock Corporations Act (“AktG”), 475 which directly impact the fiduciary duties of 
Supervisory Board directors. 476 The following sections are amended: 
 
 Section 87 Subsection 1 AktG 
 Section 87 Subsection 2 AktG 
 Section 193 Subsection 2 Clause 4 AktG 
 Section 116 AktG 
 Section 107 Subsection 3 Clause 3 AktG 
 Section 100 Subsection 2 Clause 1 No. 4 AktG 
 Section 93 Subsection 2 Clause 3 AktG 
                                                 
474   Bundesministerium Der Justiz, Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Compensation (VorstAG), 2009.  
475   Bundesministerium Der Justiz, German Stock Corporations Act (AktG), 1965. 
476  Ralf Ek, “Germany: New Developments in Management Board Compensation” Jones Day (30 November 2010), 
Online: Mondaq, 
<http://www.mondaq.com/x/116734/Directors+Officers/New+Developments+in+Management+Board+Compensation>. 
 (“On August 5, 2009, the German Act on the Appropriateness of Management Board Compensation became effective. This 
legislative amendment has had such a major impact that most stock corporations are currently reviewing their compensation 
systems. A mandatory adjustment obligation exists in case new employment contracts for management board members are 
concluded. Moreover, listed stock corporations must consider the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code, 
particularly with a view to caps on severance pay.”) 
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These amendments result in stricter obligations for directors to implement compensation 
that is appropriate in size and aligns the interests of the Management Board with the long-term 
interests of the corporation and its stakeholders. 477 The Act has 6 key features which impact how 
the Supervisory Board sets the Management Board's remuneration: 
 
 Limits on remuneration and the requirement to assess 
 Remuneration structure to promote sustainable development of company 
 Requirement to reduce remuneration when situation of company deteriorates 
 Increased liability for approving inappropriate remuneration 
 Cooling-off period for executives to serve on Supervisory Board 
 Enhanced disclosure requirements 
 
SECTION C: Limitations on Remuneration and the Requirement to Assess 
 
By imposing limits onto executive compensation 87(1) 1 AktG in its amended form 
constrains the discretion and business judgment of Supervisory Board directors, making the 
implementation of excessive pay and short-term incentives less feasible. More specifically this 
provision requires executive pay to bear a relationship to executive responsibilities and a 
company’s performance. 478 Section 87(1) 1 AktG now states: 
When fixing the total remuneration of an individual management board member (salary, 
profit participation, expense allowances, insurance premiums, commissions, incentive-based 
remuneration commitments like...stock options and fringe benefits of any kind), the supervisory 
board shall make sure that the remuneration is in adequate proportion to the duties and 
responsibilities and the performance of the management board member as well as to the situation 
of the company and does not exceed the customary remuneration without particular reasons.  
 
 This amended version increases the Supervisory Board's obligation to assess the 
appropriateness of executive remuneration. This includes an obligation to examine comparable 
environments such as the company's size, industry norms and wage levels within the company 
including those of front-line employees.  
                                                 
477  VorstAG, supra note 475. 
478  Kolla, supra note 436.  
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SECTION D: Remuneration Structure to Promote Sustainable Development of Company 
 
Through these constraints on discretion, directors are restricted to creating particular 
incentives for management that better align their interests with the best interests of the 
corporation. Section 87(1) 2 now states: 
 
“The remuneration structure for listed stock corporations shall be geared towards a 
sustainable development of the company. Variable components of the remuneration shall 
therefore be based on a perennial assessment; the supervisory board shall agree on means of 
limitation in case of extraordinary developments.”  
 
 
 This provision creates an obligation for Supervisory Board directors to adjust 
compensation incentives in line with the company's development based on several years of 
assessment data.   Section 93(2) 4 AktG as amended by VorstAG goes a step further by requiring 
Supervisory Board Directors to place a 4 year limit on the exercise of their stock options. Section 
87(2) in its amended form also requires the Supervisory Board to limit pay if extreme 
developments arise. This refers to large rises in the company's share price from events such as a 
takeover or an upwards market trend that might spur extreme demands from managers for 
increased levels of pay. This addresses the events that transpired in Mannesmann where 
Supervisor Board directors felt justified in paying the Management Board unprecedented 
bonuses based on the company’s overnight share value appreciation. 
 
The general assembly of shareholders can approve the remuneration structure by issuing 
a non-binding declaration of their opinion. This right to vote remains non-binding for two 
substantial reasons. One is to prevent shareholders from limiting the liability of directors by 
shifting decision making power away from the Board. Two is to avoid situations in which 
shareholders might approve compensation that serves their interests but is not compliant with 
statutory norms. This relates more directly to foreign investors of large public companies in 
Germany, who might have shorter investment horizons than ‘patient capital’ in Germany.  
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SECTION E: Requirement to Reduce Remuneration When Situation of Company 
Deteriorates 
 
 Despite having a similar function, this provision is not a claw-back provision for 
remuneration earned from the fraudulent misrepresentation of earnings. It relates instead to the 
state of the company as measured through various indicators. In the past if there was substantial 
decline in the corporation's state the Supervisory Board was required to reduce the Management 
Board's pay if continuing at existing levels was grossly unfair to the corporation. The company’s 
economic difficulties did not justify a reduction if management acted in good faith under the 
business judgment rule. They now have an enhanced responsibility to reduce pay if the 
corporation is distressed. Continued payment at the existing level does not have to be grossly 
unfair nor does the reduction have to be based on a substantial decline in the company's situation. 
Indicators of a decline include reductions in employee wages, terminations or layoffs of 
the workforce, inability of the company to distribute profits and a crisis or insolvency. While the 
latter will always require reduction, there is no order of priority for the other criteria. Thus, if the 
company's market price is high but substantial lay-offs are required, the obligation could be 
triggered. This statutory provision is mandatory and amounts to a legal obligation for the 
Supervisory Board. It also supersedes the employment contract, but allows affected Management 
Board members to terminate the contract with notice.  
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SECTION F: Increased Liability for Approving Inappropriately High Remuneration 
 
While sections 116 AktG and 93 AktG already make the Supervisory Board liable for 
breach of obligations, including inappropriately high pay, section 116 AtkG now includes 
explicit liability for inappropriate pay, which is emphasized as a most important duty.  Members 
who breach the duty to pay appropriately are personally liable. Section 93 AktG increases the 
effects of this liability on Supervisory Board directors by mandating a deductible of at least 10% 
on directors’ liability insurance, creating a stronger incentive to comply.  According to the 
amended version of section 107(3) 3 AktG the Board can no longer delegate new employment 
agreements to a committee including decisions on the structure and size of the remuneration. The 
entire plenum of the Supervisory Board has an obligation to determine and continually adjust the 
Management Board’s compensation.  
 
 
SECTION G: Cooling-off period for executives to serve on Supervisory Board 
  
Section 100(2) 1 (4) AktG creates a restriction on the ability of former Management 
Board members to sit on the Supervisory Board. The amended provision imposes a two-year 
cooling-off period for Management Board members seeking a position on the company’s 
Supervisory Board after serving their term. 
 
 
SECTION H: Enhanced disclosure requirements 
 
Supervisory Board members are now required to disclose in greater detail, an executive 
directors’ compensation scheme. The must explain how the compensation structure creates 
incentives for sustainable firm performance and how they have complied with appropriateness 
requirements. Moreover, if the compensation exceeds customary levels, the Supervisory Board is 
required to explain and justify why this is required. 
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SECTION I: Analysis 
 
1. Does the provision represent a new behavioral norm for directors requiring additional due 
diligence, a consideration of new circumstances or the following of new procedures when 
setting or approving compensation? 
 
 The legislation in its entirety represents new behavioral norms for directors as well as the 
enhancement of existing norms of conduct. While the Supervisory Board was previously 
required under section 87(1) to set the appropriate level of remuneration based on the duties and 
performance of the Management Board member, the provision was overbroad. Subsection 87(1) 
was originally meant to be interpreted in a stakeholder-based context, but provided no guidance 
as to what constitutes an appropriate value on executive labor or how to reconcile the state of the 
company with shareholder interests. 479 While shareholder interests are meant to be aligned with 
those of the corporation, there was previously no distinction between short and long-term. Courts 
in Germany arguably interpret these provisions in the context of fairer wealth distribution 
between stakeholders and the absence of a shareholder value norm. 480 The lack of a clear 
distinction between rewarding short-term or long-term profit proved to be particularly 
problematic in Mannesmann where the defendant’s argued for an interpretation based on 
shareholder primacy to justify the payments made. 481  
The standard established by the German Federal Court (BHG) in Mannesmann 482 and the 
amendment to 87(1) of the AktG clarifies the standard by which directors must measure 
performance and the correct context for interpreting the appropriateness of pay. By specifying 
                                                 
479  See Economist, supra note 462. 
480  The German Federal Court (BHG) in the Mannesmann trial interpreted section 87(1) par. 1 of the AktG in line with the 
values of Germany’s stakeholder model in that the remuneration of an executive’s contribution to the firm was supposed to be fair 
in comparison to how a worker’s contribution is valued and appropriate in relation to how executives contribute to the firm’s 
ongoing success.  This implies that the firm’s long-term success must be put before short-term gains.  See Bauer, supra note 370 
(noting that it was clarified by the BHG that incentives arising from executive compensation should always benefit the company 
and should never damage the company in the long-run.  The court indicated that a breach of fiduciary occurs when appreciation 
awards fail to benefit the company. “In the Mannesmann ruling the BGH held generally that the Supervisory Board must always 
act in the interests of the company.  It is obliged to preserve acquired benefits and avert damage to the company.  This obligation 
also affects the approval of appreciation awards to management board members “),(“with regards to the criminal responsibility of 
the accused supervisory board members, the BHG held that the approval of appreciation awards that do not benefit the company 
also constitutes a criminal breach of fiduciary duties”.)   
481  See Economist, supra note 462. 
482  Bauer, supra note 436 (Noting that the BHG concluded that appreciation awards of the type granted are only 
admissible if the company first and foremost receives a benefit in return). 
134 
 
that “the remuneration structure for listed stock corporations shall be geared towards a 
sustainable development of the company” 483 the provisions instruct the Supervisory Board to 
correlate executive compensation with long-term development. 
This also equates the best interests of the corporation to its long-term interests and the 
standard set is that Management Board compensation cannot be so excessive as to promote 
unsustainable management practices. 484 This limits the extent to which directors can equate the 
state of the company with its short-term share value when setting executive pay, representing a 
narrowing of the business judgment rule in this area. 
2. Is it mandatory or enabling? Does it impose extra-economic or efficiency based norms of 
conduct?  Does it require directors to account for how executive pay impacts the 
corporate entity or to engage predominantly in arm’s length bargaining? 
 
 Several aspects of this legislation are mandatory legal norms of behavior that are extra-
economic or non-market-based and require directors to account for the substantive effects of 
executive pay on the corporate entity as opposed to engaging in arm’s length bargaining on 
behalf of shareholders. The entire Supervisory Board is now responsible for ensuring an 
appropriate size and structure of executive compensation. It clarifies and expands their fiduciary 
duties. They face liability for 1) the size of pay being inappropriate, 2) for not reducing pay if the 
situation of the company deteriorates and 3) for not reducing pay in the case of extraordinary 
developments in the company’s share price.  
 In situations where directors are obligated to reduce pay or to approve appropriate levels 
in the first place, liability is triggered when the size of pay amounts to a mismanagement of the 
corporation’s assets. In this case, directors are personally liable to repay the compensation and 
are limited by statute from seeking a low deductible for D & O insurance. The enhanced duties 
of directors are extra-economic in nature and are premised on principles of loyalty towards the 
entity and proper stewardship of its assets. These duties are not discharged and do not fall outside 
the scope of scrutiny if performance is high in relation to compensation.   
                                                 
483  Ek, supra note 477. 
484  Given the background of the financial crisis and the criticism of traditional payment systems for top managers, the 
German legislative body tried to introduce a tool that would guide directors’ and officers’ remuneration and introduce a 
compensation structure that promotes long-term company development. 
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 While the term “shall” implies that directors are obligated to create long-term incentives 
geared towards sustainable firm development, liability in the case of failed risk or improper 
short-term incentives would be difficult to establish, especially where significant time has 
elapsed and the cause of a negative future development is uncertain. While the structure of a 
company’s incentive plan might appear to be short-term oriented, liability cannot be incurred ex 
ante.   
 
Inappropriate incentives must be attributed to future loss or damage to the company.  As 
discussed, the provision sets out various criteria for directors to consider when determining the 
appropriateness of pay. Directors are not liable for failing to consider each and every criterion 
individually or for improperly weighing one against the other. This range of discretion remains 
protected under the business judgment rule. However, directors are expected to act reasonably in 
the circumstances.  
 
 
3. Is the effect of the provision such that it results in the interests of other stakeholders being 
taken into account by directors when setting executive pay and does it result in directors 
prioritizing the corporation over immediate shareholder returns? 
 
The provision relates the appropriateness of executive compensation to the tasks, duties and 
responsibilities performed by the Management Board.  As a result, it imposes a limit onto how 
high an executive’s labor can ultimately be valued.  Although, the wording is not explicit as to 
what an appropriate limit might be on the remuneration of a particular managerial task, the fact 
that the law equates the value of an executive’s labor with the complexity of the task performed 
485 implies that the market is not the ultimate determinant of how executive labor is valued.    
 
                                                 
485 Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, “Germany Introduces New Rules on Management Board Compensation” 
Freshfields Briefing (August 2009), Online: Freshfields, 
<http://m.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Knowledge/Germany%20introduces%20new%20rules_26499.pdf>. 
See also Ek, supra note 477. 
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By denoting that executive pay must be appropriate “in relation to the tasks performed” or 
“in adequate proportion to the duties and responsibilities and [to] the performance of the 
management board member” this provision acknowledges that the value of a particular task or 
contribution has a maximum limit, beyond which it can no longer be justified by increases in the 
company’s share price. From a viewpoint of substantive fairness, an executive’s pay structure 
under these circumstances is a fairer reflection of their actual contributions to the firm and not 
merely a reflection of what shareholders are willing to pay for sharp increases in short-term 
performance. 486               
Section 87(1) 1 states that Supervisory Board directors have the duty to ensure that 
executive pay “does not exceed the customary remuneration without particular reasons.” 487  The 
term “customary remuneration” in this case refers to the level accepted throughout the industry 
for similar tasks, duties and responsibilities. 488  Although not quantified, the existence of such a 
level implies that the maximum amount of executive pay is restricted to what the corporate 
culture deems as being acceptable which is relative to worker pay and the distribution of societal 
wealth either regionally or nationally. 489 
The criteria for assessing the appropriateness of executive compensation reflect the 
interests of labor, creditors and long-term shareholders. By relying on these criteria, directors are 
prompted to contemplate whether the size of executive compensation is such that it will 
undermine worker morale and the willingness of workers to make wage concessions during 
                                                 
486  See Ronald Dore, “Comment: Paper on Employees and Corporate Governance” (2000) 22 COMP LAB L & POL’Y J.159 
(argues that the debate over executive pay actually debates normative questions of social justice in respect to the equitable 
compensation of one’s contribution to the firm.) 
487  Ek, supra note 477.  
488  See Freshfields, supra note 486 (Noting that “according to the legislative material, one must look to the branch, size and 
country to determine what remuneration would be customary…furthermore, the salaries paid within the company must be 
considered…thus the supervisory board has to make sure that the remuneration of the management board members remains in 
proportion to the remuneration system within the company.”) See also Ek, supra note 477 (noting that “The appropriateness of the 
total remuneration of the individual management board members is therefore based on the member's duties, responsibilities, and 
performance, as well as on the situation of the company. Furthermore, the remuneration of the individual members must not exceed 
the remuneration customary in the industry or country without particular reasons…When fixing the management board 
compensation, the supervisory board must ensure that such compensation is on a level with that of companies of the same trade 
with comparable size and complexity, but it should also take into account the particular salary and wage structure within the 
company. In addition, the supervisory board must consider what salary is deemed "customary" within the statute's area of 
application.”) 
489  Ek, ibid.  
137 
 
economically difficult periods. Directors have an interest in considering these factors because 
they impact the corporation’s ability to operate sustainably. Labor unrest and dissatisfaction with 
wages and working conditions impact operations. German industrial firms are sensitive to this 
because employees are highly skilled, trained extensively by their companies at high cost, and 
possess firm specific skills.  
 Placing substantive limits on executive compensation through criteria other than share 
price limits the extent to which executive compensation can be linked to the capital market. 
Large bonuses that reward sharp increases in profitability become less feasible. 490 This is further 
reinforced by the Supervisory Board’s obligation to limit the size compensation in the case of 
extraordinary developments stemming from market events. The extent to which executives are 
incentivized to take measures that maximize profits at the expense of worker’s interests or 
without considering the firm’s future well-being is reduced.   
 
4. Is the effect of the provision such that directors utilize performance criteria other than 
share price to gauge whether executive compensation schemes are acceptable? 
  
The requirement that the total amount of remuneration to appropriately reflect the state or 
situation of the company sets out a different standard for measuring performance than what is 
used by Anglo-American directors.  Corporate directors in the U.S. have no explicit legal 
constraints on how they should correlate firm performance with executive pay and as a result 
rely on their business judgment to determine which pay incentives are in the best interests of the 
corporation.  This usually amounts to short-term performance criteria. 
 
By denoting that executive compensation must be kept in appropriate relation to the state 
or situation of the firm, this part of the provision limits the extent to which performance can be 
correlated to short-term profit or share value, further weakening the relationship between 
executive compensation and share price.  Section 87 (1) 1 in effect instructs directors to prioritize 
the state of the firm over the short-term interests of shareholders, ensuring a consistent outcome 
                                                 
490  See Freshfields, supra note 486 (Noting that the Supervisory Board, in setting variable executive remuneration shall 
include a cap on the maximum allowable remuneration to limit the possibility of extraordinary developments such as large increases 
in share price.  The objective of such a cap is to ensure that the Management does not profit from extraordinary developments such 
as takeovers, the sale of assets or the realization of hidden reserves.)  
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in the incentives created for management. 491  This restricts the Supervisory Board’s ability to 
implement excessive bonuses that incentivize executives to focus exclusively on profits, 
resulting in moderate compensation levels correlated to the well-being of the firm itself. 492  
 
 
CHAPTER TWELVE: 
Assessing the Current Approach to Compensation Reform 
 
Here we assess our initial questions asked about executive pay in 1.10 and whether the 
goals of compensation reform identified can be achieved from within the confines of optimal 
contracting and shareholder primacy or whether effective compensation reform entails a 
repudiation of certain aspects of these models and a greater focus on and use of stakeholder-
based norms through corporate law. The following two questions were asked: 
 
1. Should managerial power in the firm be predominantly defined as a lack of 
performance and does attempting to constrain managerial power through 
performance-based norms of conduct exacerbate its outwards effects? 
 
2. Can excessive risk-taking and short-term profit-seeking be effectively constrained 
by adjusting the structure of executive compensation to better align shareholder 
and manager interests without changing the existing level of directors’ discretion 
and exposure to capital market pressures? 
 
 
                                                 
491  See Bauer, supra note 436 (noting that “In the Mannesmann ruling the BHG held generally that the Supervisory Board 
must always act in the interests of the company.  It is obliged to preserve acquired benefits and avert damage to the company.  This 
obligation also affects the approval of appreciation awards to management board members.  The BHG stated that the level of 
management remuneration must be in proportion to a management board member’s responsibilities and the company’s performance 
subject to section 87 AktG.”) 
492
  See Max Phillip Rolshoven, “The Last Word? - The July 22, 2004 Acquittals in the Mannesmann Trial” (2004) 5(8) 
German Law Journal 939 (noting that the German Federal Court in Mannesmann reiterated that the issuance of executive pay must 
be correlated with the interests of the firm. Citing that in the Mannesmann trial “the [bonus] payments nevertheless were found [by 
the Court] to violate the German stock corporation law, because they did not, according the Court, lie in the firm's, i.e. 
Mannesmann's, interest.”)  
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I. Answer to Question 1 
 Conceptualizing the problem of managerial power in the firm strictly in terms of agency 
costs and then employing compensation incentives as a mechanism for controlling these costs is 
geared towards diverting a higher level of profit to the shareholder by incentivizing managers to 
create new efficiencies in the firm.   In fact, agency costs are synonymous in the literature with 
sub-standard share price performance, inadequate risk-taking and the use of directorial discretion 
to consider other interests which might benefit the firm in the long-run or represent a socially 
responsible use of the corporation’s resources. Constraining managerial power as defined in such 
narrow terms benefits a particular set of constituents in the firm, the executive and the short-term 
shareholder by raising the corporation’s market value. What is not so obvious from the confines 
of the optimal contracting paradigm is that if taken too far, it can do so at the expense of other 
constituents, including shareholders’ own long-term interests.  
 Compensation incentives as opposed to being a comprehensive solution to the managerial 
power problem geared towards producing an outcome which benefits and enhances the 
corporation, instead shifts how the costs and benefits of managerial power are distributed and 
harnesses managerial power to a particular end.  Other aspects of managerial power remain 
unaddressed.  The propensity of managers to extract excessive rent from the corporation, 
interfere with and undermine the checks and balances designed to constrain their behaviour, 
harm the firm in order to favour the interests of a particular constituent, or oppress the interests 
of a particular group to benefit another fall outside of what the compensation incentive can 
achieve as a governance tool.       
 Before the paradigm shift in the executive pay debate, circa 1990, rent extraction was 
clearly a problem, but the extent to which managers could do this and the lengths they would go 
through were a lot less because the sums of money on the table were significantly smaller. With 
the introduction of the optimal contracting approach and high-powered compensation incentives, 
a whole new set of problems of a much larger magnitude are introduced into corporate 
governance.  Performance incentives are geared towards solving the issue of excessive pay but 
only in relation to performance by justifying high levels of pay as long as performance is 
improved. This approach fails to address the propensity of managers to extract rents from the 
140 
 
firm. In fact, high-powered compensation plans create new avenues for rent extraction of a 
greater magnitude then before thus creating a new set of problems with respect to managerial 
power in the firm.  Thus the governance by performance approach that characterizes the intended 
role of incentive compensation has the potential to magnify the problem of rent extraction and 
managerial misconduct in the public corporation. 
II. A Possible Solution 
 Looking at the German approach to compensation reform, rent extraction and the 
propensity of managers to impose the costs of short-term profit seeking onto groups outside the 
firm can be addressed by placing limits on compensation. The German reform achieves this by 
articulating a legal standard for the overall compensation amount. Compensation which is 
inappropriate triggers liability for the Board. This works in conjunction with an interpretation of 
the corporation’s best interests that rejects short-term gains in share price as an appropriate 
corporate goal. Thus, payment of large bonuses for high levels of share price appreciation, 
despite creating shareholder wealth, triggers liability unless the corporation itself benefits in the 
long-run.  
 Such an approach is suitable in the German context because long-term oriented 
shareholders or patient capital are prevalent. Capital markets are less developed than in the US 
and market pressures on management are less intense. This equilibrium is an outcome of political 
choices made by a multitude of political and economic actors.  
The latest of these is Germany’s repudiation of the European Takeover Directive, partially 
insulating German corporations from short-term value creating corporate takeovers. The 
remaining challenge in the US is the myopia generated by capital markets amongst investors 
which militates against long-term investment horizons, even amongst pension funds traditionally 
thought to pursue long-term strategies for the benefit of the labour constituency they supposedly 
represent.  
 However, with the articulation of a clear standard for inappropriately high executive 
compensation and enhanced mechanisms to pursue such claims, long-term oriented shareholders 
in the US might be inclined to keep managerial power in check. Legally limiting executive 
compensation in conjunction with a longer-term articulation of corporate purpose could begin to 
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address the extreme short-termism which led to the crisis. In practice, this could mean that 
current market value would be insufficient to justify large payments to executives. Alternative 
indicators of long-term performance might be necessary as a basis for calculating compensation. 
III. Answer to Question 2 
 Constraining risk in the firm requires shareholders to make concessions in immediate 
performance meaning that they must give up higher short-term returns for the sake of sustainable 
long-term value.  This would mean that some strategies and behaviours which typically benefited 
some investors, those seeking high short-term returns on the market, are now off limits.  Yet it is 
unclear how an incentive contract, the premise of which is based on providing managers with 
incentives to raise share price, can now be modified not only to raise share price but place 
constraints on how high share price can be raised in the short-term. This would entail placing 
limits on the size of compensation that executives could draw from the firm in a given period. 
 This approach is not popular in the LME context because placing limits on the size of pay 
could dilute managerial incentives for performance. This was the problem identified by the 
Jensen and Murphy literature in the first place. Moreover, how would shareholders know 
whether a company’s current market value reflects an adjustment for excessive risk and 
unsustainable returns?  The typical assumption under the optimal contracting approach is that the 
higher the share price the better the incentive contract is working to reduce agency costs.  With 
the onset of the excessive risk problem, higher share price can now represent excessive risk-
taking that is undertaken to drive-up the firm’s short-term market value having drastic 
repercussions in the long-run.   
 Short of having detailed inside knowledge of management’s strategy, shareholders just 
can’t know from share price alone whether compensation incentives are creating the right levels 
of risk-taking and performance and not too much performance. What is now required of 
executive compensation in the post-crisis period poses a challenge to the efficient markets 
hypothesis on which the efficacy of this approach is based.  Even if shareholders could discern 
between share price that was sustainable or too good to be true, their interests are not by any 
means homogenous.  There are short-term investors that stand to benefit extensively from an ex 
ante bonding device that aligns their interests in extracting short-term wealth from the firm with 
those of managers who seek to do the same.   
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 The trade-off between short-term versus long-term time horizons that exists in large 
organizations creates a dynamic that separates the interests of the entity itself as an ongoing 
concern and the prerogative of a few of its constituents to derive benefits at the entity’s expense.  
Some shareholders in fact might be comfortable with excessive levels of risk that pose a threat to 
the firm’s long-term viability because their investment horizons are very short-term, their risk is 
highly diversified, or the potential pay-off is large enough to compensate for their prospects of 
failed risk.  Improving mechanisms that better align managerial behaviour with the demands of 
shareholders trading on the capital market seems counter-intuitive to constraining short-termism 
and excessive risk. Certain shareholders through their market power could support 
compensations incentives that enable them to extract short-term gains at the corporate entity’s 
expense. 
 The assumption that most shareholders seek long-term sustainable returns in the context 
of a global market economy dominated by finance and will discipline managers for creating 
short-term returns that are in effect too high due to excessive risk-taking and unsustainable 
strategies, is at best unsubstantiated.  Corporate law scholarship has raised the argument that 
shareholders in the widely held public corporation suffer from a collective action problem and 
lack an incentive to discipline managers.  Why then would any shareholder discipline a Board if 
short-term returns begin to climb to high but potentially unsustainable levels when they can 
simply exit the investment?  By giving shareholders a voice without any objective standard for 
constraining risk and curbing short-termism they run the risk of approving compensation plans 
that further contribute to the pursuit of short-term profits. As long as share price remains as the 
predominant signal that managerial power is being adequately constrained in the firm, 
shareholders could rubber stamp compensation schemes that encourage excessive risk.   
 The term optimal contract is re-evaluated in the post crisis law and economics literature 
to be synonymous with performance which has been adjusted for risk and short-termism, taking 
for granted that such new norms might in fact call on directors to approach corporate governance 
not as the agents of shareholders but as the agents of the corporation.  However, the role of 
directors in this post-crisis literature is rather limited to ensuring that this ex-ante bonding device 
between executives and shareholders is properly negotiated and competently devised. Taking 
into consideration systemic risk, requires that directors look at a wide range of interests and 
exercise a higher level of discretion in how these interests are balanced in order to serve the best 
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interests if the firm over the long-run.  This in fact is what post-crisis regulatory responses to 
executive pay entail and the responses in some jurisdictions call forth a need to account for how 
corporate power impacts taxpayers and other corporate constituents. Yet the optimal contracting 
approach and shareholder primacy more generally views managerial discretion and the 
consideration of non-shareholder interests as a source of agency costs and as a principle reason 
for why compensation incentives are not high powered enough to create the requisite level of 
share value. 
IV.  A Possible Solution 
 It is clear that the German approach requires directors, on penalty of increased liability, to 
place the interests of the corporate entity ahead of shareholder profits. This is achieved through 
several tools, namely a limit on the size of compensation and an articulation of legitimate 
corporate purpose based on the corporation’s interests as an ongoing concern. Thus, directors 
could be held liable for and required to pay back inappropriately high pay which rewards even 
the highest gains in short-term share price if they fail to benefit the corporation.   
 While incentive compensation is still permitted to make up a large portion of the overall 
arrangement, a notable feature of the legislation is the requirement for directors to limit pay 
when extraordinary developments occur. Thus if market fluctuations or an exogenous event, such 
as a takeover, drives up current value, directors cannot permit the executive to benefit from the 
full extent of the short-term gain in value. This reduces any incentive to manipulate earnings or 
to place short-term earnings ahead of long-term value. This approach demonstrates that 
controlling the size of pay is essential to producing a sustainable management orientation. 
 Another key feature is the requirement to create long-term incentives. This entails using 
restricted stock options which cannot be exercised until a set period has elapsed after the 
executive's term on the Management Board is complete. This means that executives could wait 
several years from the date of vesting to exercise their options. This ensures the executive is held 
responsible for long-term negative developments that arise from short-sighted decisions made 
during their term. Several US scholars have proposed this as a viable option in the US context. 
However, it has yet to be adopted there. A key difference between US and German approaches is 
that the German corporate statute mandates such long-term incentives. The proposed US 
approach on the other hand relies on the directors to voluntary adopt such incentive contracts. 
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This again is premised on the belief that current market forces will militate towards such an 
outcome. 
 Finally, the German approach implements several non-financial criteria for assessing firm 
performance. These criteria guide directors in assessing the appropriateness of pay and in 
determining when to reduce pay in response to the situation of the company changing. When 
assessing appropriateness, directors must look at the Management Board compensation in 
relation to front-line worker pay, amongst other things. When assessing the situation of the 
company with a view to exercising the requirement to reduce pay, directors must take into 
account the company's ability to maintain current employment levels. 
 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: 
Conclusion 
 The goal of this work from the outset was to relocate the executive pay issue outside the 
confines of agency theory and explore the broader dimensions of this debate from the standpoint 
of corporate legal history and political economy. While the debate within agency theory over 
how to define and approach the problems associated with excessive compensation and poorly 
functioning incentives occupied the dominant discourse leading up to the crisis, the extreme 
short-termism and excessive risk-taking which contributed to the collapse of Wall Street firms 
has challenged the efficacy of the market-based governance model at a global level.  
 At the national and supra-national level, the need to bring firm management in line with 
sustainable, long-term governance practices has been at the center of post-crisis governance 
reform. As examined, post crisis responses to compensation reform and the underlying goals 
identified represent a shift in governance thinking of a magnitude which entails placing limits on 
risk-taking and the profit motive in large public companies.    
 The approach taken in LME countries, namely the US, in many ways fails to recognize 
the significance of this shift in thinking and what it entails for governance moving forward from 
the crisis. The ongoing debate over compensation reform in the US is framed from an agency 
theory perspective which accepts shareholder primacy's efficacy and unproblematic continued 
existence. This entails the same intensity of reliance on capital markets and performance-based 
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governance norms as before. Proponents of this model continue to argue that global responses to 
the compensation problem are rooted firmly within this paradigm, intimating that convergence of 
corporate governance to a liberal market based model persists. However, we examined several 
indicators that the crisis has called into question various aspects of this approach. 
 Yet the failure of agency theory and the optimal contacting model to deliver as promised 
and the subsequent criticisms of this governance orthodoxy, does not address what sustainable 
governance entails and whether shareholder primacy is equipped to accommodate a shift to long-
term sustainable governance. To explore the former, a review of how corporate law has evolved 
since the Great Depression, and the executive pay issue within it, was a necessary undertaking, 
as was a comparative approach. Such an enquiry demonstrated the complexity of such a question 
and how a longstanding debate over the issue has evolved over time. Comparative political 
economy assisted us with understanding what precipitated this shift from a legally grounded 
organizational model of the corporation to a market-based model which has reduced this debate 
to a choice between constraining director's discretion and increasing market forces on the Board 
on the one hand and essentially leaving them as they stand and introducing better compensation 
practices on the other. 
 While the former model has been vociferously challenged by director primacy theorists 
and for many reasons appears to be unsuitable for effecting long-term, sustainable governance, it 
has also been rejected, albeit implicitly, in the context of post-crisis compensation reform. This 
leaves director primacy and the premise that existing market forces lead to optimal governance 
arrangements as the remaining model on which reform is to be based.   
 Yet, restructuring compensation incentives to better align shareholder and manager 
interests is unsatisfactory at best.  After assessing what increasing shareholder power would 
result in, we asked the question what existing directorial discretion and capital market forces 
have led us to. Relying on alternative explanations to how markets and their supporting political 
and legal frameworks impact management orientation, namely the politics of finance approach, 
but also the critiques advanced by progressive scholars, demonstrates the dichotomous effects of 
such an approach on societal welfare. Thus, if capital markets coupled with existing directorial 
discretion have led us to unsustainable short-term management orientations, how can we base 
our approach to compensation reform on such a framework? 
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 Agency theory and shareholder primacy paradigm served a necessary function in 
addressing the problem of managerial slack and stagnation in large public corporations in the 
1980s during the transition from a corporatist political-economic model to a liberal market model 
dominated by finance. To a certain extent, this transition was inevitable. However, empirical 
evidence demonstrates the costs of such a regime on societal welfare.  
 However, the more provocative claim is that such a regime is unsustainable and prone to 
implosion, as the latest financial crisis has demonstrated. The debate over executive 
compensation and the global reform agenda identified after the crisis demonstrates that this 
model has gone too far. Understanding what the organizational model of the firm and corporate 
law originally sought to achieve, helped us to uncover how these functions have been 
undermined by the current approach's focus on improving efficiency, risk-taking and the pursuit 
of profits. In many ways, the essential functions served by corporate law conflict with the 
market-based governance approach. Yet, the question raised is whether the benefits of this 
approach to solving one aspect of managerial power will be undermined by constraining risk-
taking and the profit motive. Couched in the language of agency costs, the current orthodoxy 
stands firm on the belief that any deviation from the shareholder value norm and the 
consideration of outside interests is detrimental to effective governance.  
 Yet, recent work in the area of comparative political economy demonstrates that while 
market forces strongly influence management orientation, they can be resisted by Boards of 
Directors in favour of a longer-term, stakeholder inclusive approach referred to as the 'high road' 
to economic production. How then to reform executive pay in the LME in a manner consistent 
with such an approach? The German response to compensation reform shows not only a 
repudiation of the market-based approach, in favour of a legal one, dispelling the claim that 
convergence of corporate governance persists in the post-crisis context, but that the corporate 
entity must be placed ahead of shareholder wealth maximization.  In many ways the German 
response has crystallized into a rejection of shareholder value and market based criteria.  
 The main attribute of such an approach has been a constraining of the business judgement 
rule, but not in favour of increased shareholder power. Instead the German approach imposes 
stakeholder-based norms of conduct which are tied to the long-term success of the corporation 
not only as a vehicle for profit but as a vehicle for improving constituent welfare. This highlights 
147 
 
the need to carefully re-assess the balance between profit maximization and the need to constrain   
risk and consider the interests of other groups tied up with the firm's success. 
 This raises a much broader question, for a business corporation to be sustainable in the 
first place, can its purpose be defined as solely to make a profit for its shareholders or is its 
inherent nature such that it must take other interests into account more readily than the current 
approach permits? While this work has begun to answer this question, much more needs to done. 
However we choose to undertake this, comparative political economy and an appreciation of 
corporate legal history are essential to subsequent studies of the topic, as confining ourselves to 
the boundaries of agency theory has been ineffective so far. 
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